Military justice, human rights and the law: an appraisalof the right to a fair trial in Uganda’s military justice system by Naluwairo, Ronald
 
 
 
Naluwairo, Ronald (2011) Military justice, human rights and the law: an appraisalof the right 
to a fair trial in Uganda’s military justice system. Mphil Thesis. SOAS, University of London 
http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/18467 
Copyright © and Moral Rights for this thesis are retained by the author and/or other 
copyright owners.  
A copy can be downloaded for personal non‐commercial research or study, without prior 
permission or charge.  
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the copyright holder/s.  
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. 
When referring to this thesis, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding 
institution and date of the thesis must be given e.g. AUTHOR (year of submission) "Full 
thesis title", name of the School or Department, PhD Thesis, pagination. 
1 
 
 
Military Justice, Human Rights and the Law: 
An Appraisal of the Right to a Fair Trial in Uganda’s Military Justice System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
Ronald Naluwairo 
LLM (Cantab); LLB Hons (Makerere); Dip L.P (LDC); Advocate (Uganda) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
(Laws), Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, School of Oriental and African Studies, 
University of London. 
 
November 2011 
 
 
2 
 
DECLARATION 
 
I hereby declare that this thesis entitled ―Military Justice, Human Rights and the Law: An 
Appraisal of the Right to a Fair Trial in Uganda‘s Military Justice System‖ is my work and 
has not been submitted for any degree or examination in any university or academic 
institution. All sources and materials used are duly acknowledged and properly referenced. 
 
 
Ronald Naluwairo 
 
 
............................. 
November 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
ABSTRACT 
Any system or tribunal that exercises judicial power in a democratic society must comply 
with certain minimum standards for the administration of justice. In international human 
rights law, these standards are embedded in the right to a fair trial which undoubtedly is the 
most important prerequisite for ensuring justice in the adjudication of cases. This thesis 
examines the extent to which Uganda‘s military justice system complies with the right to a 
fair trial. It questions the competence, independence and impartiality of Uganda‘s military 
tribunals and generally casts strong doubt on the country‘s current military justice system to 
administer fair justice according to the minimum international human rights standards. It is 
argued that despite attempts at reform, Uganda‘s military justice system is still largely stuck 
in its historical origins and falls far too short of complying with the country‘s international 
human rights obligations concerning the right to a fair trial.  
The thesis points out areas that require reform and provides recommendations which can help 
to make Uganda‘s military justice system compliant with the country‘s international human 
rights obligations concerning the right to a fair trial, in particular the right to a fair and public 
hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal. Ensuring that the administration 
of military justice complies with the right to a fair trial is not only an international obligation 
which Uganda is obliged to fulfill, but could also help it to achieve effective and sustained 
military discipline – which is the main reason advanced for the existence of military justice as 
a separate system of administration of justice. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
“Justice ought to bear rule everywhere, and especially in armies; it is the only means to 
settle order there, and there it ought to be executed with as much exactness as in the 
best governed cities of the kingdom, if it be intended that the soldiers should be kept in 
their duty and obedience.” 
      Louis De Gaya (1678), The Art of War.
1
 
The importance that Uganda‘s military justice system plays in the overall administration of 
justice in Uganda cannot be over-emphasised. Specifically, military tribunals/military courts 
(terms that will hereafter be used interchangeably) as the major mechanism for the 
administration of military justice, play a very vital, unique but highly controversial role in the 
administration of criminal justice with regard to persons subject to the country‘s military 
law.
2
 Although originally designed to try serving members of the armed forces for the 
commission of military offences,
3
 the jurisdiction of Uganda‘s military justice system (as is 
                                                          
1
 Quoted in Lindley JM (1990), A Soldier is also a Citizen: The Controversy over Military Justice, 1917-1920, 
Garland Publishing Inc, New York & London, p.37. Quoted also in Fidell ER and Sullivan DH (Eds) (2003), 
Evolving Military Justice, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, pp.27-28. 
2
 Military law is a code which regulates the conduct of members of the armed forces, and which ordinarily is not 
supposed but in some jurisdictions like Uganda applies to civilians in certain circumstances. The major 
objective of military law is to ensure discipline and good order in the armed forces. See Dambazau AB (1991), 
Military Law Terminologies, Spectrum Books Limited, Ibadan, p.75. It is always important to distinguish 
military law from martial law. Martial law generally refers to the exceptional measures adopted whether by the 
military or the civil authorities in time of war or domestic disturbance for the purpose of preservation of order 
and maintenance of public authority. Unlike military law whose application is limited (i.e. to mainly members of 
the armed forces), martial law once established, applies to all persons i.e. soldiers and civilians alike. See 
O‘Sullivan R (1921), Military Law and the Supremacy of the Civil Courts, Stevens and Sons Ltd, London, p.47. 
See also Clode CM (1981), The Administration of Justice under Military and Martial Law, University 
Microfilms International, London, p.157. Martial law normally involves the suspension of ordinary law and 
derogation from the guaranteed human rights and fundamental freedoms. According to Dicey, martial law ―...is 
nothing more nor less than a name for the common law right of the Crown and its servants to repel force by 
force in case of invasion, insurrection, riot, or generally of any violent resistance to the law.‖ See Dicey AV 
(1908), Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 7
th
 Edition, MacMillan, London, p.284.  
3
 Military offences are generally those crimes which are unique to the military in the interest of maintaining 
discipline and good order, which are subject to military court trials when committed by persons subject to 
military law. See Dambazau (1991), supra note 2, p.76. 
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the case with many other countries), has expanded significantly over the years.
4
 As the 
analysis in Chapter Four will show, Uganda‘s military justice system now has jurisdiction 
over both military personnel and civilians. 
 
Although in the latter case the jurisdiction is limited, it is worryingly likely to increase. For 
instance, in June 2010, while delivering his annual State of the Nation Address, President 
Museveni is reported to have asked Parliament to consider giving jurisdiction to military 
courts to hear matters involving corruption (whether by military personnel or civilians).
5
 
Government has also previously indicated the possibility of changing the law to extend the 
jurisdiction of military courts to hear cases involving persons suspected of involvement in the 
abominable practice of child sacrifice.
6
 The major reason always advanced for the need to 
expand the jurisdiction of military courts over civilians and over matters that ordinarily fall 
within the jurisdiction of ordinary courts is that the civil courts take long to dispose of cases. 
For instance, when he asked the Parliament to extend the jurisdiction of military courts to 
hear corruption cases, President Museveni is quoted to have remarked that ―…there are 
loopholes in the trial of corrupt officials in the civilian courts as they waste a lot of time 
seeking evidence.‖7 This thesis in Section 1.1 however establishes that, in many cases, 
Uganda‘s military courts also take long to dispose of cases. The reason of civilian courts 
taking long to dispose of cases is therefore not a sound justification for expanding the 
jurisdiction of military courts.     
 
Uganda‘s military justice system now also embraces a number of crimes; many of which 
have no bearing on military discipline and, in ordinary cases, would fall under the jurisdiction 
of civilian courts. Examples of such crimes include assault, rape, defilement, larceny, 
burglary and traffic offences. According to the Uganda Peoples‘ Defence Forces (UPDF) Act 
2005 which is the major legal framework governing the administration of military justice in 
Uganda, a person subject to military law, who does or omits to do an act which constitutes an 
                                                          
4
 As a separate system of administration of justice, a military justice system includes mechanisms for 
enforcement of military law and decision making processes with regard to the arrest of suspects, investigations, 
charging, trial, sentencing and imprisonment. 
5
 See Osike J and Among B, Corrupt Officials May Face Military Court, The New Vision, 2 June 2010. 
6
 See Maseruka J, Police Issues Measures to Fight Child Sacrifice, The New Vision, 5 January 2009. 
7
 Supra note 5. 
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offence under the Penal Code Act or any other enactment, commits a service offence and is 
therefore liable to trial by a military court.
8
 Unfortunately, despite the role that military 
justice plays in the overall administration of justice in Uganda, the issue of how the country‘s 
military tribunals (as the major mechanism for administering military justice) administer 
justice remains an area that hardly receives any scholarly attention and inquiry. In particular, 
there is hardly any study that has comprehensively assessed the conformity of Uganda‘s 
military justice system with the right to a fair trial. This is despite the fact that, as this thesis 
argues, the right to a fair trial is the foundation of any criminal justice system worth its name 
in any democratic society. 
 
For the important role that the right to a fair trial plays in ensuring justice, securing the 
protection of other human rights and fundamental freedoms, and safeguarding the rule of law, 
it is recognized and protected by several regional and international human rights instruments 
to which Uganda is party. Key among these instruments is the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
9
 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples‘ Rights 
(herein after referred to as the African Charter).
10
 Regarding the former, the United Nations 
(UN) Human Rights Committee (HRC) – the UN body charged with the interpretation and 
enforcement of the ICCPR, has emphasised that the right to a fair trial as provided for in 
Article 14 applies to military tribunals in full just as it does to the civilian and other 
specialized tribunals.
11
 In no uncertain terms, the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples‘ Rights (ACHPR) has also forcefully stressed that ―...military tribunals must be 
subject to the same requirements of fairness, openness, and justice, independence and due 
                                                          
8
 See Section 179. 
9
 The ICCPR was adopted 16 December 1966 at New York, entered into force on 23 March 1976, G.A. Res. 
2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.16) 52, U.N.Doc. A/6316 (1967). Uganda acceded to the ICCPR on 
21 June 1995. See http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=322&chapter=4&lang=en 
[Accessed on 1 April 2011]. 
10
The African Charter was adopted 27 June 1981 at Nairobi, entered into force on 21 October 1986. Uganda 
ratified the African Charter on 10 May 1986. See http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ratz1afchr.htm 
[Accessed on 1 April 2011]. 
11
 See HRC General Comment No.32 (Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair 
Trial), adopted at the Ninetieth Session of the Human Rights Committee, 23 August, 2007, CCPR/C/GC/32, 
para.22. 
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process as any other process.‖12 It is thus clear that in the administration of military justice, 
military tribunals are not an exception when it comes to the requirement to protect and 
respect the right to a fair trial. 
 
This thesis canvases the major issues concerning the compliance of Uganda‘s military justice 
system with the right to a fair trial, in particular the right to a fair and public hearing by a 
competent, independent and impartial tribunal. It questions the competence of Uganda‘s 
military tribunals and casts strong doubt on their current set up to administer fair justice 
according to the minimum international human rights standards embedded in the right to a 
fair trial. By way of setting the stage for the analysis that follows, the important preliminary 
questions that must be addressed at this point are: What is military justice? Is military justice, 
justice at all? What are the justifications for having military justice as a separate system of 
administration of justice? To what extent are these justifications valid in Uganda‘s context? 
Do military personnel waive their human rights including the right to a fair trial by the mere 
fact of becoming soldiers? Section 1.1 below analytically tries to provide answers to these 
questions among other issues. 
 
1.1. The Concept of Military Justice 
The essence of military justice has been highlighted in a number of scholarly writings
13
 and 
in the case law of numerous jurisdictions. The concept of military justice largely revolves 
around the justifications for military justice as a separate system of administration of justice
14
 
                                                          
12
 Civil Liberties Organisation, Legal Defence Centre, Legal Defence and Assistance Project v. Nigeria, African 
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Comm. No. 218/98 (1998), para.44. 
13
 See for instance, Gibson MR (2008), ―International Human Rights Law and the Administration of Justice 
through Military Tribunals: Preserving Utility While Precluding Impunity,‖ Journal of International Law and 
International Relations, Vol. 4, No.1, pp.1-50, Rowe P (2006), The Impact of Human Rights Law on Armed 
Forces, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, and Fidell and Sullivan (2003), supra note 1. See also Lindley 
(1990), supra note 1, Bishop JW (1974), Justice under Fire: A Study of Military Law, Charterhouse, New York 
and Sherman EF (1973), ―Military Justice Without Military Control,‖ The Yale Law Journal, Vol.82, No.7, 
pp.1398-1425.   
14
 According to the UN Commission on Human Rights, military justice is not and should not be considered as a 
separate system of administration of justice but an integral part of the general justice system. See the UN Draft 
Principles Governing the Administration of Justice through Military Tribunals (herein after referred to as ―the 
14 
 
and the extent to which members of the armed forces are entitled to the respect and protection 
of their human rights and fundamental freedoms. As opposed to civilian justice, military 
justice is a system of administration of justice which applies to members of the armed forces 
and other persons subject to military law. It has the monopoly in dealing with military 
offences. 
 
As earlier pointed out, military offences are generally those crimes which are unique to the 
military whose major objective is to enforce discipline and good order in the army.
15
 They 
include such offences as disobedience, desertion, absence without leave, cowardice, mutiny, 
insubordination and conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline. It is said that some of 
these offences like insubordination are ―...as fatal to armies as gangrene is to human 
beings.‖16 A notable feature about many of these military offences is that they are cast in very 
broad and vague language which gives the military courts wide discretion when it comes to 
adjudicating cases involving suspected infraction of military law. Take for example the 
offence of ―conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline.‖17 In addition to encompassing 
all the other specific military offences, it can include many other undefined things which in 
the opinion of the military tribunal are prejudicial to good order and discipline. Although 
Section 178 (5) of the UPDF Act provides some of the instances that amount to conduct 
prejudicial to good order and discipline of the Defence Forces, Section 178 (6) states in no 
unclear terms that ―Nothing in subsection (5) shall affect the general effect of subsections (1) 
and (2).‖ It is submitted that the very broad and vague language in which many military 
offences are cast makes the administration of military justice susceptible to abuse and 
manipulation. The noncompliance of a military justice system with the right to a fair trial 
makes the problem even worse.  
 
Historically, as Sherman correctly observes, military justice developed as a separate legal 
system under command control because military units were often isolated from both civilians 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
UN Principles on Military Justice‖), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/58 (2006), paras.3, 10 and 11. See also UN 
Commission on Human Rights Resolutions 2004/32 and 2005/30. 
15
 Supra note 2. 
16
 See Lindley (1990), supra note 1. 
17
 Section 178 (1) of the UPDF Act, 2005 provides that ―Any act, conduct, disorder or neglect to the prejudice of 
good order and discipline of the Defence Forces shall be an offence.‖ 
15 
 
and each other.
18
 Commanders therefore needed the power to convene military courts staffed 
with their own officers so that a quick determination of guilt or innocence could be made.
19
 
However, despite the fact that modern transport and communication have ended the isolation 
of military units and that the trial of service men in civilian courts is feasible in most 
situations, military justice still remains as a separate system of administration of justice in 
many countries.
20
Advocates for military justice as a separate system of administration of 
justice advance a number of theoretical arguments in support of their viewpoint.
21
 
 
First, it is often argued that the military is a unique society apart from civilian life which 
requires different legal standards that the civilian courts cannot appreciate or adequately 
enforce. In Parker v. Levy,
22
 delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United 
States of America, Justice Rehnquist emphasised the specialised nature of the military society 
as thus: 
The Court has long recognized that the military is by necessity, a specialized 
society separate from civilian society. We have also recognized that the military 
has, again by necessity, developed traditions of its own during its long history… 
In re Grimley the Court observed: ―An Army is not a deliberative body. It is the 
executive arm. Its law is that of obedience…‖ More recently, we noted that ―the 
military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline 
from that of civilians…‖ Just as military society has been a society apart from 
                                                          
18
 Sherman (1973), supra note 13, p.1400. 
19
Ibid. For most part, military tribunals were not regarded as courts at all, but rather as instrumentalities of the 
executive power provided to aid Presidents as Commanders-in-Chief, through their authorized military 
representatives, in properly commanding the armed forces and enforcing military discipline. See Kent SB 
(1976), ―Structures of American Military Justice,‖ University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol.125, No.2, 
p.314.  
20
 Sherman (1973), supra note 13, p.1400. 
21
 It is worth pointing out from the onset that most of these theoretical arguments look at military justice in the 
context of members of the armed forces only. However, in today‘s world, a number of military justice systems 
including Uganda‘s military justice system have jurisdiction over civilians as well. The HRC has correctly 
observed that trial of civilians by military tribunals raises serious problems as regards the equitable, impartial 
and independent administration of justice. See HRC General Comment No.32 (2007), supra note 11. For a 
recent appraisal of the HRC‘s jurisprudence on the issue of trial of civilians by military courts, see Shah S 
(2008), ―The Human Rights Committee and Military Trials of Civilians: Madani v. Algeria,‖ Human Rights 
Law Review, Vol.8, No.1, pp.139-150. The issue of jurisdiction of military tribunals over civilians is analysed in 
detail in Chapter Two, Section 2.3.1. 
22
 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733(1974). 
16 
 
civilian society, so ―military law… is a jurisprudence which exists separate and 
apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial establishment.‖23 
 
Senator Nunn summarised the reasons why the military is considered as a unique specialised 
community which requires different rules and standards in the following words:  
The primary mission of the armed forces is to defend our interest by preparing for 
and, when necessary, waging war, using coercive and lethal force. Responsibility for 
the awesome machinery of war requires a degree of training, discipline and unit 
cohesion that has no parallel in civilian society. The armed forces must develop traits 
of character, patterns of behaviour, and standards of performance during peace time 
in order to ensure effective application and control of force in combat. Members of 
the armed forces are subject to disciplinary rules and military orders twenty-four 
hours a day, regardless of whether they are actually performing a military duty. 
Military service is a unique calling. It is more than a job. Our nation asks the men 
and women of the armed forces to make extra ordinary sacrifices to provide for the 
common defence. While civilians remain secure in their homes, with broad freedom 
to live where and with whom they choose, members of the armed force may be 
assigned, involuntarily, to any place in the world, often on short notice, often to 
places of grave danger, often in the most spartan and primitive conditions…Once 
military status is acquired, military service loses its voluntary character. Once an 
individual has changed his or her status from civilian to military, that person‘s duties, 
assignments, living conditions, privacy and grooming standards are all governed by 
military necessity, not personal choice.
24
 
 
While it is accepted that, indeed as elaborated by Senator Nunn, the military is a unique 
society, it is submitted that there is nothing in that uniqueness which warrants the denial or 
violation of the military personnel‘s internationally guaranteed right to a fair trial. Indeed 
because of the extra ordinary sacrifice that they make for the common good, members of the 
armed forces deserve to be treated in a just and fair manner in the process of administration 
of military justice. This can only be by guaranteeing their internationally protected right to a 
fair trial. 
 
 In support of the view that the military is a unique society which requires different rules and 
standards, it is also frequently argued that military offences such as absence without leave, 
desertion, insubordination, cowardice, mutiny and the like have no civilian analogues: the 
adjudication of guilt or innocence and the assessment of appropriate punishment may require 
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experience and knowledge not commonly possessed by civilian judges and jurors.
25
 
Delivering the judgement of the Supreme Court of the United States of America in United 
States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,
26
 Mr. Justice Black agreed thus: ―It is true that military 
personnel because of their training and experience may be especially competent to try 
soldiers for infractions of military rules. Such training is no doubt particularly important 
where an offence charged against a soldier is purely military, such as disobedience of an 
order, leaving post, etc.‖27 
 
To the extent that this argument extends only to trying members of the armed forces for 
offences of a military character, it may be valid. But in countries like Uganda where military 
tribunals also have jurisdiction over non-military (civilian) offences, the above justification 
becomes highly contentious. As the analysis in Chapter Four will establish, Uganda‘s military 
tribunals lack the necessary capacity and competence to deal with the legal intricacies and 
evidential technicalities that most civilian offences present.
28
 But even with military offences, 
it is still doubtable in Uganda‘s context that applying the same principles and standards of 
criminal justice, as should be the case, military personnel would be more competent than 
civilian judges in trying such cases. As Chapter Four will establish, Uganda‘s military justice 
legal framework does not guarantee the legal competence of Uganda‘s military tribunals and 
the short tenure of the members of these courts and the judge advocates does not allow 
gaining relevant experience. This is unlike the situation with civilian courts, where judges are 
legally qualified and, over time, develop the skills and experience to deal with peculiar cases 
in such highly specialised areas as surgery, human medicine, architecture and engineering. 
Applying the same principles and standards  of administration of criminal justice, and with 
the help of experts where need be, it is submitted that in Uganda‘s context, civilian courts 
would be more competent and better placed to deal with infractions of military law than the 
military tribunals.  
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It is also usually posited that military justice as a separate system of administration of justice 
is necessary because of the need for speedy trials to avert the erosion of discipline and the 
consequential negative effects on the operational effectiveness of the army.
29
 It is often 
argued in this respect that the machinery by which ordinary courts of law ascertain the guilt 
or innocence of an accused citizen is too slow and too intricate to be applied to an accused 
soldier. Lord Macaulay thus argued that ―…for, of all the maladies incident to the body 
politic, military insubordination is that which requires the most prompt and drastic 
measures…For the general safety, therefore, a summary jurisdiction of terrible extent must, 
in camps, be entrusted to rude tribunals composed of men of the sword.‖30 In the words of 
Mr. Justice Black, military justice must of necessity be ―...a rough form of justice, 
emphasizing summary procedures, speedy convictions and stern penalties...‖31 The 
Constitutional Court of South Africa has also stressed the need for a speedy disposal of cases 
as justification for the separation of the military justice system, emphasising that, ―The 
conditions in which the South Africa National Defence Forces (SANDF) must operate in 
times of war- and in which therefore must be trained in peace time - are such that quick and 
efficient investigation of infractions must be possible, as well as prompt decisions on 
institutions of prosecutions…‖32 
 
To the extent that military justice emphasises the need for quick investigations of infractions 
of the law and speedy trials, this is commendable. It is indeed in the interest of justice that 
suspects should be tried within the shortest time possible. For as it is often said, ―justice 
delayed is justice denied.‖ Thus, as part of the right to a fair trial, international human rights 
law guarantees and protects the right to be tried without undue delay.
33
 But how swift must 
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investigations be carried out and trials conducted in order not to compromise the very 
essence of justice? The general principle is that this depends on the circumstances of a 
particular case.
34
 There are however increasingly a number of instances in Uganda where 
even if taking the circumstances into account, the speed with which military courts dispose 
off cases raises serious questions about the administration of military justice. Perhaps the 
most shocking in recent times was the summary trial and public execution of Corporal 
Omedio and Private Abdbullah Muhamad. The two soldiers were publicly executed on 
March 25
th
 2002 after a trial of less than three hours before a Field Court Martial whose 
competence, independence and impartiality was highly doubtable.
35
 The court-martial found 
them guilty of triple murder. The investigation, trial and execution took place less than 72 
hours after the alleged crime was committed.
36
 As Onoria rightly argues, within such a very 
short time, it is highly doubtful that this was sufficient time to conduct a thorough 
investigation and trial where evidence against the accused soldiers needed to be gathered and 
weighed, as well as to enable the soldiers to prepare and present their defence.
37
 The accused 
persons had no legal representation and it is highly unlikely that they were even informed of 
their right to counsel and other fundamental human and constitutional rights in criminal 
processes. Moreover the fact that they were immediately executed means that the accused 
where never given opportunity to exercise their right of appeal. 
In Uganda‘s case, the justification for military justice as a separate system of justice on the 
basis of the need for speedy trials is also contestable because there are increasingly, a number 
of cases taking too long to investigate and dispose off than is reasonably necessary. One case 
will suffice to illustrate this point. In Attorney General v. Joseph Tumushabe,
38
 the accused 
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persons were arrested and detained in March 2003. They were never charged with any 
offence until 16
th
 April 2003 when they were charged in the General Court Martial with the 
offence of treason contrary to Section 25 of the Penal Code. This was only after an order of 
Habeas Corpus was issued by the High Court on 11
th
 April 2003, returnable on 17
th
 April 
2003. On 6
th
 November 2003, in an application seeking redress for violation of the detainees‘ 
fundamental human rights and freedoms, Justice Ntabgoba P.J, ordered that the detainees be 
allowed contact with their lawyers, relatives and friends. On 30
th
 April 2004, over 400 days 
after the detainees were charged before the General Court Martial and remanded in custody, 
their advocates wrote to the Chairman of the General Court Martial forwarding the detainees‘ 
bail application and requesting for an urgent hearing of the application in May. However, it 
was not until 2
nd
 July 2004 that the application was heard. On 22
nd
 July 2004, the General 
Court Martial delivered its ruling in which it dismissed the application, observing, inter alia, 
that bail is discretionary and not mandatory. The detainees appealed against this ruling to the 
Constitutional Court and finally the Supreme Court which rendered its decision on 9 July, 
2008 nullifying the ruling of the General Court Martial. The Supreme Court held that since 
the detainees were in custody for more than 120 days awaiting trial, under Article 23 (6) b of 
the Constitution,
39
 it was mandatory to release them on bail, irrespective of the provisions of 
the UPDF Act concerning bail. 
 
Other factors remaining constant, if a person is arrested and detained in March 2003 but by 
July 2004, investigations into their case are still ongoing and their trial is not about to start, 
does that amount to a speedy disposal of the case so as to justify military justice as a fast 
system of administration of justice? Would there be any justice done to the detained persons 
who have to wait this long? Clearly the answer to these questions is No. As earlier pointed 
out, the right to be tried without undue delay relates not only to the time by which a trial 
should commence, but also the time by which it should end and judgment rendered. Recent 
statistics from Uganda‘s General Court Martial also indicate that military justice is not 
efficient in terms of speedy handling of cases. Between 1992 and 2009, a total of 554 cases 
were registered in the General Court Martial, out of which 391 cases were disposed of, 
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leaving a backlog of 163 cases.
40
 This means that nearly 30% of the cases registered 
remained outstanding. Moreover as shown in the case of Attorney General v. Joseph 
Tumushabe above, some of these cases stretch to as far back as 2003. For a system whose 
existence is largely justified on the need to ensure speedy trials, these figures are 
disappointing. It is instructive to note that the backlog is largely attributed to delayed court 
sittings.
41
 In its ninth annual report for instance, the Uganda Human Rights Commission 
(UHRC) noted with concern, after visiting some military detention centres, that, some 
inmates had languished there for over three years without either being taken to court or their 
cases disposed of.
42
 The inmates complained to officials of the Commission that the General 
Court Martial and the Division Court Martial in which they were supposed to be tried, rarely 
convened, and when they do, they simply adjourn hearings.
43
 So, from this perspective, the 
need to ensure speedy trials as justification for having military justice as a separate system of 
administration of justice remains questionable in Uganda‘s context. 
 
Related to the need to ensure speedy trials, advocates of military justice as a separate system 
of justice further argue that military justice is premised on the need to have ―portable and 
flexible tribunals‖ to deal with infractions of military law wherever they arise. This is 
especially because by the nature of their main function (i.e. to defend national sovereignty 
and territorial integrity), armed forces of one country may find themselves in another country, 
where the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of their country may not reach or may not be 
applicable. It is therefore argued that military tribunals unlike ordinary courts must be 
portable and capable of holding trials where the crimes are committed
.44 
While this may be a 
valid justification, it is important to note that there are also a number of instances where 
ordinary courts are given extra-territorial jurisdiction. In Uganda‘s case for instance, civilian 
courts have extra-territorial jurisdiction over crimes such as treason, concealment of treason, 
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ridiculing the person of the President and terrorism.
45 
It is just that the ends of justice are 
better served to hold trials in areas where the alleged crimes are committed. 
 
Another major reason always advanced as justification for military justice as a separate 
system is that the civilian criminal process is riddled with a lot of uncertainties. ―In civilian 
jurisprudence, the number of guilty men who are not punished is far, far greater than the 
number of innocent men who are, and few of us would have it otherwise,‖ so argues 
Bishop.
46 ―But the doctrine that it is better that ninety-nine (or nine hundred and ninety-nine) 
guilty men go free than one innocent be convicted is not easily squared with the need to 
maintain efficiency, obedience and order in an army, which is an aggregation of men (mostly 
in the most criminally prone age brackets) who have strong appetites, strong passions, and 
ready access to deadly weapons,‖ he adds.47 
 
Bishop‘s argument raises fundamental questions that seem to challenge the very foundation 
of the notion of criminal justice, not to mention the right to a fair trial and due process. 
Implicit in his argument, Bishop challenges the application of the right to presumption of 
innocence and intimates that it is incompatible with the needs of the military. Although he 
argues further that ―...the demands of the military justify a procedure that does lessen the 
chance of unjust acquittal, while it need not, and should not, increase the possibility of unjust 
conviction...,‖48  the language he uses removes any doubt that the ―certainty‖ he means which 
is vital in military justice is certainty of convictions and not acquittals.  He speaks of ―the 
number of guilty men who are not punished‖ meaning not ―convicted,‖ suggesting that he 
doesn‘t believe in the internationally protected right to presumption of innocence, which 
arguably is one of the most fundamental principles of criminal justice in any democratic 
society. If in this respect military justice is incompatible with the presumption of innocence 
and therefore the right to a fair trial, then surely ―military justice‖ is a misnomer which must 
be corrected.49 It is incontestable that in any democratic society, it is mainly the fair trial 
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guarantees embedded in the right to a fair trial (including the presumption of innocence) 
which ensure that justice is not only done but is also manifestly seen to be done. It is 
therefore submitted that without guaranteeing the right to a fair trial in the adjudication of 
cases, there cannot be justice. 
 
Perhaps the most compelling justification (which also underlies all those analysed above) is 
that military justice as a separate system of administration of justice is necessary for the 
enforcement of military discipline, which is said to be paramount in ensuring military 
efficiency.
50
  Emphasising this point, Lord Bingham of Cornhill – former Lord Chief Justice 
of England and Wales stated thus: 
It is a truism, but an important truism, that the quality of any fighting force 
depends, among other things, on its discipline; and effective discipline must be 
underpinned by a code which defines the rights and obligations of those who 
serve, providing sanctions for proven misconduct. Some forms of misconduct 
such as the most serious criminal offences, affect civilians and service personnel 
alike; others such as conduct prejudicial to service discipline, have no civilian 
equivalent; others still, such as theft or possession of drugs, have a more serious 
character in a barrack-room or on a mess-deck than in any ordinary civilian 
context. And the services have their own rules and procedures for investigating 
offences, arresting and charging suspects, establishing courts, conducting trials, 
reaching and confirming decisions.
51
 
 
                                                          
50
 In the old case of Heddon v. Evans (1919) 35 TLR 642, McCardie J put it as follows: ― I agree that discipline 
is the soul of the army. It is the basis of all military efficiency. National safety depends upon the armed forces of 
the people. The power of those forces rests on maintenance of discipline. The plainest instincts of patriotism call 
for its enforcement on one hand, and a ready submission to its requirements on the other.‖  In military science, 
discipline means a state of mind in the individual serviceman, so that he will instantly obey orders no matter 
how unpleasant or dangerous the task may be. See Byrne EM (1981), Military Law, Naval Institute Press, 
Annapolis, p.1. See also Dambazau (1991), supra note 2, p.39. A subordinate officer must not judge of the 
dangers, propriety, expediency, or consequences of the order he receives; he must obey – nothing can excuse 
him but a physical impossibility. See Clode (1981), supra note 2, p.15.  The development of this state of mind 
(i.e. to instantly obey orders without question regardless of the risk involved) among members of the armed 
forces is said to be a command, responsibility and a necessity. See Dambazau (1991), supra note 2, p.39. The 
duty to obey orders from superior authority regardless of the risk involved, is ―...the first, second and third duty 
of a soldier at all times.‖ See Clode (1981), ibid.   
51
 See the Foreword to Rant JW (1998), Courts-Martial Handbook, Practice and Procedure, Johnwiley and 
Sons Ltd, London. This Foreword is reproduced in the second edition of this book viz., Rant JW (2003), Courts-
Martial, Discipline, and the Criminal Process in the Armed Services, Oxford University Press, New York, p.5. 
24 
 
In the celebrated Canada Supreme Court case of R v. Genereux,
52
 former Chief Justice of 
Canada, Justice Lamer, tersely put it as follows: 
The purpose of a separate system of military tribunals is to allow the armed forces 
to deal with matters that pertain directly to the discipline, efficiency and morale of 
the military. The safety and well-being of Canadians depends considerably on the 
willingness and readiness of a force of men and women to defend against threats 
to the nation‘s security. To maintain the armed forces in a state of readiness, the 
military must be in position to enforce internal discipline effectively and 
efficiently. Breaches of military discipline must be dealt with speedily and, 
frequently, punished more severely than would be the case if a civilian engaged in 
such conduct. As a result, the military has its own code of service discipline to 
allow it to meet its particular disciplinary needs. In addition, special service 
tribunals, rather than the ordinary courts have been given the jurisdiction to 
punish breaches of the code of service discipline. Recourse to ordinary criminal 
courts would, as a general rule, be inadequate to serve the particular disciplinary 
needs of the military. There is thus a need for separate tribunals to enforce special 
disciplinary standards in the military.
53
 
 
Wigmore made the point even clearer when he argued that, ―Military justice knows what it 
wants…i.e...discipline…and it systematically goes in and gets it.‖54 He emphasised that 
―…military Justice wants discipline – that is, action in obedience to regulations and orders; 
this being absolutely necessary for prompt, competent, and decisive handling of men.‖55  He 
pointed out that the court-martial supplies the sanction of this discipline and that ―it takes on 
the features of justice because it must naturally perform the process of inquiring, in a 
particular case, what was the regulation or order, and whether it was in fact obeyed. But its 
object is discipline.‖56 In fact, from the perspective of military authorities, it is ironically said 
that military tribunals are nothing more than discipline training schools for members of the 
armed forces. Quoting one commentator on military justice, Kent wrote thus: 
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...a court-martial is merely an agency appointed by the commanding officer 
for the training of soldiers in discipline, and though one is sentenced by such 
a tribunal to death or to a long term of imprisonment, he is not deprived of 
life or liberty or in fact punished at all, but merely trained and educated and 
disciplined. A criminal sentence in the army, in short, serves the same 
purpose as the manual of arms or the setting up exercises, and must be 
cheerfully acquiesced in, no matter how severe it may be, as it is but a part of 
the school of the soldier.
57
  
 
It is because of this supposed vital role in enforcing military discipline, that scholars like 
Gibson and Rowe argue that it is critical that military tribunals must be staffed with persons 
who not only possess an understanding of the necessity for, and role of discipline in an armed 
force, but also who understand the specific requirements of discipline.
58
 The important 
question for this thesis is: How does military justice ensure and enforce discipline? If it does 
so in ways inimical to the accused persons‘ guaranteed fundamental human rights in the 
administration of criminal justice, in particular the right to a fair trial, then surely military 
justice is not justice at all. In the international human rights discourse, it is undoubtedly the 
right to a fair trial which provides the minimum safeguards for ensuring justice in criminal 
processes in any democratic society.  
 
From the above analysis, it is clear that the principal rationale for military justice as a 
separate system of administration of justice is the enforcement of military discipline and good 
order in the armed forces. This being so, the following questions may be asked: Is it only 
military tribunals, through their penal sanctions, which can ensure discipline?  Isn‘t it a 
possibility that civilian courts can achieve even better military discipline for military 
efficiency? Why do military tribunals then have jurisdiction to try civilians or even soldiers 
for crimes unrelated to military discipline?
59
 Regarding the first question, Sharman correctly 
observes that the changes in armed forces dispute the necessity and desirability of using 
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military courts primarily as a vehicle for enforcing military discipline.
60
 The military 
leadership doctrine now favors persuasion over authoritarian domination and views the 
commander‘s objective as instilling high initiative and morale rather than rigid discipline.61 
There are also a number of effective ways through which military discipline can be enforced 
without necessarily invoking military justice through the media of military tribunals.
62
 With 
respect to the last question, disputing that jurisdiction of military tribunals to try retired 
service men who had turned civilians was important for enforcing military discipline and 
good order in the armed forces, Mr. Justice Black rightly argued that ―It is impossible to think 
that discipline of the Army is going to be disrupted, its morale impaired, or its orderly 
processes disturbed, by giving ex-servicemen the benefits of a civilian court when they are 
actually civilians.‖63 He emphasised that free countries ―…restrict military tribunals to the 
narrowest jurisdiction deemed absolutely essential to maintaining discipline among troops in 
active service.‖64 
 
The obsession of military justice with the enforcement of military discipline raises the 
question whether members of the armed forces and other persons subject to military law are 
entitled to enjoy the respect and protection of their human rights especially those related to a 
fair trial and due process. In the old case of Burdett v. Abbot, Sir James Mansfield C.J. 
emphasized the correct position when he stated that, ―It is, therefore highly important that the 
mistake should be corrected which supposes that an English man by taking upon him the 
additional character of a soldier puts off any of the rights…of an Englishman.‖65 He 
emphasised that ―…a soldier is gifted with all the rights of other citizens, and is bound to all 
the other duties of other citizens.‖66 This therefore means that persons who join the military 
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retain their fundamental rights (including the right to a fair trial), and are entitled to their 
respect and protection. Rowe argues however, that the rights of members of the armed forces 
must be considered in a military context.
67
 While this may be the correct position in 
international human rights law, it is submitted that whatever interpreting rights of members 
of the armed forces in a military context means, if in essence the end result is to deny soldiers 
the enjoyment of their guaranteed fundamental rights, any such interpretation would amount 
to violation of international human rights law. 
 
It is further argued that the obligations of a soldier under military law is based on the doctrine 
of compact; meaning that a person who enlists in the army, thereby consents to be bound, as 
in contract by military law and discipline.
68
 It has thus been held, that a man by becoming a 
soldier and receiving the Queen‘s pay does agree and consents that he shall be subject to the 
military discipline, and that he cannot appeal to the civil courts to rescue him from his 
compact.
69
 The question to be posed at this point is: how valid is this compact doctrine? How 
far true, is it, to say that by enlisting in the army, one consents to be bound by all its rules and 
regulations including military discipline, and by implication sacrifice one‘s right to a fair 
trial? 
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First, it is important to note that not all persons who enlist in the army do so voluntarily, so as 
to infer that they consent to be bound by military law and discipline. Some are just 
conscripted. In fact in Uganda‘s case, while majority of the recruits in the army join 
voluntarily, the country‘s Constitution still leaves open the option of conscription.70 Second, 
although on the face of it, it may appear that majority of persons who enlist in the army do so 
voluntarily, this is not always the case in the actual meaning of the word ―voluntary.‖ Many, 
especially in the developing world, are just forced by the very hard economic circumstances 
in which they find themselves. They enlist in the army as a last resort. But even for those 
who enlist voluntarily within the real meaning of the word, as Rowe correctly argues, ―[i]t is 
difficult to conclude that, by the mere fact of joining the armed forces voluntarily, they have 
consented to all the treatment to which they are subjected in the armed forces, or that they 
have waived or accepted limitations to be placed on those human rights available to them as 
civilians.‖71 Often times, people join the forces without knowing the true character of 
military service including the rules governing military justice. In most cases, on enlistment, 
they are never given the precise details of their job description and the conditions under 
which they will operate. As Rowe rightly points out, they are never in the same position as a 
person who wishes to know the terms of a particular civilian employment before he commits 
himself to it.
72
 
 
But even if we accept that enlisting in the army voluntarily or otherwise means that a person 
has agreed to be subjected to its rules and regulations including military justice, as Justice 
McCardie puts it that, ―the compact or burden of a man, who enters the army, whether 
voluntarily or not, is that he will submit to military law and not that he will submit to military 
illegality…,‖73 it still means that military illegality for instance in form of denial or violation 
of the fundamental human rights of members of the armed forces is contrary to the law. In a 
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series of cases, as Rowe rightly observes, the ECrtHR has emphasized the principle that a 
soldier does not waive his rights given by a human rights instrument, merely by voluntarily 
joining the armed forces.
74
 In the United States of America, the Supreme Court has 
previously held that whatever may be contained in military law and military court procedure 
cannot override a soldier‘s constitutional rights.75 Similarly, in his concurring judgment in the 
United States Supreme Court case of Weiss v. United States,
76
 Justice Ginsburg correctly 
argued that the men and women constituting the armed forces must be treated as honored 
members of society whose rights do not turn on the charity of  military commanders. He 
emphasised that ―a member of the Armed Forces is entitled to equal justice under law not as 
conceived by the generosity of a commander but as written in the Constitution.‖  
 
Clearly therefore, in the enforcement of military discipline, military tribunals just like their 
civilian counterparts, are obliged to respect, protect and uphold the accused persons‘ 
fundamental human rights, in particular the right to a fair trial. A fair and just military justice 
system which guarantees, respects and upholds the accused persons‘ guaranteed rights in the 
criminal process embedded in the right to a fair trial could in fact help achieve better and 
sustained discipline and morale in the armed forces. Justice is an essential prerequisite for 
discipline.
77
 The two are in fact said to be inseparable. As correctly stated in the 1960 Powel 
report, ―In the development of discipline, correction of individuals is indispensable; in 
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correction, fairness or justice is indispensable. Thus, it is a mistake to talk of balancing 
discipline and justice – the two are inseparable.‖78 Similarly, in his study of Canadian 
military law, Fay also argued that: 
Fairness and justice are indispensable… When the serviceman has confidence 
in his commanders and believes in the organisation, there is discipline… It is 
from military law that the serviceman receives his most tangible indication of 
the relationship between himself and those who command. It is under military 
law that he is tried and punished. If the military law system is a just system, 
then it will be recognized as such by the serviceman and thus it will promote 
and support the discipline upon which the military organisation is based.
79
 
 
If the means of ensuring and enforcing discipline are perceived as unfair, as Lederer and 
Zellif rightly put it, members of the armed forces will likely distrust superior authority and 
their institutional loyalty will be diminished.
80
 This will not help in any way to instill 
discipline and morale in the army. It will instead erode it. It is therefore important that in the 
enforcement of military discipline, military tribunals and other establishments for the 
administration of military justice protect, uphold and respect those rights considered vital for 
ensuring justice. These are the rights embedded in the right to a fair trial. It is in the above 
context therefore that this thesis sets out to examine the compliance of Uganda‘s military 
justice system with the right to a fair trial. 
 
1.2. Statement of the Problem 
The right to a fair trial is the cornerstone of any criminal justice system in a democratic 
society; without which, justice remains a mockery. It is the critical element in the protection 
and realisation of all the other internationally protected and guaranteed human rights and 
freedoms.
81
 Without its protection, human rights remain a mere statement of legal rhetoric. It 
is a basic civil right critical for safeguarding the rule of law in any democratic state.
82
 It is 
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indispensable in the protection of the individual against abuse of the criminal justice process 
by the state and its agents.
83
 The right to a fair trial is protected and affirmed by key 
international and regional human rights instruments to which Uganda is party. Key among 
these is the ICCPR and the African Charter.
84
 As a state party to these instruments, Uganda is 
obliged in accordance with the doctrine of pacta sant servanda
85
 to fulfil its obligations in 
good faith.  
Importantly, the HRC has emphatically made it clear that the right to a fair trial as provided 
for in Article 14 of the ICCPR, applies to military tribunals, just as it does to the civilian and 
other specialised tribunals.
86
 Similarly, the ACHPR has stressed that military tribunals must 
be subject to the same requirements of fairness, justice and due process.
87
 Principle 2 of the 
U.N. Principles on Military Justice
88
 also emphasises that ―...military tribunals must in all 
circumstances apply standards and procedures internationally recognized as guarantees of a 
fair trial.‖ Military tribunals are therefore not an exception as regards the obligation to protect 
and uphold the right to a fair trial. The right to a fair trial imposes on states, the duty to 
organise their courts (including military tribunals) in such a way that they comply with each 
of its requirements.
89
 This includes complying with the right to a fair and public hearing by a 
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law. The extent to which 
Uganda‘s military justice system complies with this right is the major focus of this thesis. 
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To date, the extent to which Uganda‘s military justice system complies with the right to a fair 
trial remains a matter of speculation. In Uganda, like in many African states, the question of 
military justice and the right to a fair trial hardly receives any scholarly attention or inquiry. 
This is despite the important role that the right to a fair trial plays in ensuring justice and the 
rule of law. This could be partly attributed to the fact that for most part, military justice is not 
considered as an integral part of the general system of justice in Uganda.
90
 As such, the 
administration of military justice is often left out of many initiatives aimed at improving the 
administration of justice in the country. For instance, under the Justice, Law and Order Sector 
(JLOS) which is a sector wide reform process ongoing across the entire sector, several studies 
have been commissioned and done on the question of administration of justice in Uganda, but 
there is none that focuses on the issue of military justice. In fact, a review of the key 
documents of JLOS suggests that the administration of military justice is not part of its 
agenda.
91
 
 
The net effect of all this, in particular the failure to have any comprehensive analytical study 
on the question of military justice and the right to a fair trial has been the introduction of 
reforms that do not address the fundamental issues as far as helping Uganda‘s military justice 
system to comply with the country‘s international human rights obligations is concerned. For 
instance, although the UPDF Act 2005 was intended to streamline Uganda‘s military law 
with the Constitution and the country‘s international obligations, inter alia, an analysis of the 
reforms introduced therein hardly shows any improvement in the area of military justice, 
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especially in as far as the right to a fair trial is concerned. Among other reasons, this could 
plausibly be attributed to the fact that the military law reform process was never informed by 
any incisive research on the question of military justice and human rights. In fact, with due 
respect, a review of the relevant Hansards shows that the Parliamentary debate leading to the 
enactment of the UPDF Act 2005 was shallow, uninformed and sometimes misinformed on 
the question of military justice and the right to a fair trial.
92
 It is in this regard that a thesis of 
this nature becomes imperative for triggering and informing future reform of the country‘s 
military justice system to ensure that it complies with the minimum international human 
rights standards for administering justice. 
 
1.3. Hypothesis and Major Research Questions 
This thesis is premised on the hypothesis that despite attempts at reform, Uganda‘s military 
justice system is still, in many ways, stuck in its historical origins and falls far too short of 
complying with the country‘s international human rights obligations as far as the right to a 
fair trial is concerned.
93
 This not only violates the internationally guaranteed rights of persons 
subject to military law but also renders the country‘s military justice system susceptible to 
abuse and manipulation in ways inimical to democracy and the rule of law. The analysis in 
this thesis is guided by and seeks to answer six major questions viz., 
1. What is military justice? Is military justice, justice? What are the justifications for 
having military justice as a separate system of administration of justice? To what 
extent are these justifications valid in Uganda‘s circumstances?  
2. What are Uganda‘s international human rights obligations in the administration of 
military justice as far as the right to fair trial, in particular the right to a fair and public 
hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal is concerned? 
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3. How has Uganda‘s military justice system performed over the years as far as 
guaranteeing and upholding the right to a fair trial, in particular the right to a fair and 
public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal is concerned? 
4. To what extent does Uganda‘s current military justice legal framework comply with 
the right to a fair trial, in particular the right to a fair and public hearing by a 
competent, independent and impartial tribunal? 
5. What are the implications of the right to a fair trial noncompliant military justice 
system for democracy and the rule of law? 
6. What areas in Uganda‘s military justice legal framework require reform and what 
reforms are needed to make the system compliant with the right to a fair trial, in 
particular the right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and 
impartial tribunal? 
 
1.4. Objective and Significance of this Thesis 
The major objective of this thesis is to analyse the compliance of Uganda‘s military justice 
system with the right to a fair trial as understood in international human rights law. Its major 
significance is that it identifies areas in Uganda‘s military justice system that require reform 
and provides recommendations that can be adopted to make the system compliant with the 
right to a fair trial, in particular the right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal. In this way, this research is expected to be a very 
important trigger for the reform of Uganda‘s military justice system to ensure that it complies 
with the country‘s international human rights obligations. This will greatly contribute to 
ensuring that members of Uganda‘s armed forces and other persons subject to the country‘s 
military law enjoy their internationally guaranteed right to a fair trial. 
 
This thesis is also expected to contribute to improving the rule of law and advancement of 
democracy in Uganda, especially if the recommendations proposed herein are adopted and 
effectively implemented. In light of the fact that the question of administration of military 
justice in Uganda is an area that has hardly been researched and written about, this thesis will 
also provide very useful information on the subject for academics, law and policy makers, 
legal practitioners, students and military personnel. It is also expected that this thesis will lead 
to the development of curriculum on the question of Military Justice, Human Rights and the 
Law to trigger the teaching of the subject in Uganda‘s institutions of higher learning.  
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1.5. Scope 
The right to a fair trial as provided for in international human rights law is very broad and 
multifaceted. It includes the right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent 
and impartial tribunal established by law,
94
 the right to be presumed innocent until proved 
guilty according to law
95
 and the minimum guarantees stipulated in Article 14 (3) of the 
ICCPR. These include: the right of accused persons to be informed promptly about the 
charges against them;
96
 the right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of their 
defence;
97
 the right to be tried without undue delay;
98
 the right to legal counsel;
99
 the right to 
examine, or have examined the witnesses against them;
100
 the right to an interpreter
101
 and the 
right against self-incrimination.
102
 The right to a fair trial also includes the right of convicted 
persons to have their conviction and sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal
103
 and the right 
not to be subjected to double jeopardy.
104
 
 
In their totality, the above highlighted guarantees for ensuring a fair trial constitute the 
minimum international human rights standards for the administration of justice in any 
democratic society. Failure to meet the requirements of one element is enough to constitute 
noncompliance with the right to a fair trial. It is for this reason that it is always important to 
analyse the right to a fair trial as a whole. However, from its breadth as summarised above, it 
is clear that a thorough appraisal of all these elements of the right to a fair trial in Uganda‘s 
military justice system cannot be covered in this thesis owing to the required word limits. For 
purposes of manageability therefore, this research mainly focuses on appraising the right to a 
fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal in Uganda‘s 
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military justice system. In spite of this limitation in scope, it is gratifying that the focus 
covers the core of the right to a fair trial.  
 
In appraising the right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial 
tribunal, we mainly focus on analysing Uganda‘s military justice legal framework. As Decary 
J rightly emphasised, in examining the compliance of certain aspects of military justice with 
human rights standards, ―...legislative and regulatory provisions speak for themselves and if 
they are prima facie an infringement of the rights guaranteed… no further evidence is 
necessary.‖105 
 
1.6. Literature Review 
There is very little scholarly work on the question of military justice and human rights both at 
the international and national level. In particular, there is no comprehensive analytical study 
that has examined the compliance of Uganda‘s military justice system with the minimum 
international standards for the administration of justice embedded in the right to a fair trial. 
The literature on the topic under study in this thesis is therefore very limited. Having 
considered the literature on the concept of military justice in the analysis in Section 1.1 
above, in this Section, we mainly analyse literature on the right to a fair trial especially as it 
relates to the administration of military justice. This literature can generally be reviewed 
under the following themes. 
 
1.6.1. The Right to a Fair Trial as an Internationally Guaranteed Human Right 
The right to a fair trial as a human right is perhaps the only thematic area of this study with 
relatively sufficient literature. The major literature that has considered the right to a fair trial 
as a human right include: Harris‘ classic article which analyses the right to a fair trial as a 
human right with reference to the provisions of the ICCPR, the ECHR and the draft Inter-
America Convention on Human Rights;
106
 Weissbrodt‘s text which gives an account of the 
drafting history of the right to a fair trial provisions in the UDHR and the ICCPR and tries to 
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explore how they have been interpreted especially by the HRC;
107
 and Trechsel‘s book which 
discusses human rights issues in criminal proceedings.
108
 Although this literature has been 
very important in providing some insights to this research, it is mainly written in general 
terms. Most of it also precedes important human rights instruments and pronouncements of 
the HRC in which different aspects of the right to a fair trial have been interpreted and 
expounded upon. This is for instance true of Harris‘ work which precedes the adoption of the 
UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary
109
 and the two HRC authoritative 
General Comments on the right to a fair trial.
110
 Although Weissbrodt‘s work was published 
much later i.e. in 2001, it is based on HRC General Comment No.13 (1984)
111
 which has 
since been replaced by HRC General Comment No.32 (2007).
112
 Since 2001, the HRC has 
also passed many decisions of great importance to the right to a fair trial which need 
evaluation; a task that is undertaken in this thesis. Further, in none of the above mentioned 
works have the authors attempted to analyse the right to a fair trial from the African regional 
human rights perspective. They mainly discuss the right to a fair trial as provided for either 
under the ICCPR, the ECHR, or the ACHR. This thesis not only analyses the right to a fair 
trial from the ICCPR perspective, but also as provided for in the African Charter. 
 
1.6.2. Military Justice and the Internationally Guaranteed Right to a Fair Trial 
At the international level, there are mainly four important works which have dealt with the 
issue of military justice and the right to a fair trial, i.e. the Organisation for Security and 
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Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) handbook on human rights of armed forces personnel,
113
 the 
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) work concerning military jurisdiction and human 
rights violation,
114
 Steiner, Alston and Goodman‘s text on international human rights in 
context
115
 and Rowe‘s work on the impact of human rights in the armed forces.116 Although 
these works have been very important in informing the analysis made in this thesis, they have 
certain limitations. For instance, the OSCE Handbook presents models and best practices 
from European countries that demonstrate how military tribunals can be organized so as to 
comply with the right to an independent and impartial tribunal among other human rights. 
This is very useful for this thesis which, inter alia, seeks to provide recommendations that can 
help Uganda‘s military tribunals to comply with the right to an independent and impartial 
tribunal. But the value of the models provided in the OSCE Handbook in the context of this 
thesis is limited given the fact that the circumstances obtaining in Uganda with regard to 
military justice are not the same as those in the European countries. For any model to 
successfully work in another country in addressing a particular challenge, the context of that 
particular country has to be taken into consideration. Besides, not all the models presented in 
the OSCE Handbook are compliant with the right to the fair trial as the OSCE might believe. 
For instance, as a measure to ensure independence of the military judges in Ireland, the 
handbook states that the military judges are appointed by the Judge Advocate General.
117
 
Although important, such a measure in itself is not enough to guarantee the independence and 
impartiality of the military judges. As was emphasised in R v. Genereux,
118
 in such 
circumstances, the independence of the Judge Advocate General from the military command 
and the Executive has to be guaranteed in the first place. 
 
The ICJ work while important, only focuses on the issue of the competence of military 
tribunals to try military personnel accused of committing human rights violations. This issue 
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is just a subcomponent of the broader question of the right to a competent tribunal in the 
administration of military justice which is analysed in this thesis. Beyond the right to a 
competent tribunal, this thesis also analyses the nature and scope of the right to a fair and 
public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal and the extent to which it is 
guaranteed in Uganda‘s military justice system. Steiner, Alston and Goodman raise the 
fundamental question whether in the national security context, military tribunals can provide 
a fair trial and, if so, the circumstances under which this can be achieved.
119
 They do not 
however discuss nor provide answers to the issues they raise. Instead, they just provide a few 
readings on the subject. 
 
It is only Rowe‘s work which tried to address the issue of independence and impartiality of 
military tribunals in some appreciable detail. Rowe rightly points out that the issue of 
independence and impartiality of military tribunals should be looked at from the perspective 
of a reasonable person acquainted with all the relevant facts.
120
 He notes that there are many 
ways to show actual and perceived independence and impartiality of the members of armed 
forces who serve as members of military tribunals. For instance, he argues that they should 
not be drawn from the same chain of command of the accused person or mingle socially 
during their call up for military court service with such members
121
 and that they should not 
be assessed by their military superiors in respect of their performance as members of a 
military court or receive any performance-related pay which is derived in whole or in part 
from court duties.
122
 
 
These are important criteria which this thesis adopts in its overall analytical framework in 
assessing compliance of Uganda‘s military justice system with the right to an independent 
and impartial tribunal. But beyond these criteria, as Chapter Two will establish, there are 
many other aspects critical for determining the independence and impartiality of military 
tribunals. Besides, beyond analysing the right to an independent and impartial tribunal in the 
administration of military justice, this thesis also examines other aspects of the right to a fair 
trial viz., the right to a fair hearing, the right to a public hearing and the right to a competent 
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120
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tribunal and analyses the extent to which these rights are guaranteed in Uganda‘s military 
justice system.  
1.6.3. Uganda’s Military Justice System and the Right to a Fair Trial 
At the national level, there is indeed very little scholarly work on the issue of military justice 
and the right to a fair trial. Most of the scholarly work on Uganda‘s military is generally 
centered on the role of the army in the country‘s politics.123 Among the very few scholarly 
works that have attempted to canvas the issue of military justice and the right to a fair trial in 
Uganda is Onoria‘s journal article about the Kotido Executions124 and the working paper I 
authored on the trials and tribulations of Rtd. Col. Dr. Kiiza Besigye and the 22 others.
125
 As 
shall shortly hereafter be highlighted, these works equally have many gaps in the context of 
this thesis. Onoria‘s article analyses the constitutionality of the Field Court Martial which 
tried and sentenced Corporal Omedio and Private Abdullah Mohammad. The two soldiers 
were indicted, tried and executed on the same day for the alleged murder of three civilians in 
Kotido district in North Eastern Uganda. The trial itself did not last more than three hours. He 
concludes that this Field Court Martial violated several fair trial and other human rights of 
these soldiers as guaranteed by Uganda‘s Constitution. The working paper on the trials and 
tribulations of Rtd. Col. Dr. Kizza Besigye and the 22 others mainly focused on the extent to 
which the General Court Martial which attempted to try Besigye and the 22 others complied 
with the right to an independent and impartial tribunal.  
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 Among such works include: Omara Otunnu A (1987), Politics and the Military in Uganda, 1890-1985, 
MacMillan, London, and Ddungu E (1994), ―Some Constitutional Dimensions of Military Politics in Uganda,‖ 
Working Paper No.41, Centre for Basic Research Publications, Kampala. See also,  Brett EA (1994), ―The 
Military and Democratic Transition in Uganda: Neutralizing the Use of Force,‖ in Nsibambi A (Ed), Managing 
the Transition to Democracy in Uganda under the National Resistance Movement, Report of the Uganda 
Democratisation Study for the Global Coalition for Africa and the African Leadership Forum, Makerere 
Institute of Social Research, Kampala, and Khiddu-Makubuya E (1994), ―The Military Factor in Uganda,‖ in  
Khiddu-Makubuya E, Mwaka WM, and Okoth PG (Eds), Uganda: Thirty Years of Independence, 1962-1992, 
Makerere University, Kampala. 
124
 Onoria (2003), supra note 37. 
125
 Naluwairo R. (2006), ―The Trials and Tribulations of Rtd. Col. Dr. Kiiza Besigye and 22 Others: A Critical 
Evaluation of the Role of the General Court Martial in the Administration of Justice in Uganda,‖ Working Paper 
No.1, HURIPEC Publications, Kampala.  
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The following points must be made regarding the above works in the context of this thesis. 
First, the works highlighted above focus on the specific trials and the particular circumstances 
surrounding those trials. While they attempt to address the issue of independence and 
impartiality of courts martial in Uganda, they mainly focus on the particular military courts. 
In the case of Onoria‘s work, he focused on the Field Court Martial which tried the two 
convicts. Regarding the paper on the trials and tribulations of Dr. Kiiza Besigye, the focus 
was on the General Court Martial. Over and above the General Court Martial and the Field 
Court Martial, this research analyses the extent to which the other military courts i.e. the 
Court Martial Appeal Court, the Division Courts Martial, the Unit Disciplinary Committees 
and the Summary Trial Authority comply with not only the right to an independent and 
impartial tribunal, but also the right to a fair and public hearing by a competent tribunal. 
Further, beyond analysing the compliance of Uganda‘s military justice system with the right 
to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal, this thesis 
also explores the implications of a fair trial noncompliant military justice system on 
democracy and the rule of law. Also, unlike the works highlighted above, this thesis not only 
examines the concept of military justice, but also analyses its validity in the context of 
Uganda‘s situation. Finally, this thesis explores the historical foundation and evolution of 
Uganda‘s military justice system especially as it relates to the protection and respect of the 
right to a fair trial which none of the above mentioned scholarly works did. It therefore 
follows that while the above highlighted scholarly works have been instrumental in informing 
this research, they have many gaps which this thesis addresses. 
 
1.7. Methodology 
This thesis adopts a combination of mainly qualitative legal research methods in gathering 
and analysing relevant data. These include literature review, comparative, descriptive and 
prescriptive methodologies. It draws upon the analysis of both primary and secondary 
sources. Although this is largely a legal research, it is recognized that there are certain 
historical, sociological and philosophical underpinnings of the concept of military justice. In 
order to put this research in context therefore, as part of the introduction and background, the 
thesis begins in Section 1.1 with the analysis of the concept of military justice. This analysis 
not only explores and examines the justifications of military justice as a separate system of 
administration of justice, but also analyses the extent to which those justifications are valid in 
Uganda‘s context.  
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1.7.1. Analysis of  International and Regional Human Rights Instruments  
A critical analysis of the relevant international and regional human rights instruments to 
which Uganda is party is undertaken in Chapter Two to establish the nature and scope of 
Uganda‘s human rights obligations as regards the right to a fair trial, in particular the right to 
a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal. In particular, 
relevant provisions of the ICCPR and the African Charter are examined. Other regional and 
international human rights instruments and materials in which the right to a fair and public 
hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal has been elaborated and affirmed 
are also analysed. These include; the HRC‘s General Comment 32 (2007),126 the UN 
Principles on Military Justice,
127
 the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the 
Judiciary
128
 and the Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal 
Assistance in Africa (herein after referred to as ―the African Commission Principles‖).129 
Although these materials are considered to be soft law and therefore not legally binding, they 
serve as important interpretative aids for the relevant binding treaty provisions on which this 
thesis is based. 
1.7.2. Appraisal of Relevant Case Law and Concluding Observations of the HRC 
There are many cases arising from the different regional and international human rights 
instruments which have repeatedly dealt with the issue of administration of military justice, 
that it can now be said that an international body of military justice jurisprudence is 
emerging.
130
 To complement the examination of relevant international human rights 
instruments mentioned in Section 1.7.1 above, a critical appraisal of this emerging military 
justice case law jurisprudence from the HRC and the ACHPR is undertaken in Chapter Two. 
This is further complemented by the analysis of the Concluding observations of the HRC on 
the periodic reports of states party to the ICCPR. With particular reference to these 
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 Supra note 11. 
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 Supra note 14. 
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 Supra note 109.  
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 Adopted by the ACHPR at its 33
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 Ordinary Session in Niger, May 2003, DOC/OS(XXX)247, reprinted in 12 
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43 
 
Concluding observations, the HRC General Comments and case law jurisprudence, it is 
important to emphasise that the HRC is the authoritative interpreter of the rights articulated in 
the ICCPR.
131
 Therefore, although there is debate regarding the status of its decisions, what is 
clear is that, as Conte and Burchill put it, when it pronounces itself upon the content or 
meaning of a right contained in the ICCPR, ―it does so with undeniable authority.‖132  
 
In substantiating many issues raised in this thesis, reference is also made to comparative case 
law from the ECrtHR. This is not only because of easy access and availability of cases from 
the ECrtHR, but most important, the ECrtHR has a well-developed body of jurisprudence on 
issues of military justice and human rights, in particular the right to a fair hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal as guaranteed by Article 6 (1) of the ECHR. This 
provision is in essence the same as Article 14 (1) of the ICCPR which is the major focus of 
this thesis. It is significant that decisions of the ECrtHR are increasingly referred to and cited 
with approval by the HRC and other human rights supervisory bodies. Therefore, although 
the decisions of the ECrtHR are not legally binding on Uganda or African countries, they are 
highly persuasive and have actually been cited as persuasive authority in many decisions of 
the ACHPR.
133
 Where necessary, comparative jurisprudence from the superior courts of the 
United Kingdom (in particular England), the United States of America and Canada (three 
countries that have also had a lot of litigation on issues of military justice and human rights) 
is also considered to strengthen the analysis in this thesis.  
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 Romany C (1996), ―Black Women and Gender Equality in a New South Africa: Human Rights Law and the 
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Together, the review and analysis of the human rights instruments highlighted above and the 
relevant case law will mainly answer the question regarding the nature and scope of Uganda‘s 
international human rights obligations as regards the right to a fair trial and the issue whether 
or not and to what extent the right to a fair trial applies in the administration of military 
justice.  
1.7.3. Examination of Uganda’s Military Justice Legal Framework 
It is part of the hypothesis of this research that Uganda‘s military justice as it relates to the 
protection of the internationally guaranteed right to a fair trial (in particular the right to a fair 
and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal) is still in many ways 
stuck in its historical origins. To test this part of the hypothesis, a critical examination of 
Uganda‘s military justice legal framework during the colonial period right from the 
establishment of the country‘s army as a national institution in 1895 is undertaken in Chapter 
Three. This comprises analysis of the Uganda Rifles Ordinance 1895, the Uganda Military 
Force Ordinance 1899, the King‘s African Rifles Ordinance 1902 and the Uganda Military 
Force Ordinance 1958. Examination of these legal instruments establishes the historical 
foundation, origins and evolution of Uganda‘s military justice system especially as it relates 
to the right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal. 
 
Perhaps the most important and deeply entrenched principle of international law is that 
existing treaty obligations must be fulfilled by the parties in good faith. This principle is what 
is commonly referred to as the doctrine pacta sunt servanda
.134
 In majority of the 
international human rights instruments, as the first major necessary step, states are required to 
fulfill their obligations by way of putting in place relevant legislative and administrative 
measures.
135
 The starting point therefore in analyzing the extent to which Uganda‘s military 
justice system complies with its international human rights obligations as regards the right to 
a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal is to examine the 
country‘s legal framework governing military justice. A comprehensive review and analysis 
of Uganda‘s current military justice legal framework vis-à-vis the country‘s international 
human rights obligations regarding the right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal is therefore undertaken in this respect in Chapter Four. 
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This review covers Uganda‘s 1995 Constitution as amended, the UPDF Act 2005 and the 
rules and regulations made thereunder. It also includes analysis of the parliamentary debates 
leading to the enactment of the UPDF Act 2005 and its predecessor – the UPDF Act 1992. 
1.7.4. Case Study 
It is one of the arguments of this thesis that a military justice system that does not conform to 
the minimum international human rights standards for administration of justice embedded in 
the right to a fair trial can be inimical to democracy and the rule of law.  To demonstrate this, 
in Chapter Five, using the case of Rtd. Col. Dr. Kizza Besigye and the 22 others,
136
 we 
examine the major implications of a fair trial noncompliant military justice system on 
democracy and the rule of law. The case of Rtd. Col. Dr. Kizza Besigye has been chosen not 
only because of its political overtones but also because it represents one of the very few cases 
involving questions of military justice and human rights under Uganda‘s current military 
justice legal framework in which the country‘s superior courts of record including the High 
Court, the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court were heavily involved. Although 
Chapter Five mainly focuses on the case of Rtd. Col. Dr. Kiiza Besigye and the 22 others, 
reference is also made to the case of Major General David Tinyefuza v. Attorney General137 
to strengthen the analysis made therein. 
1.8. Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter One gives the background and provides 
the context in which this research is undertaken and should be understood. Chapter Two 
explores and analyses the nature and scope of Uganda‘s international human rights 
obligations as regards the right to a fair trial, in particular the right to a fair and public hearing 
by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal. Chapter Three is an analytical 
exploration of the historical origins and evolution of Uganda‘s military justice system 
especially as regards the protection and respect of the right to a fair trial, in particular the 
right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal. The 
analysis in Chapter Three covers the period 1895-1992. A detailed assessment of the 
compliance of Uganda‘s current military justice legal framework with the right to a fair and 
public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal is undertaken in Chapter 
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Four. Using the case of Rtd. Col. Dr. Kiiza Besigye and the 22 others, Chapter Five 
demonstrates how a military justice system that does not comply with the right to a fair trial 
can have adverse implications for democracy and the rule of law. Chapter Six presents the 
major recommendations of this thesis which can help to ensure compliance of Uganda‘s 
military justice system with the right to a fair trial, in particular, the right to a fair and public 
hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal. Chapter Seven is the conclusion 
of this thesis.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL IN 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
This Chapter is an analysis of the right to a fair trial as guaranteed by international 
human rights law, in particular under the ICCPR.
1
 It specifically explores the nature 
and scope of Uganda‘s international human rights obligations with respect to the right 
to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal, 
especially insofar as the administration of justice by military tribunals is concerned. 
The Chapter begins in Section 2.1 by highlighting the importance of the right to a fair 
trial in a democratic society emphasising the reason why it occupies a special place in 
international human rights law. In Section 2.2 we analyse the nature of proceedings to 
which the right to a fair trial applies. This is critical for the reason that, as shall be 
discussed in this section, the right to a fair trial does not apply to every proceeding 
before courts or tribunals.
2
 It is therefore important in a thesis of this nature to first 
ascertain the nature of those proceedings in military tribunals to which the right to a 
fair trial applies. Section 2.3 which constitutes the main body of this Chapter analyses 
the nature and scope of the right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal especially as it relates to the administration of 
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 The main reason for focusing on the ICCPR is because it is the major international human rights 
binding instrument providing for the protection of the right to a fair trial. We however also try to 
analyse the right to a fair trial from the African regional human rights perspective, in particular under 
the African Charter. The African Charter is the main African regional human rights binding instrument 
protecting the right to a fair trial. As pointed out in Chapter One (notes 9 and 10), Uganda is party to 
both the ICCPR and the African Charter. 
2
 In this thesis, the words ―court‖ and ―tribunal‖ will be used interchangeably. The two words in 
essence mean the same thing i.e. bodies established by law with judicial power to adjudicate on 
disputes in accordance with the law. The HRC has stated in this regard that the notion of a ―tribunal‖ in 
Article 14 (1) of the ICCPR ―designates a body, regardless of its denomination, that is established by 
law, is independent of the executive and legislature branches of government or enjoys in specific cases 
judicial independence in deciding legal matters in proceedings that are judicial in nature.‖ See UN 
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No.32 (Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and 
Tribunals and to a Fair Trial), adopted at the Ninetieth Session of the Human Rights Committee, 23 
August 2007, CCPR/C/GC/32, para.18. 
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justice by military tribunals. The summary and conclusion of the analysis undertaken 
in this Chapter is presented in Section 2.4. 
 
2.1 The Importance of the Right to a Fair Trial in a Democratic Society 
The importance of the right to a fair trial in a democratic society cannot be over- 
emphasized. In its entire breadth,
3
 the right to a fair trial constitutes the most 
important human right in the administration of justice in any democratic society.
4
 
Emphasising this point with regard to the main fair trial provision in the ECHR, the 
ECrtHR has stressed that ―…in a democratic society within the meaning of the 
Convention, the right to a fair administration of justice holds such a prominent place 
that a restrictive interpretation of Article 6 (1) would not correspond to the aim and 
purpose of that provision.‖5 Through the various guarantees that it provides in the 
conduct of trials (critical among which include the right to a fair and public hearing 
by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal), the right to a fair trial guarantees 
neutrality in the adjudication of disputes and ensures that justice is not only done, but 
is also manifestly and undoubtedly seen to be done. In this connexion, it is arguable 
that, especially in criminal proceedings (which are the main stay of military tribunals), 
the notions of justice and fair trial are inseparable. One cannot or at least will not be 
seen to get justice from a tribunal that is not neutral and which does not guarantee the 
other fair trial rights and procedures. 
 
The right to a fair trial is also critical for ensuring and safeguarding the rule of law
6
 
which is a fundamental feature of any democratic society.
7
 It is indeed debatable, 
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 For the scope of the right to a fair trial, see Chapter One, Section 1.5. 
4
 See HRC General Comment 32 (2007), supra note 2, para.2.  
5
 See Delcourt v. Belgium (1970) 1 EHRR 355, para.26. 
6
 HRC General Comment 32 (2007), supra note 2, para.2. 
7
 This does not necessarily mean that states that respect the rule of law are democratic. In the modern 
human rights discourse, for a society to be generally accepted as democratic, it takes more than respect 
for the rule of law. In its Resolution 2002/46, para.1, the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights, now the United Nations Human Rights Council, declared the essential elements of democracy 
(features of a democratic society) to include: respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; 
freedom of association; freedom of expression and opinion; access to power and its exercise in 
accordance with the rule of law; holding of periodic free and fair elections by secret ballot as the 
expression of the will of the people; a pluralistic system of political parties and organisations; the 
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whether without a judicial system that guarantees fair trial rights; there can be any 
rule of law. It is only through fair trial rights compliant tribunals, that the compliance 
of individuals‘ and states‘ actions and omissions with the law can be impartially and 
properly assessed and appropriate legal remedies and punishments given. In this 
regard, the right to a fair trial is an integral part of the very notion of the rule of law in 
a democratic society.  
 
Further, the right to a fair trial is paramount in the effective protection of all other 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.
8
 Without it, all other rights and freedoms 
remain at risk.
9
 As Baderin rightly points out, ―… the protection of all other human 
rights in a state depends, inter alia, on the availability of fair trial and due process 
procedures in domestic courts through which remedies can be sought for human rights 
violations.‖10 Without guaranteeing fair trial procedures in courts, the effective 
protection of human rights and other fundamental freedoms therefore remains 
illusory. 
 
It is for the above reasons, inter alia, that the right to a fair trial occupies a central 
place in international human rights law. It is recognised and protected by all major 
international and regional human rights instruments i.e. the UDHR
11
, the ICCPR,
12
 
the African Charter,
13
 the ECHR
14
 and the American Convention on Human Rights 
(ACHR).
15
 While reservations can be made to particular aspects of the right to a fair 
                                                                                                                                                                      
separation of powers; the independence of the judiciary; transparency and accountability in public 
administration; and free, independent and pluralistic media. 
8
 HRC General Comment 32 (2007), supra note 2, para.2. See also Civil Liberties Organisation, Legal 
Defence Centre, Legal Defence and Assistance Project v. Nigeria, African Commission on Human and 
Peoples' Rights, Comm. No. 218/98 (1998), para.30. 
9
 Robertson D (2004), A Dictionary of Human Rights, 2
nd
 Edition, Europa Publications, London, p.86. 
10
 Baderin M (2006), ―A Comparative Analysis of the Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process Under 
International Human Rights Law and Saudi Arabian Domestic Law,‖ International Journal of Human 
Rights, Vol.10, No.3, p.241.  
11
 Article 10. 
12
 Article 14. 
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 Article 7. 
14
 Article 6.  
15
 Article 8.  
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trial under Article 14 of the ICCPR, it is not acceptable to make general reservations 
to the right to a fair trial as a whole.
16
 The HRC has emphasised that such reservations 
would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the ICCPR.
17
 Also, owing to 
the importance that the right to a fair trial plays in providing ―...the minimum 
protection to citizens and military officers alike, especially under unaccountable and 
undemocratic military regimes...,‖18 the ACHPR has argued that the right to a fair trial 
should be considered non-derogable.
19
 In fact, in Commission Nationale des Droits de 
l'Homme et des Libertes v. Chad,
20
 the ACHPR observed that the African Charter 
unlike other human rights instruments does not allow for states to derogate from their 
treaty obligations during emergency situations.
21
 This means therefore that the 
provisions of the African Charter dealing with the right to a fair trial are non-
derogable even during times of emergency.
22
 In the above case, the ACHPR held that 
even a civil war in Chad could not be used as an excuse by the State violating or 
permitting violations of rights in the African Charter.
23
 
 
Although the ICCPR does not specifically list the right to a fair trial as non-derogable, 
the HRC has also emphatically emphasised that states derogating from normal 
procedures required under Article 14 in circumstances of a public emergency should 
ensure that such derogations do not exceed those strictly required by the exigencies of 
the actual situation.
24
 It has stressed that guarantees of fair trial may never be made 
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 HRC General Comment 32 (2007), supra note 2, para.5. See also HRC General Comment No.24 (on 
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Fifty-second Session of the Human Rights Committee, 4 November 1994, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, 
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 See also Amnesty International and Others v. Sudan, African Commission on Human and Peoples‘ 
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 Baderin (2006), supra note 10, p.245. 
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 Supra note 20. 
24
 HRC General Comment 32 (2007), supra note 2, para.6. 
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subject to measures of derogation that would circumvent the protection of non-
derogable rights.
25
  For it is inherent in the protection of rights explicitly recognised 
as non-derogable in Article 4 (2) of the ICCPR, that they must be secured by 
procedural guarantees, including, often judicial guarantees.
26
 In fact, the HRC has 
long declared that certain aspects of the right to a fair trial under Article 14 of the 
ICCPR cannot be the subject of derogation even under emergency situations. It has 
argued inter alia that: 
…safeguards related to derogation, as embodied in article 4 of the 
Covenant, are based on the principles of legality and the rule of law 
inherent in the Covenant as a whole. As certain elements of the right to a 
fair trial are explicitly guaranteed under international humanitarian law 
during armed conflict, the Committee finds no justification for derogation 
from these guarantees during other emergency situations. The Committee 
is of the opinion that the principles of legality and the rule of law require 
that fundamental requirements of fair trial must be respected during a state 
of emergency. Only a court of law may try and convict a person for a 
criminal offence. The presumption of innocence must be respected. In 
order to protect non-derogable rights, the right to take proceedings before 
a court to enable the court to decide without delay the lawfulness of the 
detention, must not be diminished by a state party‘s decision to derogate 
from the covenant.‖27 
 
It can only be emphasised in light of the HRC‘s conclusion above that it is in fact not 
any court of law that  should try persons for criminal offences, it is only competent, 
independent and impartial tribunals that can properly without bias determine the 
merits of a particular case according to law. Because of the great importance that the 
HRC attaches to the right to a fair trial, it has, just like the ACHPR, proposed that the 
right to a fair trial should be included among the non-derogable rights provided in 
Article 4 (2) of the ICCPR.
28
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Seventy-second Session of the Human Rights Committee, 31 August 2001, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, 
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Introduction, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, p.60.  
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 See the Draft Third Protocol to the ICCPR, Aiming at Guaranteeing Under All Circumstances the 
Right to a Fair Trial and a Remedy, Annex I to: ―The Right to a Fair Trial: Current Recognition and 
Measures Necessary for its Strengthening,‖ Final Report to the U.N. Sub-Commission on the 
Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities by Mr. Stanislav Chernichenko and Mr. 
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The importance of the right to a fair trial is further reflected in the fact that it is 
protected by most Constitutions of states in the world;
29
 a practice which Baderin 
rightly argues, demonstrates the existence of state practice and opino juris necessary 
to constitute the right to a fair trial generally as a norm of Customary International 
Law (CIL).
30
 This means that even if Uganda was not a state party to any human 
rights instrument protecting the right to a fair trial, it would still, as a general rule, be 
bound to protect and respect that right  as a norm of CIL. The custom of most 
Constitutions protecting the right to a fair trial could in fact in itself also qualify the 
right to a fair trial as a general principle of law recognized by civilized nations within 
the meaning of Article 38 (1) c of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
31
 
The importance and force of the right to a fair trial in a democratic society cannot 
therefore be under estimated. But important as it is, does it mean that the right to a 
fair trial applies to all proceedings before courts? Specifically, in the context of 
military justice, does the right to a fair trial apply to all proceedings before military 
tribunals? These are some of the important questions addressed in Section 2.2 below.  
  
2.2 Proceedings in Military Tribunals to Which the Right to a Fair Trial 
Applies 
 
―In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and 
obligations in a suit at law…everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by 
                                                                                                                                                                      
William Treat on The Administration of Justice and the Human Rights of Detainees, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/24, 3 June 1994.  
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a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law,‖32 states Article 
14 (1) of the ICCPR. Similarly, the UDHR declares in Article 10 that ―everyone is 
entitled…to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the 
determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.‖33 
Although the African Charter  does not have an equivalent or similar phrase, the 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa 
(hereinafter referred to as ―the African Commission Principles‖)34 in similar 
expression state  that ―In the determination of any criminal charge against a person, 
or of a person‟s rights and obligations, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public 
hearing by a legally constituted competent, independent and impartial judicial 
body.‖35 
 
It is therefore clear from the above provisions that the right to a fair trial applies to 
two kinds of proceedings i.e. proceedings involving determination of a criminal 
charge and those involving determination of a person‘s rights and obligations in a suit 
at law. By their very nature, military tribunals rarely deal with the latter class of 
proceedings. These are therefore deliberately left out of the scope of this thesis. 
Suffice to point out however, that the HRC has clarified that the concept of 
determination of rights and obligations ―in a suit at law‖ is based on the nature of the 
right in question rather than on the status of one of the parties or the particular forum 
provided by domestic legal systems for the determination of particular rights.
36
 It has 
also emphasised that ―there is no determination of rights and obligations in a suit at 
law where the persons concerned are confronted with measures taken against them in 
their capacity as persons subordinated to a high degree of administrative control, such 
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as disciplinary measures not amounting to penal sanctions being taken against a civil 
servant, a member of the armed forces, or a prisoner.‖37  
 
With regard to proceedings involving determination of a criminal charge, a few 
pertinent questions must be posed at this point: What constitutes a ―criminal charge?‖ 
What is a ―charge‖ in the first place? How is a criminal charge different from other 
charges one may face in the context of military justice such as disciplinary charges? 
The HRC has stated that ―…criminal charges relate in principle to acts declared to be 
punishable under domestic criminal law.‖38 This means that in ascertaining whether 
there is a criminal charge for purposes of application of the right to a fair trial, the 
classification of the offence (with which one is charged) under national law is a factor 
that should be taken into account. 
 
However, where domestic law classifies certain offences as not criminal, other factors 
come into play. The HRC has thus stressed that ―…the notion of a criminal charge 
may also extend to acts that are criminal in nature with the sanctions that, regardless 
of their qualifications in domestic law, must be regarded as penal because of their 
purpose, character or severity.‖39 Although the HRC gives no reason for this 
extension of the notion of a criminal charge, the ECrtHR has stressed, in the context 
of the ECHR, whilst emphasising that the "autonomy" of the concept of "criminal" 
operates only one way, that: 
The Convention without any doubt allows the States, in the performance 
of their function as guardians of the public interest, to maintain or 
establish a distinction between criminal law and disciplinary law, and to 
draw the dividing line, but only subject to certain conditions. The 
Convention leaves the States free to designate as a criminal offence an 
act or omission not constituting the normal exercise of one of the rights 
that it protects…The converse choice, for its part, is subject to stricter 
rules. If the Contracting States were able at their discretion to classify an 
offence as disciplinary instead of criminal, or to prosecute the author of 
a "mixed" offence on the disciplinary rather than on the criminal plane, 
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the operation of the fundamental clauses of Articles 6 and 7 (art. 6, art. 
7) would be subordinated to their sovereign will. A latitude extending 
thus far might lead to results incompatible with the purpose and object 
of the Convention. The Court therefore has jurisdiction, under Article 6 
…to satisfy itself that the disciplinary does not improperly encroach 
upon the criminal.
40
 
This reasoning by the ECrtHR is very convincing. It is critical for ensuring that States 
do not abuse their power and deny individuals their right to a fair trial by merely 
designating certain acts or omissions as disciplinary. It therefore follows that three 
factors are key in determining whether or not particular proceedings amount to the 
determination of a criminal charge, viz., classification of the particular 
offence/charges under national law, the very nature of the offence (i.e. whether it is in 
essence criminal)
41
 and the nature and degree of severity of the penalty that the person 
concerned risks incurring. Regarding the last criteria, an important principle that can 
be established from Engel v. Netherlands
42
 concerning proceedings before military 
tribunals, is that, regardless of the classification of the offence with which someone is 
charged, if the penalty to be incurred involves deprivation of liberty and where the 
duration and manner of its execution is appreciably detrimental, then the proceedings 
will amount to ―determination of a criminal charge,‖ in which case the right to a fair 
trial will apply. In this case, the ECrtHR emphasised that ―...in a society subscribing 
to the rule of law, there belong to the ‗criminal‘ sphere deprivations of liberty liable to 
be imposed as a punishment, except those which by their nature, duration, or manner 
of execution cannot be appreciably detrimental.‖43 It noted that the maximum penalty 
that the supreme military court could pronounce consisted in four days' light arrest for 
Mr. van der Wiel, two days' strict arrest for Mr. Engel (third punishment) and three or 
four months' committal to a disciplinary unit for Mr. de Wit, Mr. Dona and Mr. Schul 
and held that Mr. van der Wiel was therefore liable only to a light punishment not 
occasioning deprivation of liberty.
44
  The Court also noted that the penalty involving 
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deprivation of liberty that in theory threatened Mr. Engel was of too short a duration 
to belong to "criminal" law.
45
 With respect to the ―charges‖ against Mr. de Wit, Mr. 
Dona and Mr. Schul, the Court emphasised that these ―... did indeed come within the 
"criminal" sphere since their aim was the imposition of serious punishments involving 
deprivation of liberty.‖46 
In sum, the right to a fair trial applies to all proceedings in military tribunals involving 
criminal charges and/or determination of a person‘s rights and obligations in a suit at 
law. Determination of a person‘s rights and obligations in a suit at law does not 
include administrative or disciplinary proceedings involving measures not amounting 
to penal sanctions. Military authorities cannot however evade the application of the 
right to a fair trial by merely classifying proceedings as ―disciplinary‖ or 
―administrative.‖ As long as the acts or omissions in question are criminal in nature or 
attract penal sanctions, then such proceedings will amount to determination of a 
criminal charge, the effect of which renders the right to a fair trial applicable. It is 
important to note though that the nature of the offence with which one is charged and 
the nature of the penalty one risks incurring, are alternatives and not cumulative in 
determining whether or not the proceedings amount to determination of a criminal 
charge.
47
 But as Beatson notes, this does not however exclude a cumulative approach 
where the separate analysis of each criterion does not make it possible to reach a clear 
conclusion as to the existence of a ―criminal charge.‖48 
Having established the nature of proceedings to which the right to a fair trial and 
therefore the right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and 
impartial tribunal applies, it is now important that we examine the nature and scope of 
this right especially as it relates to military tribunals. 
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2.3 The Nature and Scope of the Right to a Fair and Public Hearing by a 
Competent, Independent and Impartial Tribunal 
 
Like most international agreements, the ICCPR and the African Charter are generally 
drafted in generic terms. As such, although they guarantee the right to a fair and 
public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal, they do not give 
the details of the content, nature and scope of this right. What is clear is that, as the 
HRC has emphasised, it cannot be left to the sole discretion of domestic law to 
determine the essential content of the guarantees contained in Article 14 of the 
ICCPR.
49
 Consequently, the nature and scope of the right to a fair trial, including the 
right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal, 
can only be ascertained from a careful examination of the various regional and 
international human rights instruments and materials in which this right has been 
expounded. These include; the HRC‘s General Comment on the Right to Equality 
before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial,
50
 the UN Basic Principles on the 
Independence of the Judiciary,
51
 the African Commission Principles
52
 and the Dakar 
Declaration on the Right to a Fair Trial in Africa.
53
 The UN Draft Principles 
Governing the Administration of Justice through Military Tribunals (hereinafter 
referred to as ―the UN Principles on Military Justice‖)54 specifically address issues of 
the right to a fair trial within the context of military justice. Although these materials 
are considered as ―soft law,‖ and therefore not legally binding, they serve as very 
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important interpretive materials to the relevant binding treaty provisions. They are 
therefore of critical importance to the ensuing analysis. 
 
The nature and scope of the right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal can also be deduced from analysing the 
jurisprudence of the HRC (i.e. its views and opinions on the individual 
communications under the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, its Concluding 
Observations on States‘ reports under Article 40 of the ICCPR and its other General 
Comments on related issues) which is going to be undertaken. The jurisprudence from 
other regional human rights supervisory bodies, in particular the ACHPR and the 
ECrtHR, is also important in this regard.  
 
The ensuing analysis and discussion proceeds on the premise that, as stated by the 
HRC, the right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the ICCPR, and indeed other human 
rights instruments, applies in full to military tribunals just as it does to the ordinary 
and civilian courts.
55
 Principle 2 of the UN Principles on Military Justice also 
emphasises that military tribunals must in all circumstances apply standards and 
procedures internationally recognised as guarantees of a fair trial. Specifically, 
Principle 13 of these Principles states, inter alia, that ―…the organisation and 
operation of military courts should fully ensure the right of everyone to a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal at every stage of legal proceedings from initial 
investigation to trial.‖ While holding that military tribunals per se do not imply an 
unfair or unjust process, the ACHPR has stated in no uncertain terms that ―…military 
tribunals must be subject to the same requirements of fairness, openness, and justice, 
independence, and due process as any other process.‖56 
 
It is in the light of these observations that we now proceed to examine the content, 
nature and scope of the right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent 
and impartial tribunal. Each of the specific guarantees comprised in this right viz., the 
right to a competent tribunal, the right to an independent tribunal, the right to an 
impartial tribunal, the right to a public hearing, and the right to a fair hearing will be 
                                                          
55
 HRC General Comment 32 (2007), supra note 2 para.22. 
56
 Civil Liberties Organisation, et al v. Nigeria, supra note 8, para.44. Emphasis added. 
 59 
examined independently, although it is recognised that some of them are interrelated 
and overlap in many respects.  
2.3.1. The Right to a Competent Tribunal 
A critical element of the right to a fair trial and an essential factor in the 
administration of criminal justice in any democratic society is the right to a competent 
tribunal. The right to a competent tribunal is thus one of the essential guarantees 
protected by Article 14 (1) of the ICCPR. Although the African Charter does not 
explicitly provide for the right to a competent tribunal, it can be implied from Article 
7 (1) (b) which states that ―Every individual shall have the right to have his cause 
heard. This comprises: the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a 
competent court or tribunal.‖57 This was affirmed in Amnesty International v. Sudan 
where while holding that the fair trial guarantees provided for in Article 7 (1) of the 
African Charter are mutually dependent and that the infringement of one right could 
result in violation of others, the ACHPR held that the definition of ―competent‖ in 
Article 7 (1) (b) ―…encompasses facets such as expertise of the judges...‖58 Expertise 
of judges is undeniably a question that relates to the competence of a tribunal. 
 
Even though the right to a competent tribunal has received very limited attention from  
human rights supervisory bodies and legal scholars in terms of clarifying its content 
and scope, it is clear that the right encompasses two major aspects i.e. jurisdiction of 
the tribunal and the competence of the persons who constitute the tribunal.
59
 This is 
supported by the travaux preparatoires of the ICCPR. During the negotiations and 
drafting of the ICCPR, René Cassin the delegate from France had objected to the use 
of the word ―competent‖ arguing that it referred either to the jurisdiction of the court 
which was too complex a matter for the Commission to address, or to the technical 
qualifications of judges, which could exclude the use of elected or popular judges 
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used in some countries.
60
 Although there was not much discussion on Cassin‘s 
argument, his interpretation of ―competent‖ in the above context seems to have been 
implicitly accepted by the delegates as the correct position when they adopted Mr. 
Jevremovic‘s amendment to the effect that the tribunal should not only be 
―independent and impartial,‖ but should also be ―competent.‖61 It is significant that no 
delegate challenged Cassin‘s interpretation of the word ―competent.‖  
 
As regards the question of jurisdiction, a competent tribunal‘s jurisdiction must be 
established by law. This is in line with the fair trial requirement under Article 14 (1) 
of the ICCPR that the competent, independent and impartial tribunal must be 
established by law. The ACHPR has held that ―...the purpose of requiring that courts 
be ‗established by law‘ is that the organisation of justice must not depend on the 
discretion of the Executive, but must be regulated by laws emanating from 
parliament.‖ 62  No tribunal should confer upon itself or assume jurisdiction which the 
law does not give it. A competent tribunal must not only have jurisdiction over the 
subject matter but should also have jurisdiction over the person(s) it tries.
63
 In the 
context of military justice, as Davidson rightly observes, competence of a tribunal 
also requires that a military court must be properly composed (i.e. have the correct 
people present), properly convened (assembled), and that the criminal charges must 
be properly referred to it (ordered to trial).
64
 
 
With regard to the question of jurisdiction over the persons, an aspect that continues 
to raise international concern and debate is the issue of military tribunals having 
jurisdiction over civilians. While noting that the ICCPR does not prohibit the trial of 
civilians in military or special courts, the HRC has stressed that such trials should be 
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in full conformity with the guarantees of the right to a fair trial under Article 14 of the 
ICCPR which ―…cannot be limited or modified because of the military or special 
character of the court concerned.‖65 The HRC has further emphasised that ―...trials of 
civilians by military or special tribunals should be exceptional, i.e. limited to cases 
where the state party can show that resorting to such trials is necessary and justified 
by objective and serious reasons, and where with regard to the specific class of 
individuals and offences at issue, the regular civilian courts are unable to undertake 
the trials.‖66 In the recent decision of Madani v. Algeria,67 the HRC emphasised that it 
is incumbent on a State party that does try civilians before military courts to justify 
the practice.
68
 It stressed that ―…the State party must demonstrate, with regard to the 
specific class of individuals at issue, that the regular civilian courts are unable to 
undertake the trials, that other alternative forms of special or high-security civilian 
courts are inadequate to the task and that recourse to military courts is unavoidable.‖69  
 
On the facts of the case, the HRC therefore held that the trial of Madani (for 
jeopardizing State security and smooth operation of the national economy) by a 
military tribunal, was a violation of Article 14 of the ICCPR since Algeria did not 
show why recourse to a military court was required and did not indicate why the 
ordinary civilian courts or other alternative forms of civilian court were inadequate to 
the task of trying him. It was emphasised that the mere invocation of domestic legal 
provisions for the trial by military court of certain categories of serious offences does 
not constitute an argument under the ICCPR in support of recourse to such tribunals.
70
  
From the above reasoning of the HRC, as Shah argues, it is plausible to conclude that 
it has established a principle that as a matter of presumption, the trial of civilians by 
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military tribunals is per se a violation of the right to a competent tribunal guaranteed 
by Article 14 (1) of the ICCPR.
71
 It is therefore incumbent on the State whose military 
tribunals try civilians to rebut this presumption. 
 
From the comparative jurisprudence of the ECrtHR, the Court has held regarding the 
jurisdiction of military tribunals over civilians under the ECHR, that ―While it cannot 
be contended that the Convention absolutely excludes the jurisdiction of military 
courts to try cases in which civilians are implicated, the existence of such jurisdiction 
should be subjected to particularly careful scrutiny, since only in very exceptional 
circumstances could the determination of criminal charges against civilians in such 
courts be held to be compatible with Article 6.‖72 It emphasised that, ―The power of 
military criminal justice should not extend to civilians unless there are compelling 
reasons justifying such a situation, and if so only on a clear and foreseeable legal 
basis.‖73 The existence of such reasons must be substantiated in each specific case.74 
In this respect, the ECrtHR stressed that ―It is not sufficient for the national legislation 
to allocate certain categories of offences to military courts in abstracto.‖75 
 
On its part, the African regional human rights system goes beyond the position of the 
HRC, the ECrtHR and the UN Principles on Military Justice in dealing with the 
question of jurisdiction of military tribunals over civilians. The African Commission 
Principles completely bar military tribunals from trying civilians. Section G of these 
Principles provides for the right of civilians not to be tried by military courts. It 
emphasises that ―…the only purpose of military courts shall be to determine offences 
of a purely military nature committed by military personnel‖ and emphatically states 
that ―Military courts should not, in any circumstances whatsoever, have jurisdiction 
over civilians.”76 This position was affirmed by the ACHPR in Media Rights Agenda 
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(on behalf of Niran Malaolu) v. Nigeria.
77
 This means therefore that for countries in 
Africa like Uganda, party to the African Charter, the trial of civilians by military 
tribunals is completely forbidden. 
 
This very strong stand of the ACHPR on the question of jurisdiction of military 
tribunals over civilians is however challengeable in some respects. It contradicts 
certain existing acceptable practices in international law, in particular, International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL). As Rowe rightly notes, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
permit trial of civilians by military courts in certain circumstances.
78
  For instance, in 
war time situations, regarding the duties of an Occupying power under the Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva 
Convention IV), pursuant to Article 66, in the case of a breach of penal provisions 
applying to civilians in the occupied territory promulgated by it by virtue of Article 64 
(2), the Occupying power may hand over the accused persons to its ―properly 
constituted, non-political military courts, on condition that the said courts sit in the 
occupied country.‖79 From this perspective, it is submitted that the better view is that 
adopted by the HRC as highlighted above i.e. the jurisdiction of military tribunals 
over civilians should be exceptional and in particular only where the state can prove 
that with regard to the specific class of individuals, the regular civilian courts are 
unable to undertake the trials, and that other alternative forms of special or high-
security civilian courts are inadequate to the task and that recourse to military courts 
is unavoidable. It is not enough for the national legislation to allocate certain 
categories of offences to military courts in abstracto. 
Concerning the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter, Principle 8 of the UN 
Principles on Military Justice states that ―The jurisdiction of military courts should be 
limited to offences of a strictly military nature committed by military personnel. 
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Military courts may try persons treated as military personnel for infractions strictly 
related to their military status.‖80 In a series of its Concluding Observations on the 
periodic national reports under Article 40 of the ICCPR, the HRC has increasingly 
stressed the principle that the jurisdiction of military tribunals should be limited to 
offences of a strictly military nature.  For instance, regarding Cameroon, the HRC was 
concerned about the extension of the jurisdiction of military courts not only over 
civilians but also to offences which were not of a military nature per se, for example 
all offences involving fire arms.
81
 It consequently recommended that Cameroon 
―…should ensure that the jurisdiction of military tribunals is limited to military 
offences committed by military personnel.‖82 Similarly, regarding Guatemala, the 
HRC noted that ―…the wide jurisdiction of military courts to hear all cases involving 
the trial of military personnel and their powers to decide cases that belong to the 
ordinary courts contribute to the impunity enjoyed by such personnel and prevent 
their punishment for serious human rights violations.‖83 It therefore recommended 
that Guatemala should ―…amend the law to limit the jurisdiction of the military 
courts to the trial of military personnel who are accused of crimes of an exclusively 
military nature.‖84  In the same way, the ACHPR has noted and emphasised that while 
in many African countries military courts and special tribunals exist alongside regular 
judicial institutions, ―the purpose of Military Courts is to determine offences of a pure 
military nature committed by military personnel.‖85  
An important question regarding the competence of military tribunals in as far as the 
issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter is concerned is whether or not, military 
tribunals should have jurisdiction to try military personnel accused of committing 
gross human rights violations. Although the ICCPR does not have any provisions 
dealing with this issue, a critical analysis of the jurisprudence of the HRC points to 
the fact that it generally regards the practice of giving military tribunals jurisdiction to 
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try military personnel accused of committing human rights violations to be 
incompatible with the obligations of States under the ICCPR. For instance, in its 
Concluding observations to Colombia, it stated that ―Military courts do not seem to be 
the most appropriate ones for the protection of citizen‘s rights in a context where the 
military itself has violated such rights.‖86 It therefore recommended that Colombia 
should ―...limit the competence of military courts to internal issues of discipline and 
similar matters so that violations of citizens‟ rights will fall under the competence of 
ordinary courts of law.‖87 With respect to Brazil, the HRC expressed concern at the 
practice of trying military police accused of human rights violations before military 
courts and regretted that the jurisdiction to deal with those cases had not yet been 
transferred to the civilian courts.
88
 The HRC has also previously recommended to 
Lebanon to review the jurisdiction of its military courts and transfer their competence, 
―in all trials concerning civilians and in all cases concerning the violation of human 
rights by members of the military, to ordinary courts.‖89  
 
In line with the jurisprudence of the HRC, Principle 9 of the UN Principles on 
Military Justice also states that ―In all circumstances, the jurisdiction of military 
courts should be set aside in favour of the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts to 
conduct inquiries into serious human rights violations such as extrajudicial 
executions, enforced disappearances and torture, and to prosecute and try persons 
accused of such crimes.‖ With regard to the question of enforced disappearance, 
Article 16 (2) of the United Nations Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance
90
 stipulates that persons responsible for enforced 
disappearance, either as principal or accessory ―...shall be tried only by the competent 
ordinary courts in each State, and not by any other special tribunal, in particular 
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military courts.‖91 The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance
92
 does not however restrict the jurisdiction of military 
courts in the above respect. The Convention provides that ―any person tried for an 
offence of enforced disappearance shall benefit from a fair trial before a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.‖93 
 
An important question that can be asked now is: Why should military courts, even if 
they fully comply with the guarantees of the right to a fair trial be denied the 
jurisdiction to try soldiers accused of gross human rights violations? The major reason 
which in our opinion is legitimate lies in the great need to combat impunity. This 
reasoning is supported by the context in which the Updated Set of Principles for the 
Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity
94
  
restrict the jurisdiction of military courts.
95
 According to Principle 29 of these 
Principles: 
 
The jurisdiction of military tribunals must be restricted solely to 
specifically military offences committed by military personnel, to the 
exclusion of human rights violations, which shall come under the 
jurisdiction of the ordinary domestic courts or, where appropriate, in the 
case of serious crimes under international law, of an international or 
internationalized criminal court.
96
 
 
While it is true as writers like Gibson argue, that military courts can be effective tools 
for ending impunity and that a military court in one state may be much fairer and more 
competent to try human rights violation related offences than a civilian court in 
another state,
97
 experience from countries like Uganda where military personnel in the 
                                                          
91
 Emphasis added. 
92
 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, GA 
Res.61/177, 61
st
 Sess., UN Doc. A/RES/61/177 (20 December 2006) 1 at 5. 
93
 Ibid, Article 11 (3). 
94
 Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to 
Combat Impunity, E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1. 
95
 According to the Preamble of these Principles which gives the context in which they were adopted, 
the UN Human Rights Commission adopted them as guidelines to assist states in developing effective 
measures for combating impunity. 
96
 Emphasis added. 
97
 Gibson (2008), supra note 78, pp.40 and 41. 
 67 
different regimes have violated peoples‘ human rights with impunity points to the 
great need to restrict the jurisdiction of military tribunals in the above respect. Even 
when the military courts may apparently be fully compliant with the right to a fair 
trial, issues like the general level of professionalism in a particular army, the model of 
civil-military relations within a particular state and the integrity of Government can 
have strong bearings on whether they can truly be effective tools to fight impunity.
98
 
For instance, in an army whose level of professionalism is low, for a number of 
reasons including the desire to protect the image of the army as an institution, 
commanding officers may fail (or refuse) to initiate investigations or they may conduct 
sham investigations that cannot provide good evidence for successful prosecution of 
soldiers accused of violating human rights. Therefore, even if the courts themselves 
may be competent, independent and impartial, if cases of human rights violations are 
not brought to them or are brought to them with poor evidence as a failure of the 
military authorities to do their work, they cannot do much. In such cases, the 
deficiencies are not with the military courts but with the entire army as an institution. 
Therefore, for countries like Uganda with a repeated history of the armed forces 
violating peoples‘ human rights with impunity, and whose armed forces  
professionalism and integrity is still generally questionable, it remains important to 
restrict the jurisdiction of their military courts as far as trying soldiers accused of 
committing human rights violations is concerned.
99
  
 
The competence of persons who constitute a tribunal as the second major aspect of the 
right to a competent tribunal, requires that people who play judicial roles in a tribunal 
must have the relevant legal training and must be persons of integrity in order to carry 
out their functions effectively. Principle 10 of the UN Basic Principles on the 
Independence of the Judiciary thus states that ―Persons selected for judicial office 
shall be individuals of integrity and ability with appropriate training or qualifications 
in law.‖ The African Commission Principles also state that ―No person shall be 
appointed to judicial office unless they have the appropriate training or learning that 
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enables them to adequately fulfill their functions.‖100 In the same spirit, Principle 13 
of the UN Principles on Military Justice provides that ―…the persons selected to 
perform the functions of judges in military courts must display integrity and 
competence and show proof of the necessary legal training and qualifications.‖ The 
UN Principles on Military Justice  further stress that ―…emphasis should be placed on 
the requirement that judges called upon to sit in military courts should be competent, 
having undergone the same legal training as that required of professional judges.‖101 
This is important for the fact that, as required in any democratic society, if military 
tribunals are to dispense justice based on the same standards as civilian courts, then 
surely the judges of either court must have the same level of understanding and 
appreciation of the legal rules and procedures.  
A key question to pose here is: In the context of military tribunals, does the 
requirement to have appropriate qualifications in law (legal competence) apply to 
both the members of the tribunal and the judge advocates? It is submitted that 
principally, this requirement applies to the judge advocates since (as opposed to the 
members of the court who are triers of facts) their major role is actually to advise the 
military courts on issues of law and procedure. Thus in Cooper v. United Kingdom,
102
 
the ECrtHR held that although there was no requirement that ordinary members of 
court martial should have formal legal training, this was not necessarily inconsistent 
with Article 6 (1) of the ECHR which protects the right to an independent and 
impartial tribunal. Referring, inter alia, to the ―key role of legally qualified and 
experienced judge advocate whose directions [on issues of law and procedure] the 
ordinary members of court would be careful to respect,‖ the Court held that in the 
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circumstances, the independence of the ordinary members of court was not 
undermined by their lack of legal qualifications.
103
 
Where however, the military court does not have legally qualified advocates or where 
the judge advocates do not enjoy sufficient safeguards to guarantee their 
independence and impartiality or where, as legally qualified persons, they do not play 
substantial roles in the proceedings and decisions of court, there is always need to fill 
this gap by requiring that all or some of the members of court be legally competent. 
Thus in Media Rights Agenda v. Nigeria,
104
 where the tribunal in question seems not 
to have had anyone legally competent to advise it on issues of law and procedure, the 
ACHPR held that ―selection of serving military officers with little or no knowledge of 
law…” as members of the special tribunal which tried Niran Malaolu contravened 
Principle 10 of the UN Basic Principles on the independence of the Judiciary.
105
 At 
the end of it all, the ultimate test is whether a tribunal taken as a whole can be said to 
be legally competent. 
Another important issue that may be asked is whether the legal competence 
deficiencies of military tribunals can be solved by providing subsequent review 
mechanisms that establish the compliance of the courts‘ proceedings with the law. 
The general principle established by case law jurisprudence from the ECrtHR, is that 
an accused faced with a criminal charge is entitled to a first-instance court which fully 
complies with the requirements of the right to a fair trial, and that 
structural/organizational defects cannot be corrected by any subsequent review 
procedure.
106
 
However, when it comes to legal defects resulting from for example the lack of judge 
advocates to advise the courts, or, the courts not applying relevant legal principles or 
applying them wrongly, it may be possible that such defects can be corrected by 
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subsequent review mechanisms. In De Cubber v. Belgium,
107
 quoting the case of 
Adolf v. Austria,
108
 in which it held that the Austrian Supreme Court had ―cleared…of 
any finding of guilt‖ an applicant in respect of whom a district court had not respected 
the guarantee of presumption of innocence provided for in Article 6 of the ECHR, the 
ECrtHR held that ―The possibility certainly exists that a higher or highest court might, 
in some circumstances, make reparation for an initial violation of one of the 
provisions of the Convention.‖109 On the facts of the case, the Court held however, 
that since the defect in question did not bear solely upon the conduct of the first-
instance proceedings, its source being the very composition of the court in issue, the 
Court of Appeal did not cure it since it did not quash on that ground the judgment in 
question in its entirety.
110
 
For a subsequent review to correct the legal competency deficiencies of a court, the 
review must be made by a judicial body,
111
 or in the event that it is not a judicial 
body, the final decision must rest with a judicial body which meets the requirements 
of a fair trial.
112
 Unfortunately, as this Chapter firmly establishes, Uganda‘s appellate 
military courts (including the top most), which would be expected to correct the legal 
competence deficiencies of the lower courts, do not meet the requirements of a fair 
trial. Moreover, except in cases involving death or imprisonment for life, no appeal is 
allowed from the military courts to the civilian courts.  
In sum, it is clear that the right to a competent tribunal under international human 
rights law requires that tribunals must not only have jurisdiction over the subject 
matter and the persons they try, but also that they should be legally competent. With 
respect to the question of the jurisdiction of military tribunals over civilians, the 
general rule is that military courts should not have the power to try civilians. With 
exception to Section G (c) of the African Commission Principles which proposes an 
absolute rule in that regard, this rule is only subject to a situation where a state can 
                                                          
107
 De Cubber v. Belgium, Application no. 9186/80, Judgment of 26 October 1984. 
108
 Adolf v. Austria, Application no.8269/78, Judgment of 26 March 1982. 
109
 Supra note 107, para.33. 
110
 Ibid. 
111
 This is because as an important aspect of the right to an independent tribunal, decisions of court 
cannot be varied by a non-judicial establishment. 
112
 Cooper v. United Kingdom, supra note 102, paras.130 and 131. 
 71 
show that resorting to trial of civilians in military courts is necessary and justified by 
objective and serious reasons. The State that seeks to try civilians in military courts 
must demonstrate with regard to the specific class of individuals and offences at issue, 
that the regular civilian courts are unable to undertake the trials, that other alternative 
forms of special or high security civilian courts are inadequate to the task and that 
recourse to the military tribunals is unavoidable. These exceptions must necessarily be 
restrictively interpreted and in all cases, the trial of civilians before military tribunals 
should be in full conformity of the guarantees of the right to a fair trial. It is also the 
position in international human rights law that military courts are not generally 
considered competent tribunals for trying military personnel accused of committing 
gross human rights violations. 
2.3.2. The Right to an Independent Tribunal 
Perhaps the most important guarantee of the right to a fair trial is the right to an 
independent tribunal. The right to an independent tribunal is guaranteed by both the 
UDHR and the ICCPR.
113
 Although the African Charter does not explicitly provide 
for the right to an independent tribunal, Article 26 of the Charter imposes an 
obligation on states party to ensure that their courts are independent. Following on the 
above treaty provisions, Principle 1 of the UN Basic Principles on the Independence 
of the Judiciary states that ―…the independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed 
by the State and enshrined in the Constitution or the law of the country. It is the duty 
of all governmental and other institutions to respect and observe the independence of 
the judiciary.‖ Together with the right to an impartial tribunal, the right to an 
independent tribunal is possibly the most important canon in the administration of 
justice in any democratic society. It is a major pre-requisite for access to justice; 
without which, justice remains illusory. Only an independent tribunal is able to render 
justice impartially on the basis of law.
114
 Also, along with the right to a competent and 
impartial tribunal, the right to an independent tribunal is an absolute right; meaning 
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that it is not subject to any exceptions.
115
 It is therefore a right which applies in all 
circumstances.  
What then are the essential attributes of this important right? Although the notions of 
―independence‖ and ―impartiality‖ are closely linked, it is still possible to identify the 
major elements of each. It is clear from existing jurisprudence that the notion of 
independence of a tribunal involves individual and institutional aspects. The 
requirement of institutional independence is the embodiment of the important and 
much cherished doctrine of separation of powers which requires that in order to 
prevent and mitigate abuses of state power; the three arms of Government (viz., the 
executive, legislature and the judiciary) must constitute a system of checks and 
balances.
116
 In this regard, the HRC has emphasised that the requirement of 
independence of a tribunal refers, inter alia, to ―…the actual independence of the 
judiciary from political interference by the executive branch and the legislature.‖117  
Principle 1 of the UN Principles on Military Justice also states in this regard that 
‗Military tribunals, when they exist, may be established only by the constitution or the 
law, respecting the principle of the separation of powers.‖118 Thus in Olo Bahamonde 
v. Equatorial Guinea,
119
 where it was alleged that the President of Equatorial Guinea 
controls the judiciary, the HRC held that ―…a situation where the functions and 
competencies of the judiciary and the executive are not clearly distinguishable or 
where the latter is able to control or direct the former is incompatible with the notion 
of an independent tribunal within the meaning of Article 14 (1) of the Covenant.‖120  
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The basic principle upon which both the institutional and individual independence of 
military tribunals can be ensured in the administration of military justice is that 
military judges and other critical staff in the military justice system like the members 
of military courts should have a status guaranteeing their independence in particular 
vis-à-vis the military hierarchy and command.
121
 This is very important because it is a 
cardinal rule in the military that lower rank soldiers must obey orders and instructions 
from their superiors. If this rule were to apply to members of military courts and other 
officers of the military justice system in their conduct of judicial business, then surely 
military justice would be a mockery of justice. Although it is appreciated that the idea 
of a separate system of military justice requires some relations between the military 
hierarchy (and therefore the executive) and the military judicial system,
122
 members 
of military courts and other officers of the military justice system like the judge 
advocates should never act as agents of the military leadership or the executive. 
 
The principle of institutional independence requires that military tribunals must be 
free from interference especially from the executive and the military hierarchical 
command with respect to matters that relate to their judicial function. They must not 
only be self-governing as regards their administrative and operational matters but in 
line with Principle 3 of the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, 
they must also be independent in their decision-making. Government authorities, in 
particular the executive and the military leadership must, in keeping with Principle 1 
of the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, observe and respect 
the independence and decisions of military tribunals. In conformity with Principle 4 
of the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary; decisions of military 
tribunals should also never be subjected to revision by a non-judicial establishment. In 
Morris v. United Kingdom,
123
 the ECrtHR emphasised the point that the power to give 
a binding decision which may not be altered by a non-judicial authority is inherent in 
the very notion of a ―tribunal.‖ It held that the principle is also a component of the 
right to an independent tribunal as required by Article 6 (1) of the ECHR. In Findlay 
v. United Kingdom,
124
  the role played by the convening officer of the court martial as 
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―confirming officer‖ of the decisions of court was found to be contrary to this well-
established principle.  
Another critical aspect for ensuring the institutional independence of military 
tribunals is that the authority that appoints members of the tribunal must not be the 
same to appoint the prosecutor. In R v. Genereux
125
 where this was the case, while 
observing that the convening authority of the General Court Martial was an integral 
part of the military hierarchy and therefore of the Executive, Lord Lamer C.J 
delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada held that ―…it is not 
acceptable that the convening authority, i.e. the executive, who is responsible for 
appointing the prosecutor, also have the authority to appoint members of the court 
martial, who serve as triers of fact.‖126 He emphasised that ―…at the minimum… 
where the same representative of the executive, the ‗convening authority,‘ appoints 
both the prosecutor and the triers of fact, the requirements of s. 11 (d) will not be 
met.‖127 Similarly, in Findlay v. the United Kingdom,128 the ECrtHR was concerned 
among other things that the convening officer of the court martial who appointed its 
members, also appointed the prosecuting officers. It therefore held that in light of the 
central role played by the convening officer (which included appointing both the 
members of the court and the prosecutor); Findlay‘s misgivings about the 
independence and impartiality of the tribunal were objectively justified.
129
 
Related to the question of appointment of the prosecutors, is that it is also an essential 
requirement for ensuring the institutional independence of military tribunals that 
persons who preside as judge advocates must be appointed by an independent 
establishment. In R v. Genereux, while holding that the appointment of the Judge 
advocate by the Judge Advocate General undermined the institutional independence 
of the General Court Martial, Lord Lamer C.J observed that ―…the close ties between 
the Judge Advocate General, who is appointed by the Governor in Council, and the 
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Executive, is obvious.‖130 He emphasised that the effective appointment of the judge 
advocate by the executive could, in objective terms, raise a reasonable apprehension 
as to the independence of the tribunal.
131
 He stressed that in order to comply with 
Section 11 (d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the appointment of a 
military personnel to sit as a judge advocate at a military tribunal should be in the 
hands of an independent and impartial judicial officer.
132
 
Like with civilian judges, the three factors considered key for ensuring the individual 
independence of military judges are: the manner of appointment, security of tenure 
and financial security. In this regard, the HRC has emphasised that ―…the 
requirement of independence refers, in particular, to the procedure and qualifications 
for the appointment of judges, and guarantees relating to their security of tenure... the 
conditions governing promotion, transfer, suspension and cessation of their 
functions.‖133 The HRC has further stressed that ―…states should take specific 
measures …protecting judges from any form of political influence in their decision-
making through the constitution or adoption of laws establishing clear procedures and 
objective criteria for the appointment, remuneration, tenure, promotion, suspension 
and dismissal of the members of the judiciary, and disciplinary sanctions against 
them.‖134 Principle 11 of the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the 
Judiciary also requires that ―...the term of office of judges... adequate remuneration 
and conditions of service, pensions and the age of retirement shall be adequately 
secured by law.‖ According to the ECrtHR jurisprudence, in order to establish 
whether a tribunal can be considered independent, within the meaning of the ECHR,  
regard must be had, inter alia, to the manner of appointment of its members and their 
term of office, the existence of guarantees against outside pressures and the question 
whether the body presents an appearance of independence.
135
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Regarding the manner of appointment of persons to judicial office, two points must be 
emphasised. First, the method of judicial selection must safeguard against judicial 
appointments for improper motives and must ensure that only individuals of integrity 
and ability with appropriate training are appointed.
136
 Thus, as part of the elements 
necessary to ensure independence of tribunals, Section A (1) (i) of the African 
Commission Principles also stresses, inter alia, that ―The sole criteria for appointment 
to judicial office shall be the suitability of a candidate for such office by reason of 
integrity, appropriate training or learning and ability.‖ Principle 13 of the UN 
Principles on Military Justice states, inter alia, that ―…the persons selected to perform 
the functions of judges in military courts must display integrity and competence and 
show proof of the necessary legal training and qualifications.‖ In Media Rights 
Agenda v. Nigeria,
137
 the ACHPR held that the selection of serving military officers, 
with little or no knowledge of law as members of the special military tribunal that 
tried Malaolu was in contravention of Principle 10 of the UN Basic Principles on the 
Independence of the Judiciary. 
It is worth observing in the above regard that in addition to the issue of appropriate 
training and qualifications being critical for ensuring the competence of tribunals as 
discussed in Section 2.3.1 above, the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the 
Judiciary, the African Commission Principles, and the UN Principles on Military 
Justice consider it also as a key aspect in ensuring the right to an independent tribunal. 
This is presumably because it is assumed that through the relevant training, persons 
appointed to judicial office are able to understand and appreciate the need to ensure 
and uphold the independence of tribunals. This reasoning is reinforced by the African 
Commission Principles which require states to ensure that judicial officials have 
appropriate education and training and should be made aware of the ideals and ethical 
duties of their office, of the constitutional and statutory protections for the rights of 
accused persons, victims and other litigants and of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms recognized by national and international law. Thus, in Amnesty 
International and Others  v. Sudan,
138
 the ACHPR held that the dismissal of over 100 
judicial officers by the Sudanese government deprived the courts of qualified 
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personnel required to ensure their independence and impartiality. The UN Principles 
on Military Justice make the point even more clear. It is explicitly stated that ―The 
legal competence and ethical standards of military judges, as judges who are fully 
aware of their duties and responsibilities, form an intrinsic part of their independence 
and impartiality.‖139 
Second, the appointment of military personnel to judicial office must ensure their 
protection vis-à-vis the military hierarchy, avoiding any direct or indirect 
subordination, whether in the organisation and operation of the military justice system 
itself or in terms of career development.
140
 In Incal v. Turkey,
141
 the ECrtHR held that 
among the issues that made the Izmir National Security Court‘s independence 
questionable was the fact that it was comprised of servicemen who still belonged to 
the army, which in turn took orders from the executive. The Court was concerned that 
such members remained subject to military discipline and that assessment reports 
were compiled on them by the army for that purpose.
142
 Similarly, in Findlay v. 
United Kingdom,
143
 while assessing whether the members of the court-martial in 
question were sufficiently independent of the convening officer; the ECrtHR noted 
that all of them were subordinate to him in rank. Pointing out that in order to maintain 
the confidence in the independence and impartiality of the court, appearances are 
important, it held that since all the members of the court martial which decided 
Findlay‘s case were subordinate in rank to the convening officer, Findlay‘s doubts 
about the tribunal‘s independence and impartiality were objectively justified.144 
The essence of security of tenure as an important aspect in securing the individual 
independence of judges is that their tenure must be secured against interference by the 
Executive or other appointing authority in a discretionary or arbitrary manner. 
Principle 12 of the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary 
accordingly provides that ―…judges whether appointed or elected, shall have 
guaranteed tenure until a mandatory retirement age or the expiry of their term of 
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office, where such exists.‖ In Valente v. Queen,145 the Supreme Court of Canada held, 
regarding a legislative provision to the effect that a provincial court judge could hold 
office under a post-retirement reappointment at the pleasure of the executive, that 
such judge would not be independent within the meaning of Section 11 (d) of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
 
An important aspect of guaranteeing security of tenure is that once appointed or 
elected judge, one should only be dismissed on serious grounds of misconduct or 
incompetence, in accordance with fair procedures ensuring objectivity and 
impartiality set out in the constitution or the law.
146
 The judge affected must be 
afforded a full opportunity to be heard.  Thus the dismissal of judges by the executive 
before expiry of the term for which they had been appointed, without any specific 
reason given to them was held to be incompatible with the independence of the 
judiciary.
147
 In Mundyo Busyo et al v. Democratic Republic of Congo,
148
 where 315 
judges were dismissed by the President without following established procedures 
(which required that such dismissals could only be legal if they were in response to a 
proposal by the Supreme Council of the Judiciary), the HRC held that the dismissals 
constituted an attack on the independence of the judiciary protected by Article 14, 
paragraph 1, of the ICCPR. Similarly, in its Concluding Observations on the 1996 
Zambia periodic report under Article 40 of the ICCPR, the HRC was concerned about 
the President‘s power to remove the judges without any independent judicial 
oversight.
149
 Also, in its Concluding Observations on Algeria‘s 1998 periodic report, 
the HRC expressed concern over the fact that ―…judges enjoy immovability only 
after 10 years of work.‖150 
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A key factor in ensuring security of tenure is the duration of the term of office of the 
judges. The HRC has previously noted that ―…the election of judges by popular vote 
for a fixed maximum term of six years does not ensure their independence and 
impartiality.‖151 Similarly, the UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of the 
judges and lawyers has argued that while ―fixed term contracts may not be 
objectionable and not inconsistent with the principle of judicial independence, a term 
of five years is too short for security of tenure.‖152 In his view, a reasonable term 
would be 10 years.
153
  In Incal v. Turkey, where the major complaint was that the 
Izmir National Security Court which comprised of military judges was not 
independent, the ECrtHR held that among the aspects that made the independence of 
those judges questionable, was that their term of office was only four years and 
subject to renewal.
154
  
The final major essential condition for ensuring independence of judges is the issue of 
financial security. As was well explained by the Supreme Court of Canada, the 
essence of financial security as an essential condition for securing the independence 
of a tribunal is that ―the right to salary and pension should be established by law and 
not be subject to arbitrary interference by the Executive in a manner that could affect 
judicial independence.‖155 In R v. Genereux,156 it was held that the requirement of 
financial security will not be satisfied if the executive is in position to reward or 
punish the conduct of members of the military tribunal and the judge advocate by 
granting or withholding benefits in form of promotions and salary increases or 
bonuses. Salaries, allowances, pensions and other remunerations and benefits of 
military judges like their civilian counter-parts must not therefore depend on the grace 
or favour of the executive or the military hierarchy. As required by Principle 11 of the 
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Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, they must be adequately 
secured by law. They must be secured in a way that does not allow the executive or its 
representative to influence or manipulate the judges.  
As we come to the conclusion of the analysis in this Section about the right to an 
independent tribunal, an important question that must be asked is: With all the above 
factors in mind, what constitutes the legitimate test for determining the independence 
of a particular tribunal? In a passage that accords well with international human rights 
law, this was succinctly stated by Lamer C.J as follows: 
 …an individual who wishes to challenge the independence of a 
tribunal…. need not prove an actual lack of independence. Instead, the 
test for this purpose is the same as the test for determining whether a 
decision maker is biased. The question is whether an informed and 
reasonable person would perceive the tribunal as independent…. The 
perception must; however… be a perception of whether the tribunal 
enjoys the essential objective conditions or guarantees of judicial 
independence, and not a perception of how it will in fact act, 
regardless of whether it enjoys such conditions or guarantees.
157
  
The test stated above by Justice Lamer is in essence the same as that applied by the 
ECrtHR and other international and regional human rights supervisory bodies. The 
ECrtHR has for instance held in a wealth of decisions that ―in determining whether 
there is a legitimate reason to fear that a particular tribunal lacks independence or 
impartiality, the stand point of the accused is important without being decisive. What 
is decisive is whether his doubts can be held to be objectively justified.‖158 
One last important question to ask here is: In the context of military tribunals, do all 
the requirements of independence of tribunals apply to the members of the tribunal as 
they do to the judge advocates? In Cooper v. United Kingdom
159
 where the ECrtHR 
was, inter alia, faced with the issue of whether the lack of legal qualifications by 
members of court martial was inconsistent with the right to an independent and 
impartial tribunal, the Court held that the general principles established in its case law 
regarding the independence and impartiality of tribunals apply to both the lay judges 
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and professional judges. In Holm v. Sweden,
160
 the Court explicitly stated that the 
principles established in its case law regarding the independence and impartiality of 
tribunals ―apply to jurors as they do to professional judges and lay judges‖161 
 
The major principle which the ECrtHR has established regarding the independence of 
tribunals is that in order to establish whether a tribunal can be considered as 
independent, regard must be had, inter alia, ―to the manner of appointment of its 
members and their term of office, the existence of guarantees against outside 
pressures and the question whether the body presents an appearance of 
independence.‖162 From this perspective, it is tenable to conclude that the general rule 
is that all the requirements of independence of tribunals apply to the members of 
military courts as they do to the judge advocates. This is important because both the 
judge advocates and the members of court are decision-makers and they therefore 
need to be independent. While the judge advocate rules on issues of law and 
procedure, based on the judge advocate‘s rulings, the members of court decide the 
innocence of the accused and sentence, if found guilty. 
 
However, since at the end of it all, the ultimate test for determining compliance of a 
tribunal with the right to an independent tribunal is to establish whether taken as a 
whole, a tribunal can be said to be independent, then depending on the organisation of 
a particular country‘s military justice system and the safeguards of independence it 
provides to the different players, the guarantees for securing independence of judicial 
officers like security of tenure and financial security may not have to apply equally 
(or) to all players in the system. For instance, with respect to the issue of security of 
tenure, the general position taken by the ECrtHR and the House of Lords is that the 
members of military courts like the jurors in the civil courts do not necessarily require 
security of tenure to guarantee their independence. Thus, in Cooper v. United 
Kingdom,
163
 while noting the ad hoc nature of the appointment of the ordinary 
members of the court martial (in that they return to ordinary service immediately after 
the court-martial), the court held that such tenure does not in itself undermine their 
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independence but points to the need for strong safeguards against outside pressure 
being brought to bear on them. The Court found, inter alia, the protection offered by 
the permanent president of court martial (who enjoyed significant safeguards for 
independence including defacto security of tenure), the role of legally qualified and 
experienced judge advocates whose directions the ordinary members would have to 
respect, and the fact that the ordinary members of court could not be reported on in 
relation to their judicial function to constitute sufficient safeguards of the 
independence for the ordinary members of court.
164
 In Regina v. Boyd,
165
 while 
referring to the ECrtHR case of Morris v. United Kingdom, the House of Lords put it 
clearly that: 
It is true that, apart from any permanent president, the officers selected to 
serve on courts-martial are appointed only ad hoc…that is not in itself 
sufficient to make the court incompatible with the independence 
requirements of article 6 (1)…In the light of their experience of jury trial, 
however, courts in countries which operate with juries have concluded that 
the safeguards of the oath and the judge's directions are generally sufficient 
to ensure that jurors put aside their prejudices and reach a just verdict on the 
evidence…The European Court too has recognised that the jurors' oath, to 
faithfully try the case and to give a true verdict according to the evidence, 
and their obligation to have regard to the directions given by the presiding 
judge will generally be sufficient to safeguard their independence and 
impartiality. This is so even in cases where there is reason to believe that 
one or more members of the jury may actually be prejudiced against the 
accused.
166
 
 
Although the ECrtHR and the House of Lords have good reasons for taking the 
above-mentioned general position, it is submitted that where for instance, the 
safeguards offered by a particular military justice system may not be adequate to 
secure the independence and impartiality of the judge advocates, and where the role of 
the judge advocates in the proceedings and decisions of court is not significant, the 
issue of security of tenure of the members of military courts or the presidents of those 
courts becomes important. This is especially because, at the end of it all, the question 
will be whether taken as a whole, a tribunal can be said to be independent.    
In conclusion, it can be summarised that the right to an independent tribunal as 
guaranteed by international human rights law comprises two aspects i.e. institutional 
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independence of a tribunal and the individual independence of the members of the 
tribunal. The notion of institutional independence requires that the tribunal must be 
independent especially from the executive as required by the doctrine of separation of 
powers. In the context of military justice where the top military hierarchy is the apex 
of executive representation, this means that military tribunals must be independent 
from the executive and the military hierarchical command. Military tribunals must not 
only be self-governing as regards their operations and administrative issues but must 
also be independent in their decision making. Government authorities, in particular 
the executive and the military hierarchy must not interfere with the operations of 
military tribunals and must respect their decisions. Decisions of military tribunals 
should never be made subject to review by non-judicial establishments. Prosecutors 
and the military judges should never be appointed by the same authority that appoints 
the members of the military tribunals. They must be appointed by an independent 
establishment. Needless to emphasise, they must be persons of integrity with relevant 
qualifications.  
Individual independence on the other hand requires that only individuals of integrity 
and ability with appropriate legal training and qualifications must be appointed judges 
in military tribunals. It also entails protecting the members of military courts and 
military judges‘ independence vis-à-vis the military hierarchical command and in 
particular avoiding subordination both in the organisation of the military justice 
system itself and in terms of career development. Finally, it requires that the tenure 
and financial benefits and entitlements of the military judges and members of military 
courts should be secured against the discretionary or arbitrary interference by the 
executive, military hierarchy or any other appointing authority. 
2.3.3. The Right to an Impartial Tribunal 
Closely related to the right to an independent tribunal, is the right to an impartial 
tribunal. The right to an impartial tribunal is protected as part and parcel of the right 
to a fair trial by both the UDHR and the ICCPR.
167
 It is also guaranteed by Article 7 
(1) (d) of the African Charter. Principle 2 of the UN Basic Principles on the 
Independence of the Judiciary also stipulates that ―…the judiciary shall decide matters 
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before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without 
any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, 
direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.‖ The right to an impartial 
tribunal is arguably the most important guarantee for ensuring a fair trial. For an 
individual who is party to judicial proceedings, it is more likely that impartiality of 
the tribunal matters more than any other fair trial guarantees. To such a person, as 
Trechsel rightly argues, it may not matter much that a tribunal is incompetent and not 
independent, as long as its impartiality is guaranteed.
168
 If however the tribunal is not 
impartial, however independent and competent it may be, ―its very basis and role as a 
neutral arbiter in the adjudication of cases is distorted and public confidence in the 
judicial system is greatly undermined.‖169 It is indeed plausible to argue in the above 
respect that a tribunal which is not impartial is not a tribunal at all. This is essentially 
because the requirement of impartiality is inherent in the very concept of a tribunal. 
The requirement for impartiality of a tribunal has two aspects. First, the tribunal must 
be subjectively free of personal bias. The HRC has thus stated that the judges must 
not allow their judgments to be influenced by personal bias or prejudice, nor harbour 
preconceptions about the particular case before them, nor act in ways that improperly 
promote the interests of one of the parties to the detriment of the other.
170
 As Trechsel 
put it, ―The judge must be free to float hither and thither between the positions of the 
parties and finally reach a decision at the place which, in correct application of the 
rules of jurisprudence, marks the just solution.‖171 
 
Secondly, the tribunal must also appear to reasonable observers to be impartial.
172
 
This requirement is the embodiment of the old but still very important principle in the 
administration of justice that ―justice must not only be done, but should manifestly 
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and undoubtedly be seen to be done.‖173 This requirement is very important for 
instilling public confidence in the ability of the tribunal to execute its functions in a 
neutral manner. The ECrtHR has emphasised that the appearance of a tribunal is 
important because ―what is at stake is the confidence which the courts in a democratic 
society must inspire in the public and above all in the parties to the proceedings.‖174 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Canada has also stressed that ―both the independence 
and impartiality of a tribunal are fundamental not only to the capacity of court to do 
justice but also to individual and public confidence in the administration of justice; 
without which the tribunal cannot command the respect and acceptance that are 
essential to its effective operation.‖175 In Constitutional Rights Project (in respect of 
Wahab Akamu, Gbolahan Adeaga and others) v. Nigeria,
176
 where the ACHPR was 
faced with the issue of a special tribunal which consisted of one retired judge, one 
member of the armed forces and one member of the police force, while  observing 
that the tribunal was composed of persons belonging largely to the executive branch 
of Government, the same branch that passed the Robbery and Firearms Decree, it held 
that ―…regardless of the character of the individual members of such tribunal, its 
composition alone creates the appearance, if not actual lack, of impartiality.‖177 As a 
result, the ACHPR held that the tribunal in question violated Article 7 (1) (d) of the 
African Charter which guarantees the right to an impartial tribunal.
178
 
  
It is largely for this requirement, i.e. that the tribunal must appear to reasonable 
persons to be impartial, that international human rights law bars military and special 
tribunals with ―faceless judges.‖179 This is so even if the identity and status of such 
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judges is verified by an independent authority.
180
 In Polay Campos v. Peru,
181
 where 
the tribunal in issue was composed of ―faceless judges,‖ the HRC stated that trials by 
special tribunals composed of anonymous judges are incompatible with Article 14 of 
the ICCPR. It argued that in such a situation, ―the defendants do not know who the 
judges trying them are and unacceptable impediments are created to their preparation 
of their defence and communication with their lawyers. Moreover, this system fails to 
guarantee a cardinal aspect of a fair trial within the meaning of article 14 of the 
Covenant: that the tribunal must be, and be seen to be, independent and impartial. In 
a system of trial by ‗faceless judges‘, neither the independence nor the impartiality of 
the judges is guaranteed, since the tribunal, being established ad hoc, may comprise 
serving members of the armed forces.‖182 The HRC therefore held that the tribunal in 
issue breached the requirement for impartiality and independence of tribunals among 
other breaches of the ICCPR. 
With specific regard to military judges, the international community generally 
recognises that the concept of impartiality is a complex one. It acknowledges that 
parties to proceedings  before military tribunals have  good reasons to view the military 
judge as an officer who is capable of being ―a judge in his own cause‖ in any case 
involving the armed forces as an institution, rather than a specialist judge on the same 
footing as any other.
183
 That is why it is critical that everything should be done to 
minimise any doubts as to the impartiality of the military judges and therefore of the 
tribunals over which they preside. It is submitted in this regard that guaranteeing the 
independence and competence of military judges as discussed above are strong factors 
in themselves that can help in this respect. The presence of civilian judges in the 
composition of military tribunals is also an important factor that can help reinforce the 
impartiality of military tribunals.
184
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2.3.4. The Right to a Public Hearing 
Another yet essential guarantee of the right to a fair trial protected by international 
human rights law is the right to a public hearing. The right to a public hearing is 
protected by both the UDHR and the ICCPR.
185
 Although the African Charter does not 
provide specifically for the right to a public hearing, Section A (1) of the African 
Commission Principles states, inter alia, that ―…in the determination of any criminal 
charge against a person, or of his rights and obligations… everyone shall be entitled 
to… a public hearing…‖ In view of the fact that the African Charter does not 
specifically provide for the right to a public hearing, the approach adopted by the 
ACHPR has been to treat it as part and parcel of the general right to a fair hearing 
protected by Article 7 of the African Charter. For instance, in Civil Liberties 
Organisation et al v. Nigeria where it was alleged that except for the opening and 
closing ceremonies, the trial in issue was conducted in camera, the ACHPR held that 
that was ―… a violation of the victims‘ right to a fair hearing guaranteed under Article 
7 of the Charter.‖186  In Media Rights Agenda v. Nigeria,187 the ACHPR invoked 
Articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter which empowers it to draw inspiration from 
international human rights law and other specific and general conventions, and found 
Nigeria, inter alia, to be ―...in violation of the victim‘s right to fair trial guaranteed 
under Article 7 of the Charter.‖188 
 
Principle 14 of the UN Principles on Military Justice, emphasises with respect to 
proceedings before military tribunals, that as ―…in matters of ordinary law, public 
hearings must be the rule, and the holding of sessions in camera should be altogether 
exceptional and be authorised by a specific, well-grounded decision the legality of 
which is subject to review.‖ Subjecting the decisions of military tribunals to hold 
proceedings in camera to review is a welcome and important safeguard for the right to a 
public hearing in the administration of military justice. It enables the grounds for 
refusal to hold a public trial to be verified and thus ensures that the right to a public 
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hearing is not denied on frivolous grounds. It is however submitted that in order to be 
effective, the review should be by an independent judicial establishment preferably the 
civilian courts.  
The major importance of the requirement to make hearings public is that it ensures that 
the cardinal principle in the administration of justice that ―justice must not only be 
done, but should also manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done‖ is fulfilled. As 
Lord Atkin argued, ―Justice is not a cloistered virtue.‖189 In this regard, parties to the 
proceedings and the general public have the right to know and confirm how justice is 
administered. Article 9 (3) (b) of the UN Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of 
Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally 
Recognised Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Declaration on Human Rights 
Defenders)
190
 provides that ―…everyone has the right, individually and in association 
with others, inter alia: to attend public hearings, proceedings and trials so as to form an 
opinion on their compliance with national law and applicable international obligations 
and commitments.‖ Thus in Civil Liberties Organisation, et al v. Nigeria, while 
emphasising that Article 14 of ICCPR requires that the trial should guarantee the right 
of the accused person to examine or have examined the witnesses against him and to 
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same 
conditions as witnesses against him, the ACHPR held that ―…where the trial is held in 
camera, there can be no independent demonstration that these requirements have been 
met.
191
  
In the above regard, the requirement to make judicial proceedings public is therefore 
increasingly seen as a method of ensuring the accountability of judicial officers within 
a democratic society.
192
 It is argued that ―a judge is bound to be more fair and 
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circumspect while trying a case and delivering judgement in public than when the 
proceedings are held in secrecy.‖193  In the words of Jurist Bentham: 
 
In the darkness of secrecy, sinister interest, and evil in every shape have 
full swing. Only in proportion as publicity has place can any of the checks 
applicable to judicial injustice operate. Where there is no publicity, there is 
no justice. Publicity is the very soul of justice. It is the keenest spur to 
exertion and the surest guard against improbity. It keeps the judge himself 
while trying under trial.
194
 
 
Even if a secret trial is in fact otherwise fair, as Iheme rightly argues, the mere fact 
that it was done in secret is enough to create misgivings in the minds of members of 
public.
195
 From this perspective, publicity of judicial proceedings therefore also helps 
to instil and maintain public confidence in court processes without which; courts 
cannot command the respect and acceptance - aspects that are vital for their effective 
administration of justice in any democratic society. Thus in Axen v. Germany, while 
stressing the importance of the right to a public hearing under the ECHR, the ECrtHR 
affirmed that ―…the public character of the proceedings…protects litigants against the 
administration of justice in secret with no public scrutiny; it is also one of the means 
whereby confidence in the courts, superior and inferior, can be maintained. By 
rendering the administration of justice visible, publicity contributes to the aim of 
Article 6(1), namely a fair trial, the guarantee of which is one of the fundamental 
principles of any democratic society, within the meaning of the Convention.‖196 
 
In terms of its application, it has been affirmed that the requirement of a public 
hearing does not necessarily apply to all appellate proceedings.
197
 These proceedings 
may therefore take place on the basis of written submissions. The right to a public 
hearing does not also necessarily apply to the pre-trial decisions made by prosecutors 
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and other public authorities.
198
 Thus in Kavanagh v. Ireland where the author of the 
communication contended that his right to a public hearing was violated because he 
was not heard by the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) on the decision to 
convene a special criminal court, the HRC held that the right to a public hearing does 
not apply to pre-trial decisions made by prosecutors and public authorities.
199
 But for 
the proceedings to which the right to a public hearing applies, how is it to be realised 
in actual practice? In G. A. Van Meurs v. The Netherlands, the HRC held that ―courts 
must make information on time and venue of the oral hearings available to the public 
and provide for adequate facilities for the attendance of interested members of the 
public, within reasonable limits, taking into account, e.g., the potential public interest 
in the case, the duration of the oral hearing and the time the formal request for 
publicity has been made.‖200 
 
According to Section A of the African Commission Principles, the essential elements 
of the right to a public hearing require, inter alia that: (a) All the necessary 
information about the sittings of judicial bodies shall be made available to the public 
by the judicial body; (b) A permanent venue for proceedings by judicial bodies shall 
be established by the State and widely publicised. In the case of ad-hoc judicial 
bodies, the venue designated for the duration of their proceedings should be made 
public;  (c) Adequate facilities shall be provided for attendance by interested members 
of the public; (d) No limitations shall be placed by the judicial body on the category 
of people allowed to attend its hearings where the merits of a case are being 
examined;  and (e) Representatives of the media shall be entitled to be present at and 
report on judicial proceedings except that a judge may restrict or limit the use of 
cameras during the hearings. 
 
The HRC has emphasised that the requirement for public hearing is a duty imposed on 
the state and does not depend on request by the parties to the proceedings.
201
 It is 
therefore a requirement that where a tribunal decides to hold the proceedings in secret, 
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it must give reasons for such decision. Thus in Estrella v. Uruguay, where 
proceedings were held by the military court in camera and Estrella was only informed 
at the prison that he had been convicted and sentenced to four and a half years 
imprisonment for conspiracy to subvert the Constitution, the HRC held that the facts 
disclosed a violation of Article 14 (1) of the ICCPR because, among other issues, 
Estrella was tried without a public hearing and no reason had been given to justify this 
in accordance with the ICCPR.
202
  
The right to a public hearing is however subject to five important exceptions. The 
public including the press may be excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of 
morals, public order (ordre public) or national security in a democratic society, or 
when the interest of the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly 
necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would 
prejudice the interests of justice.
203
 A tribunal that seeks to exclude public from all or 
part of the trial on the above grounds must specify the particular ground which 
justifies its action. In Media Rights Agenda v. Nigeria, while noting that these grounds 
are exhaustive, the ACHPR noted that the Government had only presented an 
omnibus statement in its defence to the effect that the right to fair hearing in public 
was subject to the proviso that the court or tribunal might exclude from the 
proceedings persons other than the parties thereto in the interest of defence, public 
safety, public order etc.
204
 It emphasised that the Government of Nigeria had ―…not 
specifically indicated which of these circumstances prompted it to exclude the public 
from such trial. The Commission therefore considers the argument not sufficient 
enough to avail the Government of Nigeria such defence.‖205 
It is however emphasised, that notwithstanding the above exceptions to the right to a 
public hearing, any judgment rendered in a criminal case or in a suit at law must be 
made public except where the interest of juvenile persons otherwise requires or where 
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the proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the guardianship of children.
206
 A 
judgment is considered to have been made public either when it is orally pronounced 
in court or when it is published, or when it is made public by a combination of the two 
methods.
207
 The HRC has also emphasised with regard to judgments that they must be 
in writing. In Touron v. Uruguay,
208
 it lamented that in absence of a judgment in 
writing, it could not examine whether the proceedings against Touron amounted to a 
fair trial or whether the severity of the sentence imposed complied with the ICCPR. It 
therefore held that the trial of Touron violated Article 14 (1) of the ICCPR, because 
he had no public hearing and the judgement rendered against him was not made 
public because in the first place it was not in writing. The HRC has further stressed 
the point that judgments must be reasoned (i.e. they must contain the reasons for the 
decision). In Hamilton v. Jamaica,
209
 it argued that the absence of a reasoned 
judgment was likely to prevent Hamilton from successfully arguing his appeal. It 
emphasised that in cases of appeal, without a reasoned judgement, it is difficult to 
identify the point of law or serious miscarriage of justice of which the appellant 
complains.  
It necessarily follows that because of the importance of the right to a public hearing 
as analysed above, any exceptions to it must be strictly construed. This point is also 
underscored by the UN Principles on Military Justice which emphasise that all the 
acceptable grounds for excluding the public from judicial proceedings ―...must be 
strictly interpreted, particularly when ―national security‖ is invoked, and must be 
applied only where necessary in ―a democratic society.‖210 The HRC has also 
emphasised that apart from these exceptional circumstances, a hearing must be open 
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to the general public and must not be limited to a particular category of persons.
211
 
Although the HRC has tried to elaborate on the nature and scope of the exceptions to 
the right to a public hearing, they still raise important questions; answers to which are 
difficult to discern. For instance, what is the exact scope of these exceptions? What 
do the words ―morals,‖ ―public order‖ and ―national security‖ mean?  How is it to be 
determined that a particular trial should not be public on any of these grounds? 
Unfortunately, the nature and scope of the exceptions to the right to a public hearing 
is a matter that has hardly been explored in any substantial detail by human rights 
supervisory bodies and legal scholars. Nor does the travaux preparatoires of the 
ICCPR or the regional human rights instruments provide any indications as to what 
the parameters of these exceptions should be.
212
 Given the importance that 
international human rights law attaches to the right to a public hearing, this is a 
surprisingly significant shortcoming. By failing to provide guidelines on the scope of 
the exceptions to the right to a public hearing, it means, inter alia, that the regional 
and international human rights treaty bodies have left the scope of these exceptions to 
be determined solely by the individual states; something that is regrettable. Without a 
clear criteria on how these exceptions should be interpreted, their inherent 
ambiguities make the right to a public hearing susceptible to abuse and evasion. It is 
therefore critical that the HRC and the ACHPR provide guidance on this matter. 
Although some expert groups have come up with some useful guiding definitions and 
principles in the above respect,
213
 this does not absolve the international human rights 
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bodies like the HRC of their obligation to guide the international community on this 
matter. 
2.3.5. The Right to a Fair Hearing 
In addition to the guarantees of the right to a fair trial analysed above, international 
human rights law also provides for and protects the right to a fair hearing. The second 
sentence of Article 14 (1) of the ICCPR thus states inter alia that ―…In the 
determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a 
suit at law…everybody shall be entitled to a fair… hearing…‖ Similarly, Article 10 of 
the UDHR declares, inter alia, that ―Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair… 
hearing…‖ The African Charter does not have any specific provision on the right to a 
fair hearing but Section A (1) of the African Commission Principles states in line with 
the analogous provisions of the ICCPR and the UDHR quoted above, that ―...in the 
determination of any criminal charge against a person, or of his rights and 
obligations…everyone shall be entitled to a fair…hearing...‖ What then is the nature 
and scope of the right to a fair hearing as guaranteed by these provisions? How 
different is it from the general right to a fair trial? What is the relationship between 
the two? 
 
First, it is critical to point out that the right to a fair hearing is only a procedural 
guarantee intended to secure procedural justice rather than outcome justice or result-
oriented justice.
214
 The HRC has emphasised in this regard that the right to a fair 
hearing as provided for in Article 14 of the ICCPR, guarantees only procedural 
fairness and cannot be interpreted as ensuring the absence of error on the part of the 
competent tribunal.
215
 It is generally for the domestic courts to review facts and 
evidence, or the application of domestic legislation, in a particular case, unless it can 
be shown that such evaluation or application was manifestly arbitrary or amounted to 
a manifest error or denial of justice.
216
 Thus, in Juan Martínez Mercader et al. v. 
Spain,
217
 while reiterating the above position, the HRC held that ―…with regard to the 
authors' claim that the situations reported constitute a violation of article 14, 
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paragraph 1, of the Covenant, the Committee considers that the allegations relate in 
substance to the assessment of facts and evidence made by the Spanish courts… The 
Committee considers that the authors have not sufficiently substantiated their 
complaint to be able to state that such arbitrariness or a denial of justice existed in the 
present case, and consequently believes that this part of the communication must be 
found inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol.‖218 
 
As regards the essential elements and standards against which a hearing may be 
adjudged as fair, while observing that the ICCPR does not explain what is meant by a 
―fair hearing,‖ the HRC has held that ―…the concept of a fair hearing in the context of 
article 14 (1) of the Covenant should be interpreted as requiring a number of 
conditions, such as equality of arms, respect for the principle of adversary 
proceedings, preclusion of ex officio reformation in pejus, and expeditious 
procedure.‖219 According to Section A (2) of the African Commission Principles, the 
essential elements of a fair hearing include: (a) equality of arms between the parties to 
a proceedings, whether they be administrative, civil, criminal, or military; (b) equality 
of all persons before any judicial body without any distinction whatsoever as regards 
race, colour, ethnic origin, sex, gender, age, religion, creed, language, political or 
other convictions, national or social origin, means, disability, birth, status or other 
circumstances; (c) equality of access by women and men to judicial bodies and 
equality before the law in any legal proceedings; (d) respect for the inherent dignity of 
the human persons, especially of women who participate in legal proceedings as 
complainants, witnesses, victims or accused; (e) adequate opportunity to prepare a 
case, present arguments and evidence and to challenge or respond to opposing 
arguments or evidence; (f) an entitlement to consult and be represented by a legal 
representative or other qualified persons chosen by the party at all stages of the 
proceedings; (g) an entitlement to the assistance of an interpreter if he or she cannot 
understand or speak the language used in or by the judicial body; (h) an entitlement to 
have a party‘s rights and obligations affected only by a decision based solely on 
evidence presented to the judicial body; (i) an entitlement to a determination of their 
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rights and obligations without undue delay and with adequate notice of and reasons 
for the decisions; and (j) an entitlement to an appeal to a higher judicial body. 
Two key observations can be made from the jurisprudence of the HRC and Section A 
(2) of the African Commission Principles regarding the right to a fair hearing. First, 
the list of elements they espouse (which is open-ended) supports the view that the 
right to a fair hearing is used as a residual concept to address other issues (apart from 
those specifically catered for in the ICCPR and the African Charter respectively) 
which ejusdem generis may adversely affect the fairness of a trial.
220
 For instance, in 
Currie v. Jamaica,
221
 while noting that the ICCPR does not contain an express 
obligation for a state to provide legal aid for individuals in all cases, the HRC 
nonetheless held that the denial of legal aid in this particular case amounted to a 
violation of the right to a fair hearing within the meaning of Article 14 (1) of the 
ICCPR. Among the factors that informed the Committee‘s decision was the 
complexity of constitutional proceedings in Jamaica. 
Second, in a number of cases, both the HRC and the ACHPR have found a violation 
of the right to a fair hearing based on the violation of the specific fair trial rights and 
guarantees provided for in the ICCPR and the African Charter. For instance, in Civil 
Liberties Organisation et al v.Nigeria,
222
 the ACHPR held that the holding of the 
proceedings in secret (which is a violation of the right to a public hearing) was a 
violation of the victim‘s right to a fair hearing. It is therefore plausible to conclude 
that in addition to its residual meaning, the right to a fair hearing encompasses all the 
fair trial rights guaranteed under Article 14 of the ICCPR. This is in fact further 
supported by Section A (2) of the African Commission Principles which explicitly 
includes the specific fair trial guarantees under Articles 14 of the ICCPR and 7 of the 
African Charter as part of the right to a fair hearing. It therefore follows that there will 
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be noncompliance with the right to a fair hearing whenever any specific fair trial 
guarantee under Article 14 of the ICCPR or Article 7 of the African Charter is 
violated.   
In a nutshell, the right to a fair hearing requires observance and respect of all the fair 
trial guarantees provided for under the ICCPR and the African Charter, in particular, 
Articles 14 and 7 respectively. If any of them is violated, the trial will not be fair. In 
this sense, the right to a fair hearing is one and the same with the general right to a fair 
trial. Yet it doesn‘t necessarily follow that the observance of all the fair trial 
guarantees provided for in the ICCPR and the African Charter ensures a fair trial. 
There might be other issues, apart from those specifically catered for under the fair 
trial provisions of the ICCPR and the African Charter, which may taint what would 
otherwise be a fair trial. To prevent this from happening, such issues are considered 
violations of the right to a fair hearing in its residual meaning. In this sense, while still 
a part of the general right to a fair trial, the right to a fair hearing goes beyond the 
treaty fair trial provisions and extends to guarantee the fairness of a particular trial in 
all aspects. 
Consequently, in order to determine the fairness of a particular hearing/trial, regard 
must be had to the conduct of the entire proceedings. A classic example of this 
approach can be seen in Gridin v. Russia.
223
 In this case, the author of the 
Communication alleged that between 26 and 30 November 1989 radio stations and 
newspapers announced that he was the feared ―lift-boy‖ murderer, who had raped 
several girls and murdered three of them. He stated that the court room was crowded 
with people who were screaming that the author should be sentenced to death. He also 
stated that the social prosecutors and the victims were threatening the witnesses and 
the defense and that the judge did not do anything to stop this. Because of this, there 
was no proper opportunity to examine the main witnesses in court. Considering the 
proceedings as a whole, the HRC agreed with the author that his right to a fair hearing 
under Article 14 (1) had been violated. It held, inter alia, that ―With regard to the 
author's claim that he was denied a fair trial in violation of article 14, paragraph 1, in 
particular because of the failure by the trial court to control the hostile atmosphere and 
pressure created by the public in the court room, which made it impossible for 
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defence counsel to properly cross-examine the witnesses and present his defence, the 
Committee notes that the Supreme Court referred to this issue, but failed to 
specifically address it when it heard the author's appeal. The Committee considers that 
the conduct of the trial, as described above, violated the author's right to a fair trial 
within the meaning of article 14, paragraph 1.‖224 
Jurisprudence from the ECrtHR also points to the fact that no abstract definition or 
criteria for a fair hearing can be given and that in each case, the course of the 
proceedings as a whole has to be assessed. For instance in Helle v. Finland,
225
 the 
ECrtHR stated that its task was ―to assess whether or not the proceedings taken as a 
whole were fair within the meaning of Article 6 (1) having regard to all the relevant 
circumstances, including the nature of the dispute and the character of the proceedings 
in issue, the way in which the evidence was dealt with and whether the proceedings 
afforded the applicant an opportunity to state his case under conditions which did not 
place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his [adversary].‖226 
2.4 Conclusion 
This Chapter has explored the nature and scope of the right to a fair trial, in particular 
the right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial 
tribunal especially as it relates to the administration of justice by military tribunals. It 
has been established that apart from being a treaty obligation, the right to a fair trial is 
also a general principle of law recognised by civilised nations and a norm of CIL 
within the meaning of Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice. This means that even if Uganda was not a state party to any human rights 
instrument requiring the protection of the right to a fair trial, it would still, as a 
general rule, be bound to protect and uphold the right to a fair trial as a norm of 
customary international law. It has also been established that the right to a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal is an absolute right which means that it applies in 
all circumstances without exception. 
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Critical for this thesis, it was confirmed that the right to a fair trial applies in full to 
military tribunals just as it does to the ordinary civilian courts. It does not however 
apply to all proceedings before military tribunals. For instance, it does not apply to 
disciplinary or administrative proceedings that do not involve penal sanctions. 
Military authorities cannot however evade the right to a fair trial by merely 
classifying charges/proceedings as ―disciplinary‖ or ―administrative.‖ Depending on 
the very nature of the offence in question (i.e. whether in essence it is criminal) and 
the severity of the penalty, such proceedings could amount to ―determination of a 
criminal charge,‖ wherefore, the right to a fair trial will be applicable. 
Regarding the content and scope of the right to a competent tribunal, it has emerged 
that the right has two major aspects i.e. the jurisdiction of a tribunal and the 
competence of the persons who constitute a tribunal. The former requires that military 
tribunals must have jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the persons they try. 
While it is recognised that jurisdiction of military tribunals like civilian courts is a 
matter determined by national law, international human rights law emphasises that the 
jurisdiction of military tribunals must be restricted to offences of a strictly military 
nature committed by military personnel. This rule is only subject to a situation where 
a state can show that trying civilians in military courts is necessary and justified by 
objective and serious reasons. The State that seeks to try civilians in military courts 
must demonstrate with regard to the specific class of individuals and offences at issue, 
that the regular civilian courts are unable to undertake the trials, that other alternative 
forms of special or high security civilian courts are inadequate to the task and that 
recourse to the military tribunals is unavoidable. These exceptions must be interpreted 
restrictively. It is incumbent on the state whose military tribunals try civilians to prove 
existence of the said grounds. International human rights law does not also generally 
consider military courts as competent tribunals for the purposes of trying military 
personnel accused of committing gross human rights violations. As regards the aspect 
of competence of persons who constitute military tribunals, it has been established 
that they must be people of integrity with appropriate legal training and qualifications 
comparable to those required of professional judges. It is only then that they can 
competently and properly administer justice according to established legal rules and 
procedures.  
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With respect to the content and scope of the right to an independent tribunal, it has 
been established that this requires both the institutional independence of military 
tribunals and the personal independence of the individuals who constitute the military 
tribunals. Institutional independence of military tribunals requires that military 
tribunals must be independent from the executive and the military hierarchy. They 
must not only be self-governing as regards their operations and administrative issues 
but must also be independent in their decision making. The executive and military 
hierarchical command must not interfere with the operations of the military tribunals 
and must respect their decisions. Institutional independence of military tribunals also 
requires that the decisions of military courts should never be the subject of review by 
non-judicial establishments.  
The notion of individual independence as a key aspect of the right to an independent 
tribunal requires that persons appointed to military tribunals must be individuals of 
integrity with appropriate training. Significantly, it also requires that military judges 
must be protected from direct or indirect subordination within the context of the 
military hierarchy both in terms of the organisation and operation of the military 
justice system itself and in terms of career development. Finally, the requirement of 
individual independence of judges requires that tenure and financial entitlements and 
other benefits of the military judges and members of military tribunals must be 
secured against the discretionary or arbitrary interference by the executive, military 
hierarchy or any other appointing authority. Any dismissal or suspension of military 
judges must only be on grounds of misconduct and incompetence, in accordance with 
fair trial procedures set out by the law. 
Concerning the right to an impartial tribunal, it has been ascertained that it not only 
requires that the military judges and the members of the military court be subjectively 
free from bias, but also that the entire organisation of military tribunals must appear to 
the reasonable observer to be impartial. There should be nothing which in an objective 
sense gives rise to an apprehension of the tribunal not being impartial.  
With respect to the right to a public hearing, it has been established that the right 
includes two aspects, i.e. the public nature of the proceedings and publicity of 
decisions of tribunals. As regards the former, the general rule is that judicial 
proceedings must be open to the public including the press. It is required in this 
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respect that tribunals should make the information about the time and venue of 
proceedings available and provide adequate facilities for public attendance. The latter 
aspect requires that decisions of military tribunals should generally be available to 
public. This means in the first place that judgments of military tribunals just like with 
civilian courts, must be in writing and must at least contain a statement of the grounds 
for the decision. The right to a public hearing is however subject to five exceptions 
i.e. the press and public may be excluded on reasons of morals in a democratic 
society; on reasons of public order in a democratic society; on reasons of national 
security in a democratic society; in the interest of private lives of the parties; and in 
the interest of justice. Where a tribunal decides to hold proceedings in camera, it must 
justify its decision according to one or more of these exceptions which are considered 
exclusive. These exceptions are strictly interpreted and if invoked, must only go as far 
as is necessary to secure the respective interests. 
Finally, this Chapter has established that as a matter of emphasis, the right to a fair 
hearing requires the protection and respect of all the fair trial guarantees protected in 
international human rights law, including the right to a public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal. But most important, in its residual sense and 
usage, the right to a fair hearing requires that no other issue, in addition to those 
specifically catered for under the fair trial provisions of the ICCPR, should ejusdem 
generis taint the fairness of a trial. Therefore, in order to determine whether a 
particular hearing is fair, regard must be had to the conduct of the proceedings as a 
whole. 
It is the above requirements which international human rights law recognises as 
comprising the major content and scope of the right to a fair and public hearing by a 
competent, independent and impartial tribunal. It now remains to determine how these 
requirements have been complied with in Uganda‘s military justice system. The next 
Chapter examines the compliance of Uganda‘s military justice with the above 
requirements over the years. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
UGANDA’S MILITARY JUSTICE THROUGH THE TIMES (1895-1992) 
Having examined the concept of military justice, and analysed the nature and scope of 
the right to a fair trial, and particularly having established that the right to a fair trial 
applies in full to military tribunals in the administration of military justice as it does to 
civilian and other special courts in the preceding chapters, it is now appropriate to 
examine how this right has been protected and guaranteed in Uganda‘s military justice 
system over the years. This Chapter thus analyses the historical foundation, 
development and evolution of Uganda‘s military justice system especially as it relates 
to the right to a fair trial, in particular the right to a fair and public hearing by a 
competent, independent and impartial tribunal. This analysis is important because, as 
it shall become apparent, Uganda‘s current military justice has been and remains in 
many ways shaped by its historical origins. Until this background is fully appreciated 
and put into context, Uganda‘s military justice system may never fully evolve from its 
traditional patterns to fully comply with the country‘s international human rights 
obligations regarding the right to a fair trial. It is indeed part of the hypothesis of this 
thesis that although there have been attempts at reforming the country‘s military 
justice system, it is still in many ways stuck in its historical origins.
1
 
 
The analysis in this Chapter starts with an examination of Uganda‘s military justice 
during the colonial era, followed by an appraisal of the country‘s military justice in 
the immediate post-independent Uganda. In examining Uganda‘s immediate post-
independence military justice, particular attention is given to military justice under 
President Idi Amin‘s regime and President Museveni‘s style of military justice under 
the Code of Conduct for the National Resistance Army (NRA) and the NRA 
Operational Code of Conduct. It has been considered not to discuss Uganda‘s military 
justice under the NRA Statute 1992 in any substantial detail because the provisions 
dealing with military justice in this law are essentially the same as those contained in 
the Uganda People‘s Defence Force (UPDF) Act 2005 which is comprehensively 
examined in Chapter Four. In order therefore not to engage in unnecessary repetitions   
that would not add value to this thesis, this Chapter only highlights a few issues 
                                                          
1
 See Chapter One, Section 1.3. 
 103 
regarding military justice under the NRA Statute 1992. To start off the analysis, three 
preliminary questions must be posed: What are the origins of Uganda‘s military 
justice system? To what extent, if at all, did Uganda‘s early military justice legal 
frameworks during the colonial era guarantee the right to a fair trial, in particular, the 
right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal? 
In relation to Uganda‘s early military justice legal frameworks, how has the country‘s 
military justice system performed, over the years, as far as guaranteeing this right is 
concerned?  
 
3.1 Uganda’s Military Justice During the Colonial Epoch (1895-1962) 
Uganda‘s army as a national institution was first established by the Uganda Rifles 
Ordinance, passed by the British Parliament in September 1895,
2
 hardly a year after 
the country had been formerly declared a British Protectorate.
3
 The Uganda Rifles 
Ordinance empowered the Commissioner to maintain a force to be called the Uganda 
Rifles whose number and status of officers and men was to be in accordance with 
instructions from the Secretary of State of Britain.
4
 The Uganda‘s Riffles Ordinance 
1895 was the first legal framework to provide for the organisation and administration 
of military justice in Uganda. The fact that this law and the immediate subsequent 
military justice legal frameworks came from the British Parliament, it is tenable to 
argue that, in that sense, the origins of Uganda‘s military justice system as were 
reflected in those legal instruments were British. 
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The Uganda Rifles Ordinance 1895 did not put in place any clear and fair mechanism 
for administering military justice. Instead, it vested arbitrary and dictatorial powers in 
the Commandant,
5
 Chief Officers
6
 and Commanding Officers.
7
 For instance, in cases 
of aggravated or repeated offences, the Commandant had power to charge, investigate 
and convict any accused person and could impose sentences ranging from reduction in 
rank, to imprisonment, hard labour, corporal punishment and dismissal from the 
force.
8
 In a bid to check on the said powers and probably ensure impartiality and fair 
justice, Section 39 of the Ordinance provided that the Commissioner could, if he 
thought fit, order that all or any of the powers of the Commandant be exercised with 
the aid of not less than two assessors. But given its limitations, this mechanism could 
not have been effective in ensuring impartiality and fair justice. First, the opinions of 
the assessors were not binding on the Commandant. Secondly, the assessors were not 
independent from the Executive. They were named and appointed by the 
Commissioner. Besides, it was in the entire discretion of the Commissioner to choose 
whether or not to appoint the assessors. Indeed even where he chose to do so, his 
decision could be revoked at any time.  
 
It is significant that the commandant, chief officers and commanding officers were all 
appointed by the Commissioner and were answerable to him.
9
 They cannot therefore 
generally be taken to have been independent from the Executive and the military 
command influence; a requirement that is fundamental to the administration of justice 
in any democratic society. The issue here is not so much that the 1895 Uganda Rifles 
Ordinance or indeed other legislation during the colonial times should have provided 
adequately for fair trial guarantees as expected under modern democratic systems or 
under modern human rights law, but that much of the essence of the provisions of 
                                                          
5
 The Commandant was the officer in chief command of the Uganda Rifles. 
6
 Chief Officers were defined in Section 2 of the Ordinance to include wing officers, and all officers 
above the rank of wing officer. Under Section 26, they could inquire into and try any offence against 
discipline committed by any native officer, under officer and privates. On conviction, they could 
impose sentences of imprisonment, with or without hard labour, fines not exceeding 2s, confinement to 
barracks, and extra guards and piquets. 
7
 Under Section 31 (2) of the Ordinance, in cases of distant stations, the Commissioner could delegate 
the powers of the Commandant under Sections 30 and 31 to the commanding officers of such stations. 
8
 Ibid, Sections 30 and 31. 
9
 Ibid, Section 3. 
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Uganda‘s early military justice legal frameworks continue to feature in the country‘s 
military justice system. 
 
During the subsistence of a state of war between Her Majesty Queen Victoria of 
Britain and any foreign power or African State or tribe, a different kind of military 
justice applied to the officers and men of the Uganda Rifles engaged in such fighting. 
In such cases, the provisions of the Army Act of the Imperial Parliament
10
 relating to 
mutiny, desertion and other offences punishable by a sentence of a court-martial 
applied to the Uganda Rifles, but with some modifications.
11
 Tribunals set up to try 
such offences were given powers of a general court martial and could pass any 
sentence including death.
12
 As expected, members of these tribunals were not 
independent from the Executive or the command influence of the army. They were 
either directly appointed by the Commissioner or the Commandant.
13
 They had to be 
officers of the Uganda Rifles or of Her Majesty‘s army.14 There were generally no 
measures to ensure the independence and impartiality of the members of military 
tribunals. 
 
On 20
th
 February 1899, the Uganda Military Force Ordinance, 1899, was passed by 
the Imperial Parliament. This Ordinance repealed and replaced the Uganda Rifles 
Ordinance, 1895. The Uganda Military Force Ordinance, 1899, changed the name of 
Uganda‘s army from Uganda Rifles to the Uganda Military Force.15 Its major 
significance to the country‘s military justice was that it made the provisions of the 
Army Act of the Imperial Parliament relating to offences to generally apply to native 
officers, non-commissioned officers and privates.
16
 However, where the Uganda 
                                                          
10
 Statute 44 & 45 Vict., Cap 58. 
11
 Ibid, Section 58. 
12
 Ibid, Section 58 (1). 
13
 Ibid, Section 58 (3). 
14
 Ibid, Section 58 (2). 
15
 See Section 3 of the Uganda Military Force Ordinance, 1899. 
16
 Ibid, Section 24. A native officer was defined in Section 2 to mean any officer (other than 
Europeans) above the rank of Sergeant-Major. 
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Military Force Ordinance 1899 was at variance with the Army Act, the Ordinance 
would take precedence.
17
 
 
In 1902, the Imperial Parliament passed the King‘s African Rifles Ordinance 1902,18 
which established two battalions of troops in Uganda to form part of a regiment of His 
Majesty‘s forces known as the King‘s African Rifles (KAR).19 Every man enlisting or 
re-engaging in the regiment had to swear an oath of allegiance to the British Crown 
similar to that of the Uganda Rifles.
20
 The regiment was charged with the duty to 
defend East Africa, Uganda, British Central Africa and Somaliland protectorates.
21
 As 
regards discipline and military justice, two systems applied to the Uganda battalions 
as part of the K.A.R depending on the situation. When on active service, within the 
meaning of the Army Act of the Imperial Parliament, the native officers, non- 
commissioned officers and privates were subject to that Act and Articles of War of 
the United Kingdom.
22
 But when found guilty of any offence under the Army Act of 
the Imperial Parliament, any native officer, non-commissioned officer or private could 
be punished as provided for under the King‘s African Rifles Ordinance.23 European 
officers and non-commissioned officers appointed to or attached to the regiment were 
at all times subject to the Army Act of United Kingdom.
24
 
 
When not on active service, a different justice system applied. This comprised of 
summary trial by the commanding officer and trial by courts-martial where the 
                                                          
17
 Ibid, Section 24. 
18
 Ordinance No.8 of 1902, Uganda Protectorate Laws 1895-1904. 
19
 Ibid, Sections 4 and 5 (1). These troops were styled and known as the 4
th
 and 5
th
 Battalions of the 
K.A.R. ibid. For a detailed exposition of the history of the K.A.R, see Moyse-Bartlett H (1956), The 
King‟s African Rifles: A Study in the Military History of East and Central Africa,1890-1945, Gale and 
Polden, Aldershot. See also Page M (1998), A History of the King‟s African Rifles and East African 
Forces, Leo Cooper, London. For an account of a Ugandan soldier‘s experience as part of K.A.R, see 
Kakembo RH (1946), K.A.R: An African Soldier Speaks, Edinburgh House Press, London.   
20
 Ibid, Section 19. 
21
 Ibid, Section 5 (2).  
22
 Ibid, Section 32 (b). 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Ibid, Section 32 (a). 
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commanding officer deemed it fit.
25
 Under Section 40 (2), where the commanding 
officer dealt with the case summarily, he could sentence the offender to imprisonment 
(with or without hard labour) for any period not exceeding 42 days, reduce the rank of 
the offender, award corporal punishment not exceeding 25 lashes, impose fine not 
exceeding 10s levied by stoppages from the offender‘s pay and dismiss the offender 
from the regiment. For purposes of trial by courts-martial, the Ordinance established 
two courts-martial i.e. the general courts-martial and the regimental courts-martial.
26
 
A general court martial had power to try all persons subject to the King‘s African 
Rifles Ordinance 1902, and to pass any sentence including death.
27
 A regimental court 
martial could not award the punishment of death or imprisonment in excess of two 
years.
28
 
 
Although the establishment of courts-martial was a landmark step in the evolution of 
Uganda‘s military justice system, a critical analysis of the provisions governing these 
tribunals hardly shows any guarantee for ensuring their independence and impartiality 
or measures to generally ensure fair trials. The law still lodged all but dictatorial and 
arbitrary powers in the persons of commanding officers. It was the commanding 
officers who convened these courts,
29
 appointed the members
30
 and the presidents of 
these courts.
31
 The commanding officers even had power to appoint themselves 
presidents of these courts.
32
 It was also within the powers of the commanding officers 
to confirm the findings and sentences of courts-martial.
33
 Obviously this arrangement 
of courts-martial could not guarantee any independence or impartiality of the 
members nor ensure fair justice. 
                                                          
25
 Ibid, Section 40 (1).  
26
 Ibid, Section 43 (1). 
27
 Ibid, Section 43 (6). 
28
 Ibid, Section 43 (7). 
29
 Ibid, Section 43 (2) in case of general courts-martial and Section 43 (3) in case of a regimental court-
martial. 
30
 Ibid, Section 43 (4) in case of general courts-martial and Section 43 (5) in case of regimental courts-
martial. 
31
 Ibid, Section 43 (8). 
32
 Ibid, Section 43 (4) in the case of the general court martial and Section 43 (8) in the case of the 
regimental court martial. 
33
 See ibid, Sections 44 (a) and (b). 
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It is important, though, to observe that military justice systems of the time including 
those in the developed world were generally arbitrary and tyrannical in nature. They 
were heavily disciplinarian and generally emphasized the iron hand of discipline over 
fairness and justice as the core of military justice. As Sherman rightly observes, it was 
after World War II, and mainly as a result of popular dissatisfaction with wartime 
military justice, that many western nations began to re-examine the arbitrariness of 
their military justice systems and started adopting more judicial approaches and 
procedures.
34
 As a result of this very bad war time experience with courts-martial, 
West Germany, Austria, and Demark abolished their court-martial systems and other 
countries such as Great Britain retained them but adopted more judicial procedures 
and expanded civilian control over certain of its functions.
35
 In Uganda‘s case 
however, the arbitrariness of the military justice system could have been compounded 
by the ideology of racial supremacy. As Oloka-Onyango observes, this ideology 
refused to equate colonial subjects to other species of humankind, particularly homo 
colonialis.
36
 That is why for instance, among other reasons, the European officers in 
the Uganda armed forces were generally subject to different standards of military 
justice from those that applied to Ugandans.  
 
However, by the dusk of colonialism, Uganda‘s military justice had improved and had 
started providing some guarantees for ensuring fair trials. Three reasons could explain 
for this change. First, the Colonial Government‘s mission had been largely 
accomplished, so it was no longer necessary to keep the tyrannical grip over the army 
including in the area of military justice. The second factor could have been the 
influence of the adoption of important human rights instruments such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the Charter of the United Nations which 
emphasized equality of all human beings and the need to protect and respect human 
rights and freedoms. Finally, after World War II, Britain like many other western 
countries re-examined its military justice system and undertook many reforms to 
                                                          
34
 Sherman E (1973), ―Military Justice Without Military Control,‖ Yale Law Journal, Vol.82, No.7,  
p.1398.  
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Oloka-Onyango J (1993), ―Judicial Power and Constitutionalism in Uganda,‖ Working Paper No. 30, 
Centre for Basic Research, Kampala, p.16. 
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make it more humane and fair. This could also have had an impact on the reforms 
which were subsequently introduced in Uganda‘s military justice system.  
 
On 24
th
 June 1958, the King‘s African Rifles Ordinance 195837 was passed to 
consolidate and amend the law relating to the establishment, government and 
discipline of the K.A.R among other things.
38
 This law dramatically altered the 
administration of military justice in Uganda. It established a three tier courts-martial 
system, namely, general courts-martial,
39
 district courts-martial
40
 and field general 
courts-martial.
41
 Significant for ensuring the independence and impartiality of these 
courts-martial, the Ordinance provided that the officer who convenes a court-martial 
would not be a member of that court.
42
 A proviso was however included to the effect 
that in the case of a field general court martial, the convening officer could appoint 
himself president if it was not practicable to appoint another officer as president. The 
law also made it possible for non-military officers to be appointed presidents and 
members of courts-martial, in particular where in the opinion of the convening officer, 
                                                          
37
 Ordinance No. 34 of 1958, Laws of Uganda, 1958. 
38
 See the long title of the Ordinance. 
39
 See Sections 74 (1) and 77. A general court martial had power to try any person subject to the 
Ordinance for any offence triable by courts-martial and to award any punishment under the Ordinance. 
See Section 75 (1). 
40
 See Sections 74 (1) and 77. A district court- martial had powers of a general court-martial except that 
it could not try an officer or warrant officer holding the appointment of effendi. Neither could it 
sentence any other warrant officer to imprisonment or discharge with ignominy. It had no powers to 
award a death sentence or imprisonment for a term exceeding two years. See Section 75(2). District 
courts-martial were established according to military districts. The law empowered the Governor to 
appoint and establish military districts throughout the protectorate in which units of the Force could be 
raised and trained for the defence and internal security of the protectorate. 
41
 Section 74 (2). A field general court martial had the powers of a general court martial, except that 
where it was consisted of less than three officers, it could not award a sentence exceeding 
imprisonment for two years. See Section 75 (3). According to Section 79 (1), a field general court 
martial was to consist of the president and not less than two other officers, but if the convening officer 
was of the opinion that three officers having suitable qualifications were not available, it could consist 
of the president and one other officer. 
42
 See Section 80 (1).  
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the necessary number of military officers having suitable qualifications was not 
available.
43
 
 
Accused persons to be tried by any court-martial, were given the right, on any 
reasonable grounds to object to any member of the court including the president.
44
 It 
was however within the powers of the other members of court to consider the 
objection and in particular whether it was reasonable or not. It is curious to imagine 
what would happen if the accused objected to all members since the law did not 
provide for such a scenario. Whereas the above provision was aimed at assuring the 
accused of the independence and impartiality of court, it is unlikely that it achieved 
this objective since the members of courts-martial were not insulated from the 
command influence of the convening officer. It is unlikely that the other members of 
court would dare agree with the accused person‘s objection against their commander‘s 
choice. 
 
The 1958 King‘s African Rifles Ordinance also provided that the Governor or the 
convening officer could appoint a judge advocate to act at the court-martial.
45
 While 
this was an important development for ensuring that courts-martial comply with the 
law and that the accused did not suffer a miscarriage of justice, the independence of 
the judge advocate from the appointing authority and the army command influence 
was not secured. As Lamer C.J rightly emphasized, in order to comply with the 
requirement of an independent and impartial tribunal, the appointment of an army 
officer to sit as judge advocate at court-martial must be in the hands of an independent 
and impartial officer.
46
  
 
                                                          
43
 Section 80 (4) c. A ―military officer‖ was defined in Section 80 (5) to mean an officer belonging to 
her Majesty‘s military forces and subject to service law. 
44
 See Section 82 (1). For purposes of enabling the accused to avail himself of the right conferred, the 
names of the members of the court were required to be read over in the presence of the accused before 
they were sworn and the accused would be asked whether he objects to any of the named officers. See 
Section 80 (2). 
45
 Section 116. 
46
 R v. Genereux [1992] 1.S.C.R. 259, p.309. 
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Perhaps the most important reform introduced by the 1958 King‘s African Rifles 
Ordinance in Uganda‘s military justice system was the right of appeal to a civilian 
court. A person convicted by a court-martial, could, with leave of the High Court, 
appeal to the High Court against their conviction.
47
 When hearing an appeal from the 
general court martial or field general court martial, the High Court was to be 
composed of at least three judges,
48
 and in case of an appeal from a district court-
martial, one or more judges.
49
 For the first time in Uganda‘s military justice history, 
persons subject to military law now had a genuine independent and impartial appellate 
tribunal to interpret and apply military law.
50
 This development also set in motion a 
process of ―civilianization‖ of the military justice which could ensure civilian control 
and scrutiny of military tribunals to ensure that they did not abuse their powers. 
 
In preparation for and shortly before Uganda‘s independence, on the 17th September 
1962, the Uganda Military Forces (Constitution and Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Ordinance
51
 was passed to constitute the units of the K.A.R established and 
maintained under the King‘s African Rifles Ordinance, 1958, as units of the Uganda 
Military Forces: to re-entitle the King‘s African Rifles Ordinance, 1958 and to amend 
the law relating to military forces among other things.
52
 The units of K.A.R raised or 
deemed to have been raised under the King‘s African Rifles Ordinance, 1958, and 
established and maintained immediately before the operative date of the Ordinance, 
                                                          
47
 Section 122. 
48
 Section 137 (1). 
49
 Section 137 (2). Under Section 126, the High Court was the final appellate tribunal on issues of 
military justice as provided for in the Ordinance. 
50
 Prior, the only recourse after conviction was the mechanism of confirmation of findings and sentence 
of the court-martial. This mechanism was never independent. The commanding officers, who proffered 
charges against the accused, convened the court-martial and appointed members of the court, also had 
the power of confirmation of the findings and sentence of courts-martial. It is significant to note that in 
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mechanism of review of findings and sentences of courts- martial after confirmation, by the Governor, 
or any officer superior in command to the confirming officer. See Section 9 of the 1958 King‘s African 
Rifles Ordinance. 
51
 Ordinance No.52 of 1962. According to Section 1 (3), this ordinance was to come into force on the 
9
th
 October, 1962- the day Uganda attained its independence from Britain. 
52
 See the long title of the Ordinance. 
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from that date constituted units of the Uganda Military Forces.
53
 From and after the 
operative date of the Ordinance, the King‘s African Rifles Ordinance, 1958, was re-
entitled the Uganda Military Forces Ordinance, 1958 and was to be cited as such.
54
  
The military law under the Ordinance re-entitled the Uganda Military Forces 
Ordinance, 1958 was to continue in full force and effect until amended or repealed 
according to established law.
55
 Section 6 established the Uganda Military Forces 
Council to take responsibility for the command, discipline and administration of, and 
all other matters relating to, the Uganda Military Forces.   
 
3.2 Uganda’s Post Independence Military Justice (1962-1992) 
The attainment of Uganda‘s independence marked an important era in the protection 
of human rights in the country, at least insofar as their recognition within the 
country‘s legal framework was concerned. For the first time in Uganda‘s legal and 
constitutional history, Chapter III of Uganda‘s Independence Constitution,56 as agreed 
during the Uganda independence conferences,
57
 contained extensive provisions for the 
protection of individual rights and freedoms. The right to a fair trial was guaranteed 
under Section 24.
58
 Section 24 of the Constitution provided that any person charged 
with a criminal offence was entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an 
                                                          
53
 Section 3 (1). 
54
 Section 4 (1). 
55
 Section 13 (1). 
56
 This Constitution was attached as a schedule to the Uganda (Independence) Order in Council, 1962, 
passed by the Imperial Parliament on 2
nd
 October 1962. The Order was passed among other things to 
make provision for the establishment of the Constitution of Uganda.  Section 3 of the Order provided 
that the Constitution of Uganda set out in the schedule would come into effect in Uganda at the 
commencement of the Order. Section 1(2) provided that the Order would come into operation 
immediately before 9
th
 October 1962. The Uganda Independence Act, 10 &11 Eliz. 2 Cap 57 passed 
earlier by the Imperial Parliament on 1
st
  August 1962 made provision in Section 1 (1) that Her Majesty 
Government in the United Kingdom would cease to have responsibility for the government of Uganda 
on the 9
th
 October, 1962.  
57
 For details of what transpired at these conferences see Colonial Office (1961), Uganda: Report of the 
Uganda Constitutional Conference, 1961 and Text of the Agreed Draft of a New Buganda Agreement 
Initialed in London on 9
th
 October 1961, London. For the second conference, see Colonial Office 
(1962), Report of the Uganda Constitutional Conference, 1962, London. 
58
 According to the marginal note of this section, it was provided that the section was aimed at making 
―provisions to secure protection of law.‖  
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independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
59
 Such person(s) were to be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty,
60
 and had to be informed as soon as practical, 
in detail, in a language that they understand, of the nature of the offence they were 
charged.
61
 It was a requirement that persons charged with criminal offences were to 
be given adequate time and facilities for the preparation of their defence,
62
 and be 
permitted to defend themselves in person or, at their own expense, by a legal 
representative of their own choice.
63
 At the trial, it was provided that accused persons 
were entitled to free assistance of an interpreter where they did not understand the 
language used,
64
 and had to be afforded facilities to examine prosecution witnesses, 
and to call and examine their own witnesses.
65
  
 
Fundamental for the right to protection against double jeopardy, it was provided that 
no one could be tried a second time for an offence for which he had been tried before, 
or of which he could have been tried and convicted at a former trial.
66
 It was 
prohibited to compel an accused person to give evidence at the trial
67
 and no person 
could be convicted of an offence unless the offence was defined and the penalty 
therefore prescribed in written law.
68
 In its totality, Section 24 of the Uganda‘s 
Independence Constitution practically provided for the right to a fair trial almost in 
similar terms as it is currently understood in international human rights law. This is 
not so surprising, given the fact that as Morris and Read point out, the human rights 
provisions in this Constitution were modelled along the lines of the European 
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 Section 24 (1). 
60
 Section 24 (2)a. 
61
 Section 24 (2)b. 
62
 Section 24 (2)c. 
63
 Section 24 (2)d. 
64
 Section 24 (2)f. 
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Convention on Human Rights
69
 whose conformity with international human rights 
law has generally never been questioned.  
 
In light of the above constitutional development, and the developments of Uganda‘s 
military justice during the colonial period, two key questions must be asked as we 
proceed to analyse Uganda‘s post-independence military justice: First, to what extent 
did the immediate post-independence military justice systems guarantee and comply 
with the constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair trial, in particular the right to a fair 
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal? This question is important because 
Section 1 of the 1962 Independence Constitution provided in no uncertain terms that 
the Constitution was the supreme law of Uganda and that any law inconsistent with it 
was void to the extent of the inconsistency. Second, how far did Uganda‘s post-
independence military justice go in strengthening the guarantees for the protection of 
the right to a fair trial as provided for in the 1958 Uganda Military Forces Ordinance? 
 
After independence, the Parliament of Uganda seems not to have been in any hurry to 
interfere with the military justice legal framework left by the departing British 
colonial masters. In fact, in October 1963, the Parliament of Uganda confirmed that 
despite the new Constitution, the military law passed by the colonial administration in 
1958 (i.e. the Uganda Military Forces Ordinance 1958) would continue in full 
operation and force until such a time as it would be amended.
70
 Omara-Otunnu 
observes in this respect that this was a mockery of the very achievement of 
independence; for it concerned one of the most sensitive and critical organs of the 
state.
71
 Nevertheless, in September 1964, the Parliament of Uganda passed the Armed 
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 Morris H, and Read J (1996), Uganda: The Development of its Laws and Constitution, Stevens and 
Sons, London. p.169. 
70
 Omara-Otunnu (1987), supra note 2, p.53. 
71
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Forces Act
72
 which repealed and replaced the Uganda Military Forces Ordinance, 
1958, as the legal framework for the establishment, maintenance and discipline of the 
Uganda Military Forces. 
 
The 1964 Armed Forces Act maintained summary trials by commanding officers but 
made provision for the accused persons to elect to be tried by court-martial.
73
 It 
established a three tier court-martial system i.e. the general court martial,
74
 the 
disciplinary court martial
75
 and the court martial appeals court.
76
 As a departure from 
the Uganda Forces Military Ordinance, 1958, the convening authority for general 
courts-martial and disciplinary courts-martial was the Defence Council,
77
 which also 
had the power to appoint the president and members of the court. Officers responsible 
for convening courts-martial, prosecutors, the commanding officer of the accused 
person, provost officers and any person who prior to the court-martial participated in 
any investigation respecting the matters upon which a charge against the accused 
person was founded were ineligible to serve on courts-martial.
78
 This was a critical 
provision for ensuring independence and impartiality of courts-martial. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
detailed analysis of the 1964 army mutinies in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania, see Omara-Otunnu 
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An important development introduced by the 1964 Armed Forces Act was that any 
person to officiate as judge advocate at a general court-martial was to be appointed by 
the Chief Justice in consultation with the Attorney General.
79
 This was critical for not 
only guaranteeing that the persons appointed judge advocates were competent, but 
also ensuring their independence from the convening authorities of courts martial and 
the army command influence. Other factors remaining constant, it is arguable that 
there can be no better persons to guarantee competence in the above respect than the 
Chief Justice and the Attorney General. The above position contrasts sharply with the 
position under the Uganda Military Forces Ordinance 1958, where the responsibility 
for the appointment of the judge advocate was vested in the Governor and the 
convening officers of courts-martial.
80
  
 
Another important reform introduced by the 1964 Armed Forces Act was that it 
established the Court Martial Appeals Court to hear and determine all appeals referred 
to it from decisions of the general court-martial and the disciplinary court-martial.
81
 
The Court Martial Appeals Court replaced the High Court as the last appellate court 
on issues of military justice. But beyond mere replacement, the Court-Martial Appeal 
Court came with important reforms. The Court-Martial Appeal Court was to be 
composed of the Chief Justice and all puisne judges of the High Court, with the 
Registrar of the High Court serving as its Registrar.
82
 The court was to be duly 
constituted if it consisted of an uneven number of judges not less than three
83
 
summoned in accordance with the directions given by the Chief Justice.
84
 It is 
arguable, at least in theory, that the fact of the chief justice becoming a member of 
this court strengthened the right of appeal and enhanced the quality of military justice. 
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It also enhanced civilian scrutiny of military justice which is critical for checking 
excesses of military tribunals. 
 
In spite of the safeguards in the Armed Forces Act and the Constitution for the 
protection of the right to a fair trial, Uganda‘s military courts of the time, in particular 
President Amin‘s military tribunals were often convened and acted contrary to the 
law. Because of the profound effects of President Amin‘s regime to the country‘s 
military justice system especially as far as guaranteeing and upholding the right to a 
fair trial is concerned, the next subsection is dedicated to analysing the administration 
of military (in)justice during the Amin era. 
3.2.1 President Idi Amin’s Military Justice 
Perhaps the most abominable courts-martial in Uganda‘s post-independence history 
(especially as far as upholding the right to a fair trial is concerned) were those 
established during President Idi Amin‘s regime.85 They can only be compared to 
President Museveni‘s military tribunals under the NRA Codes of Conduct which are 
discussed in Section 3.2.2 below. In total disregard of the Constitution and the 
provisions of the Armed Forces Act, military justice as dispensed by President 
Amin‘s military tribunals violated all the tenets of the right to a fair trial. First, the 
tribunals were composed of illiterate individuals who did not have any basic 
understanding of the law.
86
 This amounted to violation of the right to a competent 
                                                          
85
 President Idi Amin came to power on 25 January 1971 through a coup d‟etat he staged when 
President Apollo Milton Obote was away in Singapore attending the Commonwealth Heads of State 
and Government Conference. Through Legal Notice No.1 of 1971 which ushered in his regime, 
President Amin suspended Sections 1, 3 and 63 of the 1967 Constitution inter alia. In effect, this meant 
that the Constitution was no longer ―supreme law,‖ that it could be altered without reference to the 
Parliament, and that Parliament lost its law-making powers to the Head of State – who was now 
empowered to rule by Presidential decree. See Oloka-Onyango (1993), supra note 36, p.31. 
86
 See Onoria, HM (1994), ―Soldiering and Constitutional Rights in Uganda,‖ The East African Journal 
of Peace and Human Rights, Vol.9, No.1, p.100. This is not surprising. President Idi Amin‘s 
Government was largely composed of illiterate and semi-illiterate officers. The President himself is 
said to have ended in Primary Three. His Vice President was not any better. In fact, in an interview, the 
Vice-President during Amin‘s regime - Mr. Adrisi Mustafa, confessed that during his vice presidency, 
he did not even know of such a thing as the Constitution. See Mukholi D (1995), A Complete Guide to 
Uganda‟s Fourth Constitution: History, Politics and the Law, Fountain Publishers, Kampala, p, p.20. 
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tribunal as protected in international human rights law.
87
 In Civil Liberties 
Organisation v Nigeria, the ACHPR emphasized that competence of a tribunal also 
requires a judicial system with adequately trained officers and satisfactory procedural 
rules.
88
  
 
Also, Amin‘s military tribunals were never independent and impartial as was required 
by Section 15 of the 1967 Republican Constitution.
89
 They were staffed with serving 
military men whose only basis of appointment was loyalty to President Amin and the 
fact that they could be relied upon to convict whoever the military regime wanted 
convicted.
90
 Contrary to the fundamental principle of presumption of innocence, 
Amin‘s military tribunals also often proceeded on the premise that suspects were 
guilty of the offences with which they were charged. The International Commission 
of Jurists for instance reports about an incident were a suspected rebel was sentenced 
to death by firing squad on the basis of ―curious entries‖ in his diary, which he could 
not explain. 
91
 The right to a fair trial within a reasonable time as guaranteed by the 
Constitution was understood to mean instant (in)justice and on conviction, the 
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tribunals normally had a standard sentence, i.e. death by firing squad.
92
 This not only 
infringed the right to a speedy trial but also amounted to denial of the accused 
persons‘ right to adequate time for preparation of their defence and constituted a 
violation of the right to life as was guaranteed by the Constitution. In sum, as 
Amnesty international observed in its June 1978 report on human rights in Uganda; 
 
... the military tribunals were a complete travesty of any accepted norms of 
justice. Their members had no legal training, the defendants were usually 
denied legal representation; a legally qualified ―court advisor‖ has no power 
to intervene where legal procedures are contravened, such as rules of 
evidence and other internationally accepted judicial norms; trials are often in 
closed court and proceedings are not published. Cases are known of trials 
which have been conducted in secret or even without the defendant‘s 
knowledge. There is no appeal from these tribunals to a non-military legal 
authority, only to the Defence Council (i.e. to President Idi Amin).
93
 
 
The above situation was compounded by the fact that in 1973, President Amin had 
substantially increased the jurisdiction of military tribunals to include the trial of 
civilians accused of committing capital offences.
94
 This was the genesis of conferring 
military tribunals in Uganda with the jurisdiction to try civilians, moreover of 
offences that were not military in character. Hitherto, the jurisdiction of military 
tribunals was limited to the trial of offenders within the armed forces. The effect of 
extension of the jurisdiction of military tribunals was succinctly summarized by a 
former minister in the regime as follows: 
the setting up of military tribunals to try offences known to the Ugandan 
Penal Code, with power to pronounce sentence of death, has eroded the 
powers and prestige of the ordinary courts of law almost to extinction. The 
accused is not permitted to be represented by counsel of his own choice, 
indeed he is not represented by anyone, because, in the eyes of the regime, 
the lawyers are a nuisance that will not be tolerated. The taking of 
evidence by the tribunal is an abominable abuse of legal procedure and a 
denial of justice that ought to be condemned in the strongest possible 
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terms. Several people have been executed by firing squad on false 
evidence. The presiding officers of the tribunals do not possess even an 
elementary knowledge of the law, their only qualification is that they are 
trusted friends of President Amin and can be relied upon to convict 
whoever is unfortunate to be taken before them‘95 
 
Sadly, there was no remedy against the Government including members of the 
military tribunals for any violation of human rights and freedoms.  In May 1972, the 
Military Government was insulated from all forms of legal sanction when President 
Amin signed Decree No.8 of 1972, which was to apply retroactively from 24
th
 
January 1971 until such date as the he would appoint.
96
 In its very wide scope, the 
Decree provided that: 
notwithstanding any written law or other law, no court would make any 
decision, order or grant any remedy or relief in any proceedings against 
the Government or any person acting under the authority of Government 
in respect of anything done or omitted to be done for the purpose of 
maintaining public order or public security in any part of Uganda, or for 
the defence of Uganda or for the enforcement of discipline or law and 
order or in respect of anything relating to, consequent upon or incidental 
to any of those purposes, during the period between the 24
th
 day of 
January 1971, and such date as the President shall appoint.
97
  
 
In sum, it is a fallacy to talk about compliance of military justice with the right to a 
fair trial in general, and the right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal in particular during President Amin‘s regime. 
While the Constitution guaranteed this right in full measure, it was never respected in 
the country‘s military justice system. Indeed as analysed above, it was blatantly 
violated in all its facets. Although there is hardly any information on the 
administration of military justice in the first years after the overthrow of President 
Amin‘s regime in 1979, it is unlikely that the situation as regards upholding the right 
to a fair trial changed much. This probably confirms Oloka-Onyango‘s observation 
that the protection and enjoyment of fundamental human rights in Uganda‘s criminal 
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justice system generally, is very much dependent on the prevailing system of 
governance in the country.
98
 Yet, while this may be true, it should never 
underestimate and obscure the need to have these rights sufficiently safeguarded in 
the relevant legal frameworks. Although the right to a fair trial was violated with 
impunity during the Amin era, its protection by Uganda‘s Constitution and the 
safeguards under the 1964 Armed Forces Act could have made a big difference. In 
other words, the situation could have been worse.  
 
Between April 1979 when President Amin‘s regime was overthrown (by the 
combined Ugandan exile and Tanzanian forces) and January 1986 when President 
Museveni‘s Government came to power, Uganda suffered a lot of political turmoil. 
Within that short period, the country went through change of Government five times. 
After overthrowing the Government of President Idi Amin, the Uganda National 
Liberation Front (UNLF) which was at the forefront in liberating the country from 
Amin‘s dictatorship installed a civilian Government with Professor Yusuf Lule as 
President. Hardly two months after, President Yusuf Lule was removed by the UNLF 
and replaced with Mr. Godfrey Lukongwa Binaisa as President. Like his predecessor, 
on 13 May 1980, President Binaisa was unceremoniously removed from the 
Presidency by the UNLF Military Commission. From this point on, the UNLF 
Military Commission assumed the powers of the Presidency until the December 1980 
general elections which were controversially won by President Apollo Milton Obote‘s 
Party - the Uganda Peoples‘ Congress (UPC). President Obote II regime was 
overthrown through a coup d‟etat in July 1985 which brought General Tito Okello 
Lutwa to the Presidency.
99
 Unfortunately, there is hardly any information on how 
military justice was administered in these short successive Governments. It is mainly 
for this reason, that this study does not discuss military justice during this period. To 
attempt do so would be highly speculative. What is clear though, is that the 1964 
Armed Forces Act remained the country‘s major legal framework for the 
administration of military justice. Whether or not its provisions were complied with, 
is another issue.  
                                                          
98
 Oloka-Onyango J (2006), ―Criminal Justice, the Courts and Human Rights in Contemporary Uganda: 
A Perspective Analysis,‖ Makerere Law Journal, Vol.1, No.1, p.22. 
99
 For a detailed analysis of these unfolding political events in Uganda‘s history, see Omara-Otunnu 
(1987), supra note 2, pp.145-174. 
 122 
3.2.2 President Museveni’s Military Justice Under the NRA Codes of Conduct 
One of the challenges that President Yoweri Museveni‘s National Resistance 
Movement (NRM) Government faced soon after it came to power was how to enforce 
military discipline in an army that had expanded to include the soldiers of former 
military regimes whose character and record as regards respect for fundamental 
human rights was very questionable.
100
 This was critical for President Museveni as 
indeed he had to prove in many ways that his Government ―…was not a mere change 
of guards but a fundamental change.‖101 In order to achieve this, inter alia, his 
Government maintained two very strict and rigid codes viz., the Code of Conduct for 
the NRA
102
 and the NRA Operational Code of Conduct.
103
 Together, these two codes 
served as the blue print of the NRA Military Justice System. They were originally 
designed to regulate the behaviour and conduct of the NRA soldiers during its bush 
war against the Government of President Apollo Milton Obote. They were 
subsequently appended as a schedule to Legal Notice No.1 of 1986 which ushered 
NRM into power. Legal Notice No. 1 of 1986 modified but did not repeal the 1964 
Armed Forces Act. The Act continued in operation to the extent that it was not 
modified by the proclamation.
104
 The NRA codes had far-reaching implications for 
the protection and enjoyment of the right to a fair trial in Uganda‘s military justice 
system. 
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As compared to the military justice system under the Armed Forces Act of 1964, 
military justice under the NRA Codes was an embarrassingly big setback as regards 
the protection of the right to a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal as 
guaranteed by the Constitution.
105
 First of all, the Code of Conduct for NRA 
abolished the Court Martial Appeal Court and established the General Court Martial 
as the supreme trial organ of the military justice system.
106
 As discussed earlier, the 
Court Martial Appeal Court was a key area where critical reforms had taken place 
regarding the right to a fair trial by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal. 
Under the Armed Forces Act, 1964 and the regulations made thereunder, the Court-
Martial Appeal Court was composed of the Chief Justice and the puisne judges of the 
High court, with the Registrar of High Court serving as its Registrar.
107
 This was very 
important for guaranteeing the competence, independence and impartiality of the 
Court-Martial Appeal Court. Importantly, it also provided the opportunity for civilian 
scrutiny of the administration of justice by the military courts which, was vital for 
checking the excesses of such tribunals and ensuring that they complied with the law. 
By abolishing the Court-Martial Appeal Court, the Code of Conduct for NRA in 
effect negated the NRA soldiers‘ right of appeal and removed the country‘s military 
justice system from any scrutiny by civilian authority. This was a big setback not only 
in terms of ensuring fair military justice but for democracy as a whole. 
 
Civilian authority and control of the military including military justice is now a 
cherished principle of democracy. Scholars like Kohn have argued that while a 
country may have civilian control of the military without democracy, it cannot have 
democracy without civilian control.
108
 The HRC has also consistently stated that 
States must take steps to ensure that military forces are subject to civilian authority.
109
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It is submitted that one of the major ways in which civilian control of the military can 
be achieved is by subjecting the administration of military justice to the supervision 
and scrutiny of the civilian courts. In this regard, as Rowe rightly put it, it can be 
argued that just as the armed forces must be under civilian control, the military justice 
system should also in the same way ultimately be under civilian control.
110
 Thus in its 
Concluding observations to Lebanon in 1997, the HRC was concerned, inter alia, 
about the procedures followed by the country‘s military courts, ―as well as the lack of 
supervision of the military courts‘ procedure and verdicts by the ordinary courts.‖111       
 
In addition to the General Court Martial, the NRA military justice system as 
established by the Code of Conduct of NRA and the Operational Code of Conduct 
was comprised of the Field Courts Martial,
112
 Unit Disciplinary Committees
113
 and 
the Unit Tribunals.
114
 The independence and impartiality of all these tribunals (if any) 
is highly questionable. The General Court Martial consisted of a chairman, two senior 
army officers, two junior army officers, one political commissar and one non-
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commissioned officer.
115
 All the members of the General Court Martial were 
appointed by the High Command for a period of three months.
116
 They were all 
eligible for re-appointment.
117
 In addition, the High Command would appoint reserve 
members who would sit in court as observers.
118
 The High Command was also 
responsible for appointing the prosecutor who had to be an intelligence or security 
officer.
119
 The judge advocate and the secretary to the court (who had to be members 
of NRA) were personally appointed by the Chairperson of the High Command who 
was the President and Commander in Chief of NRA.
120
  
 
It was a requirement for all minutes of the proceedings of the General Court Martial 
and Unit Tribunals to be sent to the High Command for perusal
121
 and the High 
Command had powers to revise, quash or suspend any sentence of courts-martial.
122
 
In case of any disagreement arising among members of court about the construction 
or interpretation of any provision of the Code of Conduct for NRA and the NRA 
Operational Code of Conduct, or regarding the rights of anybody appearing before the 
court, a single arbitrator would advise the court.
123
 The law was not clear on who this 
single arbitrator was or how he/she would be appointed. But Section 2 (ii)a of the 
NRA Operational Code of Conduct provided that any case involving the legal 
interpretation of any provisions of the Code would be referred to the High Command 
which would constitute itself into a court-martial for that purpose. This provision was 
in contradiction of Section 10 (viii) and (ix) of the Code of Conduct for NRA which 
stipulated that the Chairman of the High Command had to appoint at least two judge 
advocates from members of NRA to advise the general court martial on the law and 
procedure. If interpretation of the NRA Codes was the responsibility of the High 
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Command, what then was the role of the judge advocates? What competence did the 
High Command have to interpret the law? How objective were its interpretation, 
given its structure and composition?  
 
The fundamental question to pose at this point is; could such a structure and 
composition of Uganda‘s military system comply with the right to a fair trial, in 
particular the right to a fair hearing by a competent, independent and impartial 
tribunal as understood in international human rights law? As discussed in Chapter 
Two, the undisputed major conditions for guaranteeing independence of judicial 
tribunals are essentially three; security of tenure of the members,
124
 financial 
security
125
 and institutional independence with respect to matters of administration 
that relate directly to the exercise of the tribunal‘s judicial function. In Gunes v. 
Turkey,
126
 the ECrtHR emphasised that in order to establish whether a tribunal can be 
considered as "independent", regard must be had, inter alia, to the manner of 
appointment of its members and their term of office, the existence of guarantees 
against outside pressures and whether the body presents an appearance of 
independence. Also, as pointed out in R v. Genereux,
127
 an individual who wishes to 
challenge the independence of a tribunal need not prove an actual lack of 
independence; rather, the question is whether an informed and reasonable person 
would perceive the tribunal as independent. It is clear that the general court martial as 
established by Code of Conduct for NRA could not pass this test. So were the other 
military tribunals. 
 
First, the members of these tribunals did not enjoy any meaningful security of tenure 
and were not insulated from the command influence to guarantee their independence. 
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Second, the independence of the general court martial and indeed other courts-martial 
established by the NRA codes was compromised by the fact that the High Command 
(which is part of the executive) appointed both the members of court and the 
prosecutors. Further, the appointment of judge advocates was not done by an 
independent authority; it was done by the High Command which also appointed the 
members of court and the prosecutors. Besides, the High Command – a non-judicial 
body had power to vary decisions of courts-martial. The power to give a binding 
decision which may not be altered by a non-judicial authority is a component of the 
right to an independent tribunal and is inherent in the very notion of a tribunal.
128
   
 
Perhaps the most disturbing provisions regarding the independence and impartiality of 
military tribunals established by the Code of Conduct for NRA and NRA Operational 
Code of Conduct were those contained in Sections 25 (iv) and (vi) of the latter 
instrument. According to Section 25 (iv), where a Unit Tribunal or Field Court 
Martial was found to be guilty of gross contravention of the provisions of the Code, 
either in substance, or procedure, the High Command would suspend such court, set 
up a provisional one, and all members or any one of them would be charged. As a 
punishment, they could be dismissed, demoted from the substantive rank and could 
suffer any other punishments laid down in the Code up to the maximum sentence of 
death. Section 25 (vi) provided that where members of a Unit Tribunal or court 
martial failed to execute their duty under the Code, or in any other way neglected or 
favored an accused, they would be charged of conspiracy and would be dismissed by 
the High Command and could suffer any additional punishment as the High 
Command would determine. Together, the above provisions constituted the most 
serious affront to the independence and impartiality of military tribunals under the 
NRA military justice system. They directly impinged on the tribunal‘s institutional 
independence from the military hierarchy and the Executive. These provisions went 
far beyond what is acceptable for any tribunal that purports to exercise judicial power 
in a democratic society.  
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To sum it all, Uganda‘s military justice under the Code of Conduct for NRA and the 
NRA Operational Code of Conduct was a very big setback as regards the protection of 
the right to a fair trial. From an analytical perspective, it can rightly be concluded that 
what the NRA Codes of Conduct did, was to take back the country‘s military justice 
system, as far as guaranteeing the right to a fair trial is concerned, to the pre -1958 
traditions.  
3.2.3 From Museveni’s NRA Codes of Conduct to the NRA Statute 1992: Old 
Wine in New Bottle? 
In 1992, the NRA Statute 1992 (which later became the UPDF Act 1992),
129
 was 
enacted by the National Resistance Council (NRC)
130
 to replace the two NRA Codes 
of Conduct and the 1964 Army Act as Uganda‘s major legal framework governing the 
country‘s armed forces and therefore issues of military justice. As it is not intended to 
discuss military justice under the NRA Statute in any detail for the reasons given at 
the beginning of this Chapter,
131
 it is important to highlight just a few pertinent issues 
at this point regarding this law as we proceed towards analysing compliance of 
Uganda‘s current military justice legal framework with the right to a fair trial. 
 
First, the NRA Statute 1992 did not introduce any significant reforms in the area of 
military justice, especially as far as guaranteeing the right to a fair trial (in particular 
the right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial 
tribunal) is concerned. This law retained many aspects of the disgraceful NRA Codes 
of Conduct whose provisions regarding military justice as discussed above, fell far 
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below the acceptable minimum international human rights standards for the 
administration of justice embedded in the right to a fair trial. This is however not so 
surprising because during the parliamentary debates leading to the enactment of this 
law, Major General David Tinyefuza, the Minister of State for Defence at the time, 
had pointed out clearly when introducing the NRA Bill for the Second Reading, that 
the Bill was intended among other things to make ―…provision for the maintenance 
of enhanced discipline in the armed forces by retaining the Code of Conduct and the 
Operational Code of Conduct.”132 Hon. Mrs. Njuba, a historical member of the NRA 
made the point even clearer when she informed members of the NRC that actually 
―the origins of the NRA Bill were in the desire to legalise the two Codes of Conduct 
of NRA.‖133 Given that the NRC was mainly comprised of ardent supporters of NRM 
including senior military officials, it came as no big surprise when at the end of it all, 
the NRA Bill was passed into law without any significant changes. 
 
A reading of the record of the parliamentary debates that took place regarding this law 
also gives the impression that members of the NRC were not generally cautious about 
human rights issues like the need to protect the soldiers‘ right to a fair trial.134 There 
were hardly any submissions during these debates that were based on or made 
reference to the country‘s international human rights obligations regarding the right to 
a fair trial. This is notwithstanding the fact that at least by this time, Uganda had 
ratified the African Charter. But yet even if Uganda had not ratified the African 
Charter, it was still obliged to protect the right to a fair trial as an obligation at 
customary international law. As discussed in Chapter Two, many aspects of the right 
to a fair trial are also principles of customary international law which generally binds 
all states.  
 
The NRA Statute like its predecessor (i.e. the NRA Codes of Conduct) was too harsh. 
In fact, during the parliamentary debates that took place regarding this law, many 
members of the NRC expressed concern about the harshness of the NRA Bill which 
unfortunately was passed into law without any significant changes. In particular, they 
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were concerned with the number of times where the Bill provided for the death 
penalty as a sentence for those found guilty of committing certain offences. Hon. 
Karuhanga for instance observed thus ―I randomly opened the Bill and on page 14 and 
15, I found that at the conclusion of every section, suffering death is the punishment. 
Now, on just two pages, there are four times you can die in this Bill. To me, it seems 
that the Bill has been brought so that we finish our soldiers…‖135 Arguing that the Bill 
was ―terribly harsh,‖ Hon. Kisamba Mugerwa observed that in total, there were 54 
incidences in the Bill where a soldier could die. He argued that at that rate, Uganda 
could soon find itself without any body in the army.
136
 
 
On the other hand, Government and the military leadership justified the harshness of 
the NRA Bill and indeed the retention of the NRA Codes of Conduct on ground that 
such harshness was critical for the maintenance of military discipline. It was argued 
that since the harshness underlying the NRA Codes of Conduct had proved efficient 
in maintaining discipline during the NRA guerrilla war and first five years of NRM in 
power, there was no need to change the status quo.
137
 It can thus be concluded that the 
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 See for instance generally the submissions of members like Major General David Tinyefuza, Mrs. 
Njuba, Lt. Col. Jeje Odongo and Major General Elly Tumwine. It is worth noting that of all the army 
officials representing the NRA in the NRC, it was only Brigadier Kyaligonza who opposed and 
criticized the NRA Bill as being too harsh. He argued that many of the provisions were a replica of the 
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reminded of some of the famous executions which have taken place, because of the undefined law,‖ he 
lamented. Ibid, p.124. Unfortunately, on a point of order raised by Major. General Tinyefuza, Brigadier 
Kyaligonza was ruled out of order on the erroneous grounds that as a historical member of the NRC, 
who was also a member of the Army Council and the NRA High Command which had passed the NRA 
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my point as a legislator, especially, to this House. Especially to this House where we are going to pass 
the Bill concerning our own citizens both civilian and our own sons, the army men and officers…‖ 
Ibid. Disappointingly, but perhaps not surprising, the following day, Brigadier Kyaligonza withdrew all 
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NRA Statute of 1992 was nothing but old wine in new bottle, at least as far as 
ensuring compliance of Uganda‘s military justice with the right to a fair trial is 
concerned. 
 
Starting in early 2000, members of the Uganda legal fraternity organized under their 
umbrella organisation - the Uganda Law Society (ULS) started challenging the 
constitutionality of several provisions of Uganda‘s military law including those that 
had a direct bearing on the right to a fair trial. Some of the decisions of court in these 
cases call into question the Courts‘ role as guarantors and defenders of peoples‘ 
rights. With regard to challenging the constitutionality of the NRA Statute, there are 
mainly two cases worth highlighting here. One such case is Uganda Law Society v. 
Attorney General.
138
 The applicants (ULS) sought, inter alia, to challenge the 
constitutionality of the NRA Statute 1992 insofar as it provided for the passing of a 
death sentence without the right of appeal to the Supreme Court. The application 
sought for an injunction to restrain the State from carrying out the death sentences 
passed by the field court martial until the petition was heard. The Attorney General 
argued that Article 22 (1) of the Constitution
139
 did not apply to decisions passed by 
the field court martial because it was not a court of judicature and that even if it was, 
by virtue of Article 137 (5)
140
 and 121
141
 of the Constitution, Article 22 (1) was never 
                                                                                                                                                                      
his submissions against the Bill, stating that on a point of procedure, he ought to have raised them in 
the Army Council and the High Command. Ibid, p.130. One may not help but to imagine the pressure 
under which Brigadier Kyaligonza acted in withdrawing his submissions. It might be that minus the 
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intended to apply to field courts martial. The Constitutional Court held that the 
primary objective of field courts-martial was to administer instant justice and instill 
discipline among the men and women in the armed forces at the front line and that to 
that extent; it could not be bogged down by appeal procedures. The court held further 
that the Constitution regarded field courts-martial as special courts which were 
established to maintain law and order and military discipline in a field operation, 
where to employ the normal court structures would create problems for the field 
commander. It argued that although death was an end to everything, it had to be 
balanced with the higher objectives the punishment was intended to achieve. That the 
necessity for the death sentence in a field operation cannot be underestimated for in a 
field operation, tough decisions and actions are a sine quo non. The court held 
therefore that on a balance of convenience, it was not proper to suspend the operation 
of the provisions which permitted the field courts-martial to pass death sentences 
without the right of appeal to the Supreme Court.
142
  
With great respect to the Constitutional Court, that a court which is specifically 
charged with interpreting and upholding the Constitution chose to defend the 
military‘s objective in having the death sentence, at the expense of the accused 
persons‘ constitutionally guaranteed right of appeal was quite disappointing. As 
guarantors and defenders of peoples‘ rights and freedoms, courts are expected to 
interpret provisions that seek to curtail the internationally and constitutionally 
guaranteed rights very restrictively. In the converse, they are expected to interpret 
provisions guaranteeing fundamental human rights and freedoms broadly and 
purposively. The Constitutional Court failed disappointingly in this noble duty. 
Instead, the Court acted, more executive-minded than the executive by upholding the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
question as to the interpretation of the Constitution shall be determined by the Court of Appeal sitting 
as the Constitutional Court. 
141
 This provision deals with the issue of Prerogative of Mercy. The essence of it is that on advice of 
the Advisory Committee on the Prerogative of Mercy, the President may grant to any person convicted 
of an offence a pardon or a respite or substitute the punishment imposed with a less severe form of 
punishment. Article 121 (6) states however that ― a reference in this article to conviction or imposition 
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sentence or forfeiture by a court martial or other military tribunal except a field court- martial.‖  
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 133 
military necessity‘s objective in having death sentences at the expense of the accused 
persons‘ right of appeal. As emphasised by Justice Ginsburg in the United States 
Supreme Court of Weiss v. United States,
143
 "[I]t is the function of the courts to make 
sure, in cases properly coming before them, that the men and women constituting our 
Armed Forces are treated as honored members of society whose rights do not turn on 
the charity of a military commander. . . . A member of the Armed Forces is entitled to 
equal justice under law not as conceived by the generosity of a commander but as 
written in the Constitution . . . ." 
Praiseworthy however, in its recent decision of 5
th
 February 2009 in the case of 
Uganda Law Society and Another v. The Attorney General,
144
 the Constitutional 
Court departed from its disappointing decision summarised above. This case involved 
two soldiers of the UPDF who were indicted, tried by a field court martial and 
executed on the same day for the murder of three civilians in Kotido district in North 
Eastern Uganda. The petitioners filed two applications seeking declarations that the 
entire process was unconstitutional. They invited the court to, inter alia, revisit its 
decision in Uganda Law Society v. Attorney General discussed above. Delivering the 
unanimous decision of the Constitutional Court, Justice Twinomujuni held that the 
right of appeal applies even to the decisions of the field courts-martial. Citing Justice 
Mulenga‘s decision in the Supreme Court case of Attorney General v. Tumushabe,145 
Justice Twinomujuni correctly stated that except where the Constitution expressly 
exempts application of an article to any person or authority, the Constitution applies 
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to all. It is remarkable that Justice Twinomujuni grounded his decision in regional and 
international human rights law. He argued as thus   
At the trial of this appeal, both counsel for the petitioners and the 
respondent appeared to accept the argument that the UPDF Act does 
not provide for a right to appeal against the decision of a Field Court 
Martial. I am unable to tell precisely how they came to that 
conclusion. However, from the submissions of counsel Philip 
Karugaba, I hold the view that the impression emanated from the 
fact that section 78 of the UPDF Act, 1992 which created the Field 
Court Martial and gave it powers did not state that a decision of that 
court could be appeallable.  It is said that there is no right of appeal 
as such unless that right has been specifically created by the relevant 
statute. This means that where a Statute grants a jurisdiction to a 
court, then unless the Statute states that a person aggrieved by a 
decision of such a court can appeal, then there is no right of appeal.  
This further means that there is no automatic right of appeal.  This is 
frequently asserted in our courts as if we forget that the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights [Banjul Charter] which was 
adopted on 27
th
 June, 1981 by the OAU and which came into force 
on 21
st
 October, 1986 is part and parcel of our Constitution.  This is 
so by virtue of article 287 of the Constitution which states…‖146 
 
Quoting Article 7 (1) (a) of the African Charter which provides that every individual 
has ―the right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts of violating 
fundamental rights as recognised by conventions, laws, regulations and customs in 
force,‖ Justice Twinomujuni held that by virtue of Article 45 of the Constitution,147 
individuals have an automatic right of appeal where their fundamental rights and 
freedoms have been violated. He therefore held that a denial of that right was clearly 
unconstitutional and that the accused persons in the Kotido trial were entitled to the 
right to life as guaranteed under Article 22(1) of the Constitution. Justice 
Twinomujuni also clarified many other issues regarding the constitutionality of the 
current military justice system under the UPDF Act, 2005. These will accordingly be 
analysed in Chapter Four of this thesis. Suffice to point out here that this case is a land 
mark in many ways as far as Uganda‘s court jurisprudence on issues of military 
justice, human rights and the law is concerned.  
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3.3 Conclusion 
In this Chapter, we set out to analyse the historical foundation/origins and evolution 
of Uganda‘s military justice system especially as it relates to the right to a fair trial, in 
particular the right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and 
impartial tribunal. From the fore going analysis, it is clear that the origins of Uganda‘s 
military justice were British. As a colony, all Uganda‘s early military justice legal 
frameworks were passed by the British Parliament. These military laws like was the 
case with many countries (including the colonial powers) at the time, were less 
concerned with issues of justice and human rights.  
 
The notion of the right to a fair trial as it is understood in the modern human rights 
discourse was largely nonexistent in Uganda‘s military justice system during the 
colonial times. The military ordinances in the colonial times vested all but dictatorial 
and arbitrary powers in the persons of the commanding officers. It was the 
commanding officers who had the authority to proffer charges against accused 
soldiers and they generally participated in the investigations. The power to convene 
courts-martial including appointment of the members and the presidents of such 
courts also vested in the commanding officers. The law did not prohibit the 
commanding officers from appointing members of the courts-martial who were 
subordinate to them in rank. In fact, it is probable that in most cases, this is what 
happened in real practice. In other cases, the law actually allowed the commanding 
officers to preside over the courts-martial they had convened. The commanding 
officers also had the power to confirm the findings and sentences of courts-martial. 
Such arrangement of Uganda‘s military justice system in the colonial period could not 
definitely guarantee the independence and impartiality of the military courts.  
 
The military justice laws in the colonial period were also quiet about several other 
aspects of the right to a fair trial as it is understood in human rights law. For instance, 
they did not require military courts to be legally competent. Nor was there any 
provision requiring the proceedings of military courts to be public. In fact, it is 
plausible to argue that Uganda‘s military courts during the colonial era were not 
tribunals in the real sense of the word as it is understood in international human rights 
law but were just mere ad hoc establishments whose real purpose was to help the 
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commanding officers achieve their objectives under the guise of administering 
military justice.  
The above notwithstanding, by the end of the colonial era, Uganda‘s military justice 
had started improving as far as guaranteeing the right to a fair trial was concerned. For 
instance, the 1958 Military Forces Ordinance contained several provisions that were 
aimed at guaranteeing the right to a fair trial. For example, it provided that officers 
who convene courts-martial could not be members of those courts and that the 
accused soldiers had the right to object to any member of court, including the 
president. As a way of improving on the competence of courts-martial, provision was 
made for the appointment of judge advocates to advise these courts on issues of law 
and procedure. The law also provided for the right of appeal to a civilian court, i.e. the 
High Court, thus setting in motion the process of ―civilianisation‖ of military justice 
which was critical for ensuring civilian control and scrutiny of courts martial to 
ensure that they did not abuse their powers. 
 
Uganda‘s immediate post-independence military justice system under the 1964 Army 
Act even improved the country‘s military justice further in as far as guaranteeing the 
right to a fair trial is concerned. For instance, it established the Court Martial Appeals 
Court as the last appellate court on issues of military justice. This court was 
constituted of the Chief Justice and all the puisne judges of the High Court, with the 
Registrar of the High court serving as its Registrar. The 1964 Army Act also vested 
the authority to appoint judge advocates in the office of the Chief Justice. This was 
critical for not only guaranteeing that the persons appointed judges were competent 
but also for ensuring their independence from the convening authorities of courts 
martial and the general army command influence. 
 
Disappointingly, Uganda‘s military regimes starting with the infamous bloody Amin 
era blatantly violated most of the above and other progressive provisions of the 1964 
Army Act which guaranteed the right to a fair trial. As discussed, Amin‘s military 
justice system was a complete travesty of all the minimum acceptable international 
human rights standards for the administration of justice in any democratic society. 
The regime kept tight control of the military justice system whose courts-martial were 
composed of illiterate men whose only basis of appointment was friendship and 
personal loyalty to Amin and the fact that they could be relied on to convict whoever 
 137 
the military regime wanted convicted. In many instances, Amin‘s military tribunals 
proceeded on the premise that accused persons were guilty as charged and that the 
onus was on them to prove their innocence. The right to a fair trial within a reasonable 
time was understood to mean instant (in)justice and on conviction, the tribunals had 
an almost standard penalty, i.e. death by firing squad. To make matters worse, there 
was no right of appeal from Amin‘s military tribunals to a non-military legal 
authority. Only appeals to the Defence Council which in essence was President Amin 
himself were permissible. The country‘s military justice system most likely remained 
in this abominable and precarious state even after the overthrow of President Amin 
until President Museveni came to power in 1986. 
 
Instead of reforming the administration of military justice to ensure that it complies 
with the minimum international standards for administering justice as was expected, 
President Museveni‘s military justice under the NRA Codes of Conduct which 
substantially modified the 1964 Army Act, just legitimized the denial and indeed the 
violation of the internationally guaranteed right to a fair trial. The NRA Codes of 
Conduct were an embarrassingly big setback in as far as guaranteeing the right to a 
fair trial in Uganda‘s military justice system is concerned. Like Uganda‘s military 
courts during the colonial times and Amin‘s military tribunals, courts martial 
established under the NRA Codes of Conduct were neither competent nor 
independent. Neither could they be said to have been impartial. They were comprised 
of serving military officers subject to the command influence and who almost did not 
enjoy any security of tenure or financial security. Members of these courts were 
appointed by the High Command for a period of three months subject to renewal. The 
High command which appointed the members of court also had the powers to appoint 
the presidents of these courts, the prosecutor, the judge advocate and the secretary. 
Almost all the persons appointed to these offices had to be serving military officers. If 
the NRA High Command found members of courts-martial guilty of ―gross 
contravention of the NRA Codes of Conduct,‖ or ―favoring an accused,‖ they could 
be charged of conspiracy, dismissed and could suffer other punishments including 
death. The NRA High Command, a non-judicial body, had the power to revise, quash 
or suspend decisions of court martial. To crown it all, like it happened with Amin‘s 
military justice, the NRA Codes of conduct abolished the Court Martial Appeal Court 
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thus effectively denying the military personnel any right of appeal and removing the 
country‘s military justice system from any civilian scrutiny and control. 
 
In totality, the effect of the NRA Codes of Conduct in as far as protecting and 
guaranteeing the right to a fair trial in Uganda‘s military justice system is concerned, 
was to take back the system to the pre 1958 traditions. In fact, military justice under 
the NRA Codes of Conduct was more punitive in other respects than the military 
justice under the legal frameworks of the colonial times. Unfortunately, the NRA 
Statute 1992 which repealed and replaced the NRA Codes of Conduct retained much 
of the essence of the infamous Codes. 
 
Thus, despite attempts at reform, by 1992, Uganda‘s military justice system was in 
essence still largely stuck in its origins and was still far from complying with the 
minimum acceptable international standards for the administration of justice 
embedded in the right to a fair trial. It is from this background that we now proceed to 
examine the compliance of Uganda‘s current military justice system with the right to 
a fair trial, in particular, the right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
UGANDA’S CURRENT MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE RIGHT 
TO A FAIR TRIAL 
 
In Chapter Three above, it was established that despite attempts at reform, by 1992, 
Uganda‘s military justice system was very far from complying with the country‘s 
international human rights obligations as far as the right to a fair trial is concerned. 
The extent, to which Uganda‘s current military justice complies with the right to a fair 
trial, in particular the right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent 
and impartial tribunal, is the major focus of this Chapter. The analysis provides a 
critical examination of Uganda‘s current military justice legal framework. As Decary 
J rightly emphasised, in examining the compliance of certain aspects of military 
justice with human rights standards, ―...legislative and regulatory provisions speak for 
themselves and if they are prima facie an infringement of the rights guaranteed… no 
further evidence is necessary.‖1 But before analysing the extent to which Uganda‘s 
current military justice complies with the right to a fair trial, it is essential to first 
explore, briefly, what the concept of compliance with international norms entails. 
 
4.1 The Concept of Compliance with International Norms 
The gap between the international recognition of human rights and their national and 
local level implementation and compliance is the most problematic aspect of the 
international effort to ensure universal respect for human dignity.
2
 As Mugwanya 
rightly argues, the basic challenge facing the human rights movement therefore is to 
close this gap to make human rights meaningful in peoples‘ lives.3 The question of 
compliance with international human rights norms is therefore of critical importance 
for the effective realisation and enjoyment of the protected rights and freedoms. But 
what does compliance with international norms (such as the international human 
rights norms) entail? Why do states comply with international norms and in other 
cases fail or refuse to abide by them even when they are obliged to do so? What 
                                                          
1
 R v. Genereux (1990) 5 C.M.A.R. 38, p.59. 
2
 Mugwanya, GW (2003), Human Rights in Africa: Enhancing Human Rights Through the African 
Regional Human Rights System, Transnational Publishers, Inc, Ardsley, p.4. 
3
 Ibid, p.5. 
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factors can help to improve states‘ compliance with their international obligations? 
These are some of the major questions that the concept of compliance with 
international norms attempts to answer. 
 
In addressing these questions, it is always important to distinguish between two 
interrelated aspects i.e. implementing international norms (especially where a treaty is 
involved) and complying with such norms. There is general consensus in academic 
scholarship that the two concepts do not mean the same thing. Implementation 
generally refers to the measures that states undertake to give effect to international 
agreements,
4
 including legislative measures. From this perspective therefore, 
implementation of international agreements does not necessarily mean compliance 
with the norms that those agreements espouse. However, where a human rights treaty 
provides, as, for example, in Article 2 (2) of the ICCPR that: ―Where not already 
provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the present 
Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional 
processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other 
measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant,‖ then implementation of the provision will automatically transform to 
compliance, because compliance in that case requires only that the treaty be put into 
domestic law. 
 
But generally, compliance goes beyond implementation, and refers in particular to 
whether countries in fact adhere to the provisions of the accord and to the 
implementation measures that they have instituted.
5
 Compliance therefore involves 
the actual behaviour of states, in particular whether it conforms to the prescribed 
behavior.
6
 It involves examining state behavior and other measures governments 
undertake in addition to their formal step of implementing the particular international 
                                                          
4
 Jacobson HK and Weiss EB, ―A Framework for Analysis,‖ in Weiss EB and Jacobson HK (Eds) 
(2000), Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords, 
The MIT Press, Cambridge, p.4. See also Burgstaller M (2005), Theories of Compliance with 
International Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, p.4. 
5
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6
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agreement.
7
 In this respect, it is important to emphasise that this Chapter is mainly 
concerned with the extent to which Uganda‘s military justice legal framework 
conforms to the international human rights norms of the right to a fair trial. It does not 
deal with compliance in its full technical sense as highlighted above. It needs no 
emphasis to point out the fact that once the national legal framework(s) for 
implementing the international norms is inconsistent with the relevant norms, there 
can hardly be any compliance (in its technical sense) with such norms as is well 
reflected in the observation of Decary J, earlier quoted above. Indeed from this 
perspective, it is plausible to argue that implementation is perhaps the most important 
step towards ensuring compliance with international norms. In many ways, it 
determines the extent to which compliance will actually be achieved. If the different 
legal and policy measures adopted to conform to international norms are 
noncompliant, there is little actual compliance that can be expected. That is why this 
thesis focuses mainly on the question of conformity of Uganda‘s military justice legal 
framework with the right to a fair trial. 
 
Regarding the reasons why states comply with international norms, it is apparent that 
it does not necessarily follow that because a state is party to an international 
agreement, it will therefore comply with the provisions of that instrument. Although 
by virtue of their consent, states are technically obliged to comply with their treaty 
obligations,
8
 the fact is that the legal obligation in itself does not provide an incentive 
structure sufficient to foster compliance.
9
 Indeed in the area of human rights, as 
Moore rightly observes, despite the dramatic increase in the number of human rights 
treaties over the years, noncompliance remains prevalent.
10
 Henkin‘s assertion that 
―almost all nations observe almost all their obligations almost all of the time‖11 is 
therefore contestable, at least as far as compliance with international human rights 
instruments is concerned. 
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There are a number of theories that have been advanced to explain what motivates 
states to comply with or deviate from complying with their international obligations. 
These can be categorised into five main theories viz., the rational choice theory 
advanced by the rationalists, the managerial model theory propounded mainly by the 
Chayeses, the rule legitimacy theory, Koh‘s transnational legal process theory, and the 
liberalists‘ theory of compliance. A critical aspect to note about most of these 
theories, if not all, is that they reject the assertion that coercion alone per se plays any 
significant role in ensuring states‘ compliance with their international obligations. The 
Chayeses and Mitchell for instance argue that in case of noncompliance, coercive 
sanctions are not only ineffective but are inherently unsuitable.
12
 They contend that 
states face high political and economic costs at home and collective-action-type 
difficulties in building international coalitions among other challenges.
13
 They 
therefore conclude that efforts to negotiate and include coercive sanction clauses in 
treaties and to invoke sanctions are largely a waste of time.
14
  
 
According to the rationalists like Abbot,
15
 and Goldsmith and Posner,
16
 states comply 
with norms of international law not so much because they feel morally or legally 
obligated to do so, but because it serves their short and long term interests to do so. It 
is argued in this regard that as the major players at the international scene, states 
employ different cooperative and coordinated strategies to pursue a complex, 
multifaceted long-run national interest, in which compliance with negotiated legal 
norms serves as a winning strategy for all. Arguing from the customary international 
law perspective, Goldsmith and Posner for instance contend that states‘ compliance 
with international law is as a result of an epiphenomenal result of convergence of their 
                                                          
12
 See Chayes A, Chayes AH and Mitchell RB, ―Managing Compliance: A Comparative Perspective‖ 
in  Jacobson and Weiss (2000), supra note 4, p.41.  
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 See generally, Abbot KW (1989), ―Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for 
International Lawyers,‖ Yale Journal of International Law, Vol.14, No.2, pp.335-411. See also Abbot 
KW (1985), ―The Trading Nation‘s Dilemma: The Functions of the Law of International Trade,‖ 
Harvard International Law Journal, Vol.26, No.2, pp.501-532. 
16
 See generally Goldsmith JL and Posner EA (1999), ―A Theory of Customary International Law,‖ 
University of Chicago Law Review, Vol.66, No.4, pp.1113-1178. 
 143 
interests with the norms of international law.
17
 They argue that compliance with 
international law is as a result of patterns of behaviour of states resulting from the 
pursuit of self-interest under four behaviour logics: coincidence of interest, coercion, 
cooperation, and coordination.
18
 
On their part, the Chayeses who are the main architects of the managerial theory of 
compliance argue that the main mechanism for maintaining compliance with treaties 
at acceptable levels is the ―…iterative process of discourse among the parties, the 
treaty organisation and the wider public.‖19 According to this approach, to the extent 
that treaties generally reflect the interests of the states party, and taking into 
consideration the norms they enunciate and the question of efficiency, there is a 
general ―propensity to comply.‖20 But the actual level of compliance depends on the 
iterative process of discourse among the parties, the treaty organisation and the wider 
public thus the managerial theory of compliance. According to this theory, there are 
three main reasons that explain noncompliance especially where it is not deliberate 
i.e. ambiguity and indeterminacy of the treaty language; limitations on the capacity of 
parties to carry out their undertakings; and the temporal dimension of the social, 
economic, and political changes contemplated by regulatory treaties.
21
 In order to 
address these deficiencies, the Chayeses advocate for a sophisticated integrated 
management strategy that addresses the causes of noncompliance. This includes 
effective participation in the treaty regime, ensuring transparency, dispute settlement, 
capacity building and persuasion.
22
 
The legitimacy-oriented theorists led by Thomas Franck contend that states comply 
with international norms when they perceive the norms and their institutional 
penumbra to be legitimate.
23
 They define legitimacy as ―a property of a rule or rule-
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making institution which itself exercises a pull towards compliance on those 
addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has 
come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of 
right process.‖24 According to the legitimacy theorists, the more states perceive a 
norm to be legitimate, the more likely they will comply with that norm. In this 
respect, it is argued that the concept of legitimacy contributes to norm compliance by 
providing an ―internal‖ reason for the states to follow the norm.25 Where the state 
believes a norm to be legitimate, it is argued that compliance is neither motivated by 
fear of retribution or coercion, nor self-interest; rather, it is motivated by an internal 
sense of obligation.
26
 
Criticising the legitimacy-oriented theorists and the Chayeses‘ managerial theory, 
Koh argues that their accounts of the compliance story omit ―a thoroughgoing account 
of transnational legal process: the complex process of institutional interaction 
whereby global norms are not just debated and interpreted, but ultimately internalized 
by the domestic legal systems.‖27 He points out that the transnational legal process 
describes the theory and practice of how public and private actors – nation-states, 
international organisations, multinational enterprises, non-governmental 
organisations, and private individuals – interact in a variety of public and private, 
domestic and international fora to make, interpret, enforce, and ultimately, internalize 
rules of transnational law.
28
 In his view, it is this transnational legal process of 
interaction, interpretation and internalization of international norms into domestic 
legal systems which is pivotal to the understanding of why nations ―obey‖ 
international law.
29
 It describes the pathways whereby a ―managerial‖ discourse or 
―fair‖ international rule penetrates into a domestic legal system, thus becoming part of 
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that nation‘s internal value set. In this way, the evolutionary process of repeated 
compliance gradually becomes habitual obedience, argues Koh.
30
 
 
Finally, the liberal theorists argue that the level of states compliance with 
international norms is not determined at a systemic level, but the level of domestic 
structure. They posit that individuals and groups acting in domestic and transnational 
civil society are the primary actors in the international system.
31
 According to the 
liberalists, states are nothing but agents of the individuals and groups in the domestic 
and transnational society. Accordingly, they contend that it is the pressure that the 
individuals and groups exert on the state through the domestic political institutions 
which determines the extent to which a particular state will comply with international 
norms.
32
 
 
Although all the theories of compliance explored above have their own merits, each of 
them has gaps. None of them can singly offer a complete explanation of the reasons 
why states comply and sometimes fail or refuse to comply with international norms. 
In order therefore to fully understand the concept of compliance, recourse has to be 
made to all the above-highlighted theories. But depending on the circumstances of a 
particular case, one, two or more theories may suffice to explain the incident of 
(non)compliance. 
 
Specifically regarding the reasons for noncompliance of Uganda‘s military justice 
legal framework with the right to a fair trial, it is plausible to argue (especially going 
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by the parliamentary debates preceding the enactment of the UPDF Act, 2005 and its 
predecessor- the UPDF Act, 1992) that the inadequate awareness by the Members of 
Parliament about the nature and scope of the country‘s international human rights 
obligations could be one of the main factors.
33
 A critical analysis of the relevant 
Hansards hardly shows any reference to Uganda‘s international human rights 
obligations let alone the constitutional provisions concerning the right to a fair trial. In 
fact, in some cases as the analysis in Section 4.4 will reveal, Members of Parliament 
made submissions that were clearly contrary to the right to a fair trial as understood in 
international human rights law. That is why, inter alia, a thesis of this nature becomes 
critical to help inform future debates on the question of military justice in Uganda. 
 
Now that the concept of compliance with international norms has been examined, it is 
apt to start analysing the compliance of Uganda‘s current military justice legal 
framework with the right to a fair trial. In doing this, it is necessary to first of all, 
examine the current Ugandan constitutional framework for right to a fair trial. This is 
the major focus of Section 4.2 below. 
 
4.2 The Ugandan Constitutional Framework for the Right to a Fair Trial 
Perhaps the most important starting point in analysing the constitutional framework 
for the right to a fair trial in the administration of military justice is Article 2 of 
Uganda‘s Constitution of 1995.34 This provision emphatically states that the 
Constitution is the supreme law of Uganda and that it has binding force on all 
authorities and persons throughout the country.
35
 According to Article 2 (2), if any 
law or custom is inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Constitution, the 
Constitution prevails and such law or custom is rendered void to the extent of the 
inconsistency. Emphasising the supremacy of the Constitution in his concurring 
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judgment in Attorney General v. Joseph Tumushabe,
36
 Bart Katureebe, Justice of the 
Supreme Court of Uganda, observed that the arguments of the appellants that  the 
provisions of the Constitution regarding the right to bail were not applicable to the 
General Court Martial in particular and courts-martial in general were based on wrong 
premises and were untenable‖37 He stressed that the Constitution is the supreme law 
of Uganda with binding force on all authorities and persons throughout the country 
including courts-martial. 
 In Uganda Law Society & Another v. The Attorney General,
38
 citing Article 2 of the 
Constitution, Justice Twinomujuni delivering the unanimous decision of the 
Constitutional Court,
39
 also re-affirmed the Constitution as the supreme law of 
Uganda with binding force on all authorities including military tribunals. He stated 
thus: 
In the course of my eleven years service as a justice of the Constitutional 
Court, I have heard very senior representatives of the Attorney General 
argue that the Constitution does not apply to the Uganda Peoples 
Defence Force as it applies to other authorities and persons in Uganda.  
They particularly like to argue that the Constitution does not apply to the 
military courts martial because the Courts are not Courts of judicature 
within the meaning of Article 129 of the Constitution. They argue that 
these are special institutions that were never intended to be bound by 
stringent rules and procedures laid down in the Constitution. I have 
always held that this argument is fallacious. The majority of Justices of 
this Court have always maintained that the Constitution applies to all 
authorities and persons throughout Uganda. I was, therefore, shocked to 
hear the same arguments being advanced in this petition by counsel for 
the respondent.
40
 
 
It is therefore clear that Uganda‘s highest court i.e. the Supreme Court and the court 
specifically charged with the responsibility of interpretation of the Constitution i.e. 
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the Constitutional Court, have unequivocally pronounced themselves on the fact that 
the Constitution as the supreme law also binds military tribunals in the administration 
of military justice. 
Uganda‘s Constitution like many constitutional frameworks in other countries 
contains an extensive Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights in Uganda‘s Constitution is 
contained in Chapter Four which deals with the protection and promotion of 
fundamental and other human rights and freedoms. It is provided that the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of the individual are inherent and not granted by the state.
41
 This 
means that fundamental human rights and freedoms are not favours granted by 
benevolent governments but are entitlements of every human being by the fact of 
being human.
42
 The Constitution also provides that the rights and freedoms enshrined 
in Chapter Four must be respected, upheld and promoted by all organs and agencies 
of government and by all persons.
43
 In Attorney General v. Joseph Tumushabe,
44
 
where the main issue was whether the provisions regarding bail in Article 23 (b) of 
the Constitution apply to the proceedings in military courts in particular the General 
Court Martial, Justice Mulenga, delivering the unanimous decision of the Supreme 
Court stressed that ―...the Constitution guarantees to every person the enjoyment of 
the rights set out in Chapter 4 except only in the circumstances that are expressly 
stipulated in the Constitution.‖45 He pointed out that the Constitution also commands 
the government, its agencies and all persons, without exception, to uphold those 
rights. He held that the General Court Martial was not exempted from the 
constitutional command to comply with the provisions of Chapter Four. Military 
courts like their civilian counter parts are therefore obliged to respect and uphold the 
rights and freedoms contained in Chapter Four of the Constitution. This includes the 
right to a fair trial. 
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The right to a fair trial which is stated as ―the right to a fair hearing‖ is provided for in 
Article 28 of the Constitution. This Article provides that in the determination of civil 
rights and obligations or any criminal charge, a person shall be entitled to a fair, 
speedy and public hearing before an independent and impartial court or tribunal 
established by law.
46
 It is however provided that notwithstanding the above, nothing 
prevents the court or tribunal from excluding the press or the public from all or any 
proceedings before it for reasons of morality, public order or national security, as may 
be necessary in a free and democratic society.
47
 Article 28 (3) provides that every 
person who is charged with a criminal offence shall— be presumed to be innocent 
until proved guilty or until that person has pleaded guilty;
48
 be informed immediately, 
in a language that the person understands, of the nature of the offence; be given 
adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his or her defence; be permitted to 
appear before the court in person or, at that person‘s own expense, by a lawyer of his 
or her choice; in the case of any offence which carries a sentence of death or 
imprisonment for life, be entitled to legal representation at the expense of the State; be 
afforded, without payment by that person, the assistance of an interpreter if that 
person cannot understand the language used at the trial; and be afforded facilities to 
examine witnesses and to obtain the attendance of other witnesses before the court. 
Trials in absentia are generally prohibited.
49
 A person tried for any criminal offence, 
or any person authorised by him or her is entitled to a copy of the proceedings upon 
payment of a fee prescribed by law.
50
 As a critical aspect of the right to a fair trial, it 
is also provided that no person should be charged with or convicted of a criminal 
offence which is founded on an act or omission that did not at the time it took place 
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constitute a criminal offence.
51
 As part of the right to a fair trial, the Constitution also 
provides that no penalty shall be imposed for a criminal offence that is severer in 
degree or description than the maximum penalty that could have been imposed for 
that offence at the time when it was committed.
52
 Further, it is provided that a person 
who shows that he or she has been tried by a competent court for a criminal offence 
and convicted or acquitted of that offence shall not again be tried for the offence or 
for any other criminal offence of which he or she could have been convicted at the 
trial for that offence, except upon the order of a superior court in the course of appeal 
or review proceedings relating to the conviction or acquittal.
53
 Related to this, the 
Constitution also provides that no person shall be tried for a criminal offence if that 
person shows that he or she has been pardoned in respect of that offence.
54
 Finally, as 
part of the package of the right to a fair trial, the Constitution protects the right against 
self-incrimination
55
  and also provides that except for contempt of court, no person 
shall be convicted of a criminal offence unless the offence is defined and the penalty 
for it prescribed by law.
56
  
The right to a fair trial as summarised above is one of the four non-derogable 
fundamental rights and freedoms under the Constitution,
57
 which means that it cannot 
be suspended, regardless of the circumstances. This demonstrates the importance that 
Uganda‘s Constitution and indeed the people of Uganda attach to the right to a fair 
trial. In fact, even those guarantees of the right to a fair trial protected in the ICCPR 
and the African Charter that are not explicitly provided for in Article 28 of the 
Constitution
58
 are protected by virtue of Articles 45
59
 and 287
60
 of the Constitution. In 
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Uganda Law Society & Another v. The Attorney General,
61
 delivering the unanimous 
decision of the Constitutional Court, Justice Twinomujuni pointed out that Article 28 
of the Constitution which provides for the right to a ―fair hearing‖ is not and was 
never intended to be exhaustive. Quoting Article 45 of the Constitution, he argued 
that it is clear that there are many other aspects of the right to a ―fair hearing‖ that are 
not covered in Article 28 of the Constitution. These nonetheless remain protected. 
Thus, in response to the perception that there was no right of appeal from decisions of 
Field Court Martial, as this was not explicitly stated in the UPDF Act of 1992, Justice 
Twinomujuni observed that that was ―...frequently asserted in our courts as if we 
forget that the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights... is part and parcel of 
our Constitution.‖62 He held that the African Charter was part of the Constitution by 
virtue of Article 287 of the Constitution. 
 
The above notwithstanding, it is provided that in the enjoyment of the right to a fair 
trial and other rights and fundamental freedoms provided for in the Constitution, no 
person shall prejudice the fundamental or other human rights and freedoms of others 
or the public interest.
63
 Article 43 (2) of the Constitution provides that public interest 
shall not permit –  political persecution; detention without trial; and any limitation on 
the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms prescribed by Chapter Four beyond what is 
acceptable and demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society, or what is 
provided in the Constitution. In Charles Onyango Obbo and Anor v. Attorney 
General,
64
 a case that was concerned with freedom of expression and speech as 
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guaranteed in Article 29 of Uganda‘s Constitution, the main issue was whether the 
Court of Appeal erred in failing to find that Section 50 of the Penal Code Act which 
criminalises the publication of false news was not demonstrably justifiable in a free 
and democratic society as required by Article 43 (2) c of the Constitution. In his 
leading judgement, Justice Mulenga stated that Article 43 (2) c is ―a limitation upon 
the limitation.‖65 He held that by virtue of Article 43 (2) c, any restrictions on the 
guaranteed rights in defence of public interest, however rationalised, cannot be valid 
unless they are acceptable and demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic 
society.
66
 
 
From the foregoing, it can safely be concluded that at least from a generic point of 
view, Uganda‘s Constitution sufficiently incorporates the guarantees of the right to a 
fair trial as understood in international human rights law. The guarantees of the right 
to a fair trial in the ICCPR and the African Charter are therefore part of Uganda‘s 
domestic law
67
 and are binding on all persons and authorities in Uganda in accordance 
with Articles 2 (1) and 20 (2) of the Constitution. It is therefore appropriate that we 
now turn to analyse the extent to which Uganda‘s military justice system complies 
with the right to a fair trial. But before embarking on this task, it is essential to first 
briefly explore the structure of Uganda‘s current military justice system.  
4.3 Overview of the Structure of Uganda’s Military Justice System  
The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda proclaims that ―judicial power is derived 
from the people and shall be exercised by the courts established under this 
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Constitution in the name of the people and in conformity with law and with the 
values, norms and aspirations of the people.‖68 Delivering the unanimous decision of 
the Supreme Court of Uganda in Attorney General v. Joseph Tumushabe,
69
 Justice 
Mulenga emphasised that the principle stated in Article 126 (1) of the Constitution 
embraces all judicial power exercised by both the civilian and military courts. He 
rightly pointed out that ―While Parliament established the Courts Martial as organs of 
UPDF, the authority to vest them with judicial power must be construed as derived 
from this constitutional principle, for only „courts established under this constitution‟ 
have mandate to exercise judicial power.‖ He further pointed out that ―...although 
Courts Martial are a specialised system to administer justice in accordance with 
military law, they are part of the system of courts that are, or are deemed to be, 
established under the Constitution to administer justice in the name of the people.‖ 70 
 
Following on Article 126 (1), the Constitution further provides that the judicial power 
of Uganda shall be exercised by the courts of judicature which shall consist of: the 
Supreme Court of Uganda;
71
 the Court of Appeal of Uganda;
72
 the High Court of 
Uganda;
73
 and such subordinate courts as Parliament may by law establish, including 
qadhis courts for marriage, divorce, inheritance of property and guardianship, as may 
be prescribed by Parliament.
74
 It is further provided that ―the Supreme Court, the 
Court of Appeal and the High Court of Uganda shall be superior courts of record and 
shall each have all the powers of such a court.‖75 Article 129 (3) provides that subject 
to the provisions of the Constitution, Parliament may make provision for the 
jurisdiction and procedure of the courts. 
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Under Article 210, Parliament is mandated to make laws regulating the UPDF
76
 and 
in particular to provide for: the organs and structures of the UPDF;
77
 recruitment, 
appointment, promotion, discipline and removal of members of the UPDF;
78
 terms 
and conditions of service of members of the UPDF;
79
 and the deployment of troops 
outside Uganda.
80
 Pursuant to this provision, Parliament enacted the UPDF Act, 2005 
as the major legal framework governing the UPDF.
81
 The UPDF Act 2005 is ―An Act 
to provide for the regulation of the Uganda Peoples‘ Defence Forces in accordance 
with article 210 of the Constitution, to repeal and replace the Armed Forces Pensions 
Act and the Uganda Peoples‘ Defence Force Act [1992], and for other related 
matters.‖82  Part VIII of the Act, deals with the establishment and operation of 
military courts in Uganda. From the structural point of view, military courts in 
Uganda comprise of the Summary Trial Authority, Unit Disciplinary Committees and 
Courts Martial.
83
 Under Courts Martial, the Act provides for a four tier military court 
system viz., Field Courts Martial; Division Courts Martial; the General Court Martial; 
and the Court Martial Appeal Court.
84
  
4.3.1 The Summary Trial Authority  
Under the ―Summary Trial Authority,‖ an accused person can be tried either by his or 
her commanding officer or officer commanding or by a superior authority.
85
 A 
commanding officer or an officer commanding may try an accused person by 
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summary trial
86
 provided that the accused person is either a junior officer or a 
militant;
87
 he or she has authority to try the offence under the UPDF Act or 
regulations made thereunder;
88
 his or her powers of punishment are adequate having 
regard to the gravity of the offence;
89
 and if he or she is not precluded from trying the 
accused person by reason of his or her election to be tried by court-martial.
90
 In case 
of a conviction, the commanding officer or officer commanding can pass any of the 
following sentences i.e. detention for a period not exceeding six months;
91
 forfeiture 
of seniority;
92
 severe reprimand;
93
 reprimand;
94
 a fine not exceeding basic pay for one 
month;
95
 and minor punishments as may be prescribed.
96
 Each of these punishments is 
deemed to be a punishment less than any other punishment preceding it.
97
 Officers 
senior in command to the commanding officers or officers commanding are barred 
from interfering with the powers of the commanding officers or officers commanding 
except in exercise of their appellate powers.
98
 
 
With regard to trials by superior authority, it is provided that a superior authority may 
try a senior army officer by summary trial if – he or she is equal to or higher in rank 
than the accused;
99
 the offence is one that he or she is authorised to try;
100
 his or her 
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powers of punishment are adequate having regard to the gravity of the offence;
101
 and 
if he or she is not precluded from trying the accused person by reason of his or her 
election to be tried by court martial.
102
 On conviction, the superior authority can pass 
one or more of the following punishments: forfeiture of seniority;
103
 severe 
reprimand;
104
 reprimand;
105
 and fine.
106
 
 
There are a number of reasons why many military justice systems around the world 
like that of Uganda give commanding and senior military officers the power to hear 
cases by way of summary trial. Most of these reasons relate to the need to enforce 
discipline in the armed forces. It is argued by scholars like Rowe that since 
commanding officers have the responsibility for the maintenance of discipline in their 
units, the power to try soldiers under their control provides them with a means to 
directly enforce this discipline on their subordinates.
107
 Also, the power to hear cases 
summarily is considered important for ensuring speedy trials. As Gibson generally 
argues, extensive delays in dealing with offences which have disciplinary implications 
can result in rapid erosion of discipline and consequential negative effects on 
operational effectiveness of an armed force.
108
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As regards the trial itself, it is a requirement that an accused officer or militant should 
be afforded a proper opportunity to prepare himself or herself for the trial
109
 and 
should be informed of – the charges brought against him or her;110 the fact that he or 
she is to be subjected to summary trial;
111
 and his or her right to elect to be tried by 
court martial.
112
 Where the accused person opts for summary trial, they are not 
entitled to representation by counsel.
113
 It is explicitly provided that ―there shall be no 
legal officer at such trial‖ but that both the accused and the summary trial authority 
can seek legal advice out of court.
114
 There is no prosecution side at a summary 
trial.
115
 The accused person is arraigned by the summary trial authority who examines 
both the witnesses for the state and the witnesses for the defence.
116
 Needless to point 
out, it is the summary trial authority which in the first place prefers and investigates 
the charges against the accused officer or militant. It is observable that this 
arrangement and way of administering military justice is akin to the deplorable 
position during the colonial era where, as was analysed in Chapter Three, the 
commanding officers had power to place charges and try accused officers without any 
legal representation.  
 
Appeals from decisions of summary trial authority lie only to the commanding officer 
or the immediate superior in command of the summary trial authority.
117
 In particular, 
appeals from decisions of superior authority in exercise of original jurisdiction lie to 
the Commander-in-Chief.
118
 It is a requirement that all appeals should be submitted 
through the summary trial authority that presided at the trial at which the decision 
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appealed against was made.
119
 The summary trial authority must endorse the appeal to 
his or commanding officer or immediate superior in command.
120
 On receipt of the 
appeal, the commanding officer or immediate superior in command of the summary 
trial authority must refer the appeal to an advocate for advice and he or she or the 
Commander-in-Chief, as the case may be may, if necessary, take corrective action or 
order a retrial.
121
 The UPDF Act and the Regulations are silent as to the advocate 
from whom the advice is sought
122
 and whether or not his or her advice is binding. It 
is plausible to argue however that such advice is not binding; otherwise the law would 
have explicitly stated so. 
 
From the above exploration, one may be tempted to assume that as the trials by 
Summary Trial Authority are generally disciplinary in nature (especially going by the 
nature of the offences they are authorised to try),
123
 the right to a fair trial does not 
apply to them. But as was established in Chapter Two of this thesis, the right to a fair 
trial applies to all proceedings involving determination of criminal charges. The 
pertinent question therefore is: Do trials by summary trial authority involve 
determination of criminal charges? As was stressed in Chapter Two, the HRC has 
emphasised that the notion of a ―criminal charge‖ does not only relate to acts declared 
punishable under domestic criminal law, but also extends to acts that are criminal in 
nature and whose sanctions are penal because of their purpose, character or 
severity.
124
 Therefore, regardless of the domestic law classification of the offence 
with which someone is charged, if the penalty to be incurred involves deprivation of 
liberty and where the duration and manner of its execution is appreciably detrimental, 
then any such proceedings would amount to ―determination of a criminal charge,‖ in 
which case the right to a fair trial applies.
125
 Specifically, as the ECrtHR rightly 
emphasised, ―...in a society subscribing to the rule of law, there belong to the 
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‗criminal‘ sphere deprivations of liberty liable to be imposed as a punishment, except 
those which by their nature, duration, or manner of execution cannot be appreciably 
detrimental.‖126  
 
Summary trial authorities as highlighted above, have power to sentence a convict to 
six months detention among other punishments. It is submitted that this is a serious 
punishment involving deprivation of liberty for too long a duration that it can rightly 
be argued that the sentence belongs to the ―criminal‖ sphere, thereby making the right 
to a fair trial applicable to trials by summary trial authorities. In Engel v. Netherlands, 
regarding charges whose maximum penalty was four months committal to a 
disciplinary unit, the ECrtHR held that such charges came within the criminal sphere 
since their aim was the imposition of serious punishments involving deprivation of 
liberty.
127
 Clearly therefore, Summary Trial Authorities are obliged to respect and 
uphold the right to a fair trial in their administration of military justice. 
4.3.2 Unit Disciplinary Committees 
Section 195 (1) of the UPDF Act establishes a Unit Disciplinary Committee for each 
Unit of the defence forces.
128
 Unit Disciplinary Committees consist of: a chairperson 
who should not be below the rank of captain;
129
 the administration officer of the 
unit;
130
 the political commissar of the unit;
131
 the Regiment Sergeant Major or 
Company Sergeant Major of the unit;
132
 two junior officers;
133
 and one private.
134
  
The UPDF Act and the Regulations made thereunder are silent on the question of the 
appointing authority of the members of Unit Disciplinary Committees who are 
members not by virtue of the positions they hold in the Unit i.e. the chairperson, the 
two junior officers and the private. This silence on a very important issue can be 
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problematic in terms of the independence and impartiality of such members. The 
quorum of a Unit Disciplinary Committee is five members including the 
chairperson.
135
 The jurisdiction of a Unit Disciplinary Committee is limited to trying 
persons accused of committing non-capital offences under the UPDF Act.
136
 It can 
impose any sentence authorised by law.
137
 The convening authority of a Unit 
Disciplinary Committee is a Division Commander or a Commander of the equivalent 
formation.
138
 In addition, the High Command
139
 or any other authority as may be 
authorized can convene a Unit Disciplinary Committee.
140
 This is so because Section 
196 (1) of the UPDF Act states that ―The High Command or any other authority as 
may be authorized in that behalf by the High Command may convene a military 
court.‖ Section 2 of the UPDF Act defines a ―military court‖ to include not only a 
court martial but also a unit disciplinary committee and a summary trial authority. 
Decisions of a Unit Disciplinary Committee are by majority opinion and once passed, 
are binding on all the members concerned.
141
 It is an offence for any member who 
takes part in the proceedings of the Committee to disassociate him or herself from the 
decision.
142
 A party to the proceedings of a Unit Disciplinary Committee or court 
martial other than a Field Court Martial who is not satisfied with its decision has the 
right to appeal to an appellate court on any or all of the following matters – the 
                                                          
135
 Section 195 (2). 
136
 Section 195 (3). The UPDF Act does not define what a capital or non-capital offence is. 
137
 Section 195 (4). 
138
 Section 196 (2). 
139
 The High Command is mainly comprised of the top military hierarchy of the UPDF. According to 
Section 15 (1) of the UPDF Act, it is comprised of the President as the chairperson; the Minister 
responsible for defence; members of the High Command on 26 January 1986 whose names are set out 
in the Third schedule to the UPDF Act; the Chief of Defence Forces; all Service commanders; the 
Chief of Staff; all Service Chiefs of Staff; all Chiefs of the Services of the Defence Forces; all 
commanders of any formations higher than a Division; all Division Commanders, officers commanding 
equivalent units of the Defence Forces and the Commandant of the General Headquarters; and such 
other commanders and experts as are from time to time co-opted by the President to advise the High 
Command. A notable and very disturbing aspect about this composition is that the law entrenches 
certain individuals (i.e. members of the High Command on 26 January 1986) as members of the High 
Command for life. This is an unacceptable practice in a democratic society.  
140
 Section 196 (1). 
141
 Section 201 (1). 
142
 Section 201 (2). 
 161 
legality or propriety of any or all the findings; the legality of the whole or part of the 
sentence; and the severity or leniency of the sentence.
143
   
 
The important question to be asked now is: Given their jurisdiction among other 
things, does the right to a fair trial apply to proceedings before Unit Disciplinary 
Committees? It is observable to note in this respect that the name ―Unit Disciplinary 
Committee‖ is misleading as to the real nature of proceedings which the Unit 
Disciplinary Committees actually deal with. The name presupposes that they only 
deal with disciplinary matters as opposed to criminal charges, so that the right to a fair 
trial is inapplicable to them. A critical analysis of the law governing their operations 
however reveals that, in fact, Unit Disciplinary Committees are also heavily involved 
in the determination of criminal matters/charges, and are therefore obliged to respect 
and uphold the right to a fair trial. As pointed out above, the jurisdiction of Unit 
Disciplinary Committees is limited to trying persons accused of committing non-
capital offences. Although the UPDF Act and its regulations do not define what a 
―capital‖ or ―non-capital‖ offence is, the term ―misdemeanour‖ which can generally 
be accepted as its equivalent, is defined in the Penal Code Act as an offence which is 
not a felony.
144
 A felony is defined as an offence which is declared by law to be so or, 
if not declared to be a misdemeanour, is punishable with death or with imprisonment 
for three years or more.
145
 This therefore means that a Unit Disciplinary Committee 
has power to try offences where the accused person risks incurring serious 
punishments including imprisonment for upto three years. Indeed Article 195 (4) of 
the UPDF Act explicitly states that a Unit Disciplinary Committee has power to pass 
any sentence authorised by law. According to Section 221 of the UPDF Act which 
provides the scale of the different punishments that may be imposed in respect of 
service offences, imprisonment for two or more years is second to death in terms of 
severity. It is higher in scale than all the other punishments authorised by law. 
Deprivation of one‘s liberty for three years is without a doubt a serious punishment 
and too long that it can correctly be argued that the sentence belongs to the ―criminal‖ 
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sphere, thereby making the right to a fair trial applicable to proceedings before the 
Unit Disciplinary Committees.  
4.3.3 Division Courts Martial 
The UPDF Act establishes a Division Court Martial for each Division or equivalent 
formation of the defence forces.
146
 A Division Court Martial has unlimited original 
jurisdiction under the UPDF Act.
147
 It consists of: a chairperson who should not be 
below the rank of Major;
148
 two senior officers;
149
 two junior officers;
150
 a political 
commissar;
151
 and one non-commissioned officer.
152
 All the above officers are 
appointed by the High Command for a period of one year
153
 and are eligible for re-
appointment.
154
 The quorum of a Division Court Martial is five members, but when 
trying an accused person for a capital offence, all members of court must be 
present.
155
 The power to convene a Division Court Martial vests in the High 
Command or any other authority authorised in that behalf by the High Command.
156
 
Decisions of a Division Court Martial like those of a Unit Disciplinary Committee are 
by majority opinion and once passed, are binding on all the members concerned.
157
 It 
is an offence for any member who takes part in the proceedings of a court martial or 
Unit Disciplinary Committee to disassociate him or herself from the decision.
158
 
This aspect of Uganda‘s military justice system is problematic and quite disturbing. 
Why should a member of court be bound by a decision he or she doesn‘t believe in, to 
the extent of making it an offence if he or she disassociates him or herself from that 
decision? If even at Supreme Court level, where it is highly desirable that all judges 
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should be in agreement with the decision of Court, their Lordships are allowed to give 
dissenting judgments, what makes military courts special? It is in fact arguable, that 
this aspect of making it an offence for a member of military court to disassociate him 
or herself from the majority opinion of court, is one of the issues that puts the 
independence and impartiality Uganda‘s military tribunals into question. As was 
discussed in Section 2.3.3 for instance, the right to an impartial tribunal requires that 
tribunals must not only be subjectively free from personal bias, but should also appear 
to reasonable observers to be impartial. Given the many shortcomings of Uganda‘s 
military justice system as far as the right to a fair trial is concerned, as this Chapter 
will establish, it is submitted that when military law also makes it an offence for a 
member of military court to disassociate him or herself from a decision of court he or 
she does not believe in, a reasonable observer would indeed doubt the independence 
and impartiality of Uganda‘s military tribunals.  
 
With respect to the question whether or not the right to a fair trial applies to the 
proceedings before the Division Courts Martial, it is important to note that as earlier 
pointed out, these courts have unlimited original jurisdiction under the UPDF Act.
159
 
This means that they have jurisdiction to hear and determine all offences (including 
criminal offences or offences that are criminal in nature)
160
 provided for under the 
UPDF Act. By virtue of their jurisdiction, the Division Courts Martial therefore also 
have power to pass any sentence as provided for in the UPDF Act including death and 
imprisonment for two or more years.
161
 Clearly therefore, the right to a fair trial 
applies to the Division Courts-Martial as well. 
4.3.4 Field Courts Martial 
Uganda‘s military justice system also consists of Field Courts Martial.162 Field Courts 
Martial consist of the Field Commander of the operation as the chairperson and eight 
other members appointed in writing by the deploying authority before departure.
163
 
Like the Division Courts Martial and the Unit Disciplinary Committees, decisions of 
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the Field Courts Martial are by majority opinion, and when a decision is reached in 
such manner, it is binding on all members.
164
 Prosecutors; witnesses for the 
prosecution; provost officers; and persons who prior to the proceedings of the court 
martial participate in the investigation of the case against the person charged are 
disqualified from sitting as members of Field Courts Martial.
165
  
The jurisdiction of Field Courts Martial is limited to only circumstances where it is 
impractical for the offender to be tried by a Unit Disciplinary Committee or a 
Division Court Martial.
166
 In Uganda Law Society & Another v. The Attorney 
General,
167
 one of the contentious issues that the Constitutional Court had to 
determine was whether at the time of the Kotido Field Court Martial in question, 
circumstances existed such that it was not practical for the alleged offenders to be 
tried by a Unit Disciplinary Committee or a Division Court Martial. In addressing this 
issue, Justice Twinomujuni who delivered the unanimous decision of Court posed a 
very important question regarding the jurisdiction of Field Court Martial in the above 
respect. He asked: ―Who is competent to determine whether the requisite 
circumstances existed; is it subjectively the province of the appointing authority or 
can the matter be determined using an objective test by another person or authority 
like a court of law?‖ Noting that on the particular day in question, there was no 
evidence of a war like situation or military operation in progress, he nonetheless 
stated that it was not possible for a person or authority like court to determine the 
nature of the military operation that was required in Karamoja to disarm the heavily 
armed war lords of Karamoja region. He opined that such decision should be left to 
the military command and the appointing authority to use his good judgement in 
accordance with the intelligence he may be in possession of. He therefore held that 
since that is what happened in the case in question, the Field Court Martial which 
handled the Kotido trial was a competent court. 
With great respect, it is submitted that the Court applied the wrong test. The correct 
test should be an objective one. This can reasonably be implied from the very 
language of Section 200 (2) of the UPDF Act which states that ―A Field Court Martial 
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shall only operate in circumstances where it is impractical for the offender to be tried 
by a Unit Disciplinary Committee or Division Court Martial.‖168 Going by the 
language used in the above provision, it could not have been the intention of the 
Legislature that the issue of whether or not circumstances exist to warrant a Field 
Court Martial should be left to the entire discretion of the military commanders or the 
Commander-in-Chief. Were this to be the case, the law would have explicitly stated 
so. It would have stated that A Field Court Martial shall only operate in circumstances 
where the Field Commander or the deploying authority considers it impractical for the 
offender to be tried by a Unit Disciplinary Committee or Division Court Martial. In 
the above case therefore, both the parties to the proceedings should have adduced 
evidence as to the circumstances that existed at the time in question and from such 
evidence, the Court should then have ruled whether from an objective point of view, it 
was impractical to have the offenders tried by a Unit Disciplinary Committee or a 
Division Court Martial.  
Regarding the important question whether or not the right to a fair trial applies to 
Field Courts Martial, these courts like the Division Courts-Martial have unlimited 
jurisdiction under the UPDF Act. Like the Division Courts Martial, they therefore also 
have jurisdiction to hear and determine all offences provided for under the UPDF Act 
including criminal offences or offences that are criminal in nature. They can also pass 
any sentence under the UPDF Act including penal sentences like death and 
imprisonment for two or more years. From this perspective therefore, the right to a 
fair trial also applies to the Field Courts-Martial. 
4.3.5 The General Court Martial 
Uganda‘s military justice structure also includes the General Court Martial for the 
Defence Forces.
169
 The General Court Martial is the second highest military court in 
the country. It comprises of a chairperson who should not be below the rank of 
Lieutenant Colonel;
170
 two senior officers;
171
 two junior officers;
172
 a political 
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commissar;
173
 and one non-commissioned officer.
174
 All members of the General 
Court Martial are appointed by the High Command for a period of one year.
175
 They 
are all eligible for re-appointment.
176
 The General Court Martial has both original and 
appellate jurisdiction.
177
 Its appellate jurisdiction includes hearing and determining all 
appeals referred to it from decisions of Division Courts Martial and Unit Disciplinary 
Committees.
178
 
 
The General Court Martial also has revisionary powers in respect of findings, 
sentences or orders made or imposed by any Summary Trial Authority or Unit 
Disciplinary Committee.
179
 The quorum of the General Court Martial is five 
members,
180
 but when trying an accused person for a capital offence, all members of 
the court must be present.
181
 Decisions of the General Court like other courts martial 
are by majority opinion,
182
 and when the decision is reached in that manner, it is 
binding on all members of the court.
183
 As the General Court Martial also has 
unlimited original jurisdiction under the UPDF Act,
184
 for the reasons advanced in 
respect of the Division Courts Martial and the Field Courts Martial, the right to a fair 
trial also applies to it. 
4.3.6 The Court Martial Appeal Court 
The Court Martial Appeal Court is the highest military court in Uganda. It hears and 
determines all appeals referred to it from decisions of the General Court Martial.
185
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The Court Martial Appeal Court comprises: a chairperson who must be an advocate 
qualified for appointment as a judge of the High Court of Uganda;
186
 two senior 
officers of the defence forces;
187
 and two advocates who must be members of the 
defence forces.
188
 All members of the Court Martial Appeal Court are appointed by 
the Commander-in-Chief of the UPDF on the advice of the High Command.
189
 The 
registrar of the Court Martial Appeal Court, who must be a legally qualified person, is 
appointed by the High Command.
190
 The quorum of the Court Martial Appeal Court is 
three members, but when considering an appeal against a judgement involving a 
sentence of death, the quorum must be five members.
191
 Decisions of the court, as is 
the case with other military tribunals, are by majority opinion.
192
 The Court Martial 
Appeal Court is the last appellate military tribunal in Uganda. No appeal lies from the 
Court Martial Appeal Court to any other court, except cases of appeal against 
convictions involving death sentence or life imprisonment which have been upheld by 
it.
193
 In such cases, the appellant has a right of further appeal to the Court of 
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Appeal.
194
 It is obvious that like with all the other military courts earlier discussed, the 
right to a fair trial certainly also applies to the Court Martial Appeal Court. 
4.3.7 Other Key Players in the Administration of Military Justice 
Other than the members of military courts, persons who act as judge advocates and 
the prosecutors are the other key players in the administration of military justice in 
Uganda. An overview of the structure of Uganda‘s military justice system would 
therefore be incomplete without highlighting their role and the law governing their 
operations. The UPDF Act provides that at any proceedings of a Court Martial or Unit 
Disciplinary Committee, there must be a secretary to record all the proceedings of the 
court;
195
 an advocate or, in case of a Unit Disciplinary Committee, a para-legal to 
advise the court during its proceedings on the law and procedure;
196
 and a 
prosecutor.
197
 All these officers are appointed by the High Command or any other 
authority as may be authorised in that behalf by the High Command.
198
  
 
Specifically regarding the role of the judge advocate, on the assembly of the court, he 
or she is charged with responsibility of advising the court of any defect in its 
constitution or in the charge sheet.
199
 During the trial, the judge advocate is charged 
with the responsibility of advising the court upon all questions of law or procedure 
which may arise.
200
 His advice on such matters is binding unless the court has good 
grounds for not following it.
201
 After the closing addresses, the judge advocate is 
charged with the responsibility of summing up the evidence and advising the court 
upon the law relating to the case.
202
 He does not participate in the deliberations on the 
findings of the court nor does he take part in the sentencing.
203
 It is however provided 
that if the judge advocate is of the opinion that the finding of court is contrary to the 
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law relating to the case, ―he shall, on one more occasion only, advise the court what 
findings are, in his opinion, open to them, and the court shall then reconsider its 
findings in closed court.‖204 The prosecutor and the accused person are, at all times 
entitled to the opinion of the judge advocate on any question of law or procedure 
relative to the charge or trial, whether he is in court or out of court.
205
 
 
To what extent does the structure of Uganda‘s military justice system analysed above 
comply with the right to a fair trial, in particular the right to a fair and public hearing 
by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal? This is the major question that 
we now proceed to address in Section 4.4 below. 
 
4.4 Compliance of Uganda’s Military Justice with the Right to a Fair Trial 
It is the major argument of this thesis that despite attempts at reform, Uganda‘s 
current military justice is in many ways still stuck in its colonial origins and falls far 
too short of complying with the right to a fair trial as understood in international 
human rights law. The analysis in this section, is, for the most part, based on a critical 
examination of Uganda‘s military justice legal framework. We begin by first 
analysing the compliance of Uganda‘s military justice legal framework with the right 
to a competent tribunal; followed by the right to an independent tribunal; the right to 
an impartial tribunal; the right to a public hearing; and finally the right to a fair 
hearing.  
4.4.1 Compliance with the Right to a Competent Tribunal 
In Chapter Two, it was established that the right to a competent tribunal as provided 
for in international human rights law has two major aspects i.e. the competence of the 
persons who constitute a tribunal and the jurisdiction of the tribunal. The former 
requires that persons called upon to play judicial roles in military tribunals must have 
appropriate legal training and qualifications comparable to those required of 
professional judges and must be people of integrity. It is only then that they can 
competently and properly administer justice according to established legal rules and 
procedures. The latter requires that military tribunals must have jurisdiction over both 
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the subject matter (jurisdiction ratione materiae) and the persons they try (jurisdiction 
ratione personae). As was discussed in Chapter Two, international human rights law 
emphasises that the jurisdiction of military tribunals must be restricted to offences of 
a strictly military nature committed by military personnel and that, the trial of 
civilians by military tribunals should be exceptional i.e., limited to cases where the 
state can show that the trial of civilians by military tribunals is necessary and justified 
by objective and serious reasons, and where with regard to the specific class of 
individuals and offences at issue, the regular civilian courts are unable to undertake 
the trials.
206
 Specifically, in Madani v. Algeria, the HRC set the test thus ―…the State 
party must demonstrate, with regard to the specific class of individuals at issue, that 
the regular civilian courts are unable to undertake the trials, that other alternative 
forms of special or high-security civilian courts are inadequate to the task and that 
recourse to military courts is unavoidable. The state must further demonstrate how 
military courts ensure the full protection of the rights of the accused pursuant to 
article 14 [of the ICCPR].‖207 
 
It is against the above criteria that we assess the competence of Uganda‘s military 
tribunals. From these criteria, the following questions can be posed as a guide to the 
ensuing analysis: To what extent does Uganda‘s military justice legal framework 
guarantee the legal competence of the country‘s military tribunals? To what extent 
does Uganda‘s military justice legal framework ensure that the jurisdiction of military 
tribunals is limited to only offences of a military nature committed by military 
personnel? In case of military tribunals having jurisdiction over civilians, are there 
serious justifications for such deviation from the international human rights position? 
In particular, are the regular civilian courts in Uganda unable to undertake those trials 
in which military tribunals are given jurisdiction over civilians? Are other alternative 
forms of special or high-security civilian courts inadequate to the task? Is resort to 
military tribunals unavoidable? In case it is unavoidable, are the military tribunals in 
position to ensure the full protection of the rights of the accused persons guaranteed 
by Article 14 of the ICCPR?   
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With regard to the first question, as was pointed out in Chapter Two, in the context of 
military justice, it is normally the judge advocates that ensure legal competence of 
military tribunals. But where there are no judge advocates or, where they do not 
possess appropriate legal qualifications or, the weakness of the military justice system 
generally make it difficult for their legal competencies to bear on the proceedings and 
decisions of court, it becomes important to examine whether (especially with respect 
to the members of the court) there are measures that can be taken to guarantee the 
legal competence of the courts. In attempt to ensure that Uganda‘s military courts are 
legally competent, Section 202 (b) of the UPDF Act 2005 provides that at any 
proceeding of court martial, there must be an advocate or, in case of a Unit 
Disciplinary Committee, a para-legal to advise the court during its proceedings on 
issues of law and procedure. During the parliamentary debates preceding the 
enactment of the UPDF Act 2005 and its predecessor – the UPDF Act 1992, some 
Members of Parliament argued that such a provision would suffice to make Uganda‘s 
military courts legally competent.
208
 
 
It is submitted that in Uganda‘s circumstances, the mere presence of an advocate at 
courts martial to advise the courts on issues of law and procedure is not sufficient to 
fulfill the requirement of ensuring that military tribunals are legally competent. First 
of all, the advocates are not members of court and do not participate in the 
deliberations on the findings of the court nor take part in the sentencing. Secondly, not 
all military tribunals have advocates to advise them on issues of law and procedure. 
There is, for instance, no provision for advocates to advise a summary trial authority 
on issues of law and procedure. In fact, the UPDF Act expressly provides that ―there 
shall be no legal officer at a summary trial.‖209 This is notwithstanding the fact that a 
summary trial authority is classified as a military court and as earlier discussed, by 
virtue of its penal sentencing powers, is bound by the right to a fair trial. 
 
In the case of the Unit Disciplinary Committees, it is para-legals and not advocates 
who advise the Committees on issues of law and procedure. It is submitted that given 
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their level of training, para-legals are not qualified enough to competently advise 
these tribunals on the technicalities of law and procedure that may arise during their 
conduct of judicial business.
210
 Although the jurisdiction of the Unit Disciplinary 
Committees is limited to trial of non-capital offences, some of those offences and the 
penalties involved are too complex for para-legals to competently handle. But even 
for those military tribunals like the General Court Martial and the Division Courts 
Martial where there are qualified advocates to advise the court on issues of law and 
procedure, the value of their advice is compromised by the fact that, as shall be 
analysed later, they cannot be said to independent and impartial as is required in 
international human rights law. In any case, there is some evidence that in practice, 
persons appointed as judge advocates are never given sufficient opportunity to 
address the court on issues of law and procedure and very often, their advice is 
ignored by the members of military courts.
211
 Besides, depending on the particular 
case, matters of law and procedure are not simple issues that it should be expected 
that members of military tribunals will easily and quickly comprehend them 
especially given the speed at which military courts dispose of cases. It therefore 
follows that mere provision for advocates or para-legals to advise military courts on 
issues of law and procedure does not sufficiently ensure that Uganda‘s military 
tribunals are legally competent as is required by the right to a competent tribunal. 
 
Unfortunately, the members of military courts who would have filled the legal 
competence deficiency of the military tribunals are generally not required to be 
legally competent. Other than the Court Martial Appeal Court where it is required that 
the chairperson should be an advocate qualified for appointment as a judge of the 
High Court of Uganda,
212
 and that the court should be composed of two other 
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advocates among other members, there is no legal requirement that members of 
military tribunals in Uganda should have appropriate legal training. Also, in practice, 
legally qualified persons are rarely appointed as members of military tribunals. On his 
part, when defending the UPDF Bill (as the responsible minister) during the 
Parliamentary debates leading to the enactment of the UPDF Act 2005, Hon. Amama 
Mbabazi – the Minister of Defence at the time, vehemently argued against having 
legally qualified persons as members of military tribunals. He shockingly argued that 
except at the Court Martial Appeal Court, issues of law rarely arise in the proceedings 
before the other military tribunals;
213
 ―... in most of the levels of trial courts, it is a 
question of establishing facts whether people did it or did not do it, and we do not 
really need professional lawyers to do that,‖ he argued.214 With respect, the Minister‘s 
argument was very disappointing. As long as military tribunals apply the law to the 
facts in the adjudication of cases – which they are obliged to do, then obviously issues 
of law arise regardless of the level of court. Indeed it could be that there are many 
issues of law that arise in the administration of military justice only that, perhaps, as is 
evident in Professor Kanyeihamba‘s revelation,215 they are not taken serious by the 
military tribunals. In fact, going by Hon. Amma Mbabazi‘s argument, it would seem 
that ―facts‖ are more important than the law insofar as the administration of military 
justice in Uganda is concerned.  
 
Hon. Amma Mbabazi also argued that requiring lawyers to man military tribunals 
could stifle the administration of military justice because there could arise occasions 
when there would be no lawyers in the army to administer justice.
216
 To the extent 
that Uganda would allow such a situation to happen, means that it would have 
abdicated its international human rights obligation of ensuring that its military courts 
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are competent. In any case, as Captain Guma
217
 and Hon. Twarabireho
218
 pointed out 
during the parliamentary debates, there are many lawyers in the UPDF and there are 
still many members of the UPDF who are studying law at various institutions of 
higher learning. It is just that for unclear reasons, Government does not seem to be 
comfortable with having legally trained persons as members of military tribunals.
219
 
This leaves a lot to be desired. How do persons who are legally incompetent 
administer fair justice according to law as should be the case in any democratic 
society? This unwillingness and or failure to ensure that Uganda‘s military tribunals 
are sufficiently legally competent is reminiscent of Uganda‘s early military justice 
systems during the colonial times, which, as was pointed out in Chapter Three, did not 
require military courts to be legally competent nor provide guarantees for ensuring 
their legal competence. That this is almost still the position in 21
st
 century Uganda, 
when the country is clearly bound by various international human rights instruments 
to ensure that its courts including military tribunals are legally competent, is very 
regrettable. It proves the hypothesis that despite attempts at reform, Uganda‘s military 
justice is to a large extent, still stuck in its historical origins.  
  
As regards the extent to which Uganda‘s military justice legal framework ensures that 
the jurisdiction of military tribunals is limited to only offences of a military nature, 
both the HRC and the ACHPR have consistently emphasised that the jurisdiction of 
military tribunals should be limited to offences of a military nature.
220
 Principle 8 of 
the UN Principles on Military Justice
221
 also stresses, inter alia, that ―The jurisdiction 
of military courts should be limited to offences of a strictly military nature committed 
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by military personnel.‖222 A critical examination of Uganda‘s military justice legal 
framework however reveals that military tribunals in Uganda have wide discretion to 
try nonmilitary offences not only under the UPDF Act but also under any other law in 
Uganda. The law provides that any person subject to military law, who does or omits 
to do an act in Uganda or outside Uganda, which constitutes (or if it had taken place 
in Uganda) would constitute an offence under the Penal Code Act or any other 
enactment, commits a service offence and is therefore liable to trial by a military 
court.
223
 A ―service offence‖ is defined as an offence under the UPDF Act or any 
other Act in force, committed by a person while subject to military law.
224
 This means 
therefore that Uganda‘s military tribunals have jurisdiction to try persons subject to 
military law not only for commission of military offences but also ordinary civilian 
offences. In its Concluding Observations on the national periodic report of Guatemala 
under Article 40 of the ICCPR, the HRC was concerned about such wide jurisdiction 
as Uganda‘s military justice legal framework confers to military tribunals. The 
Committee expressed concern about the broad jurisdiction of military tribunals ―...to 
hear all cases involving the trial of military personnel and their powers to decide cases 
that belong to the ordinary courts...‖225 It recommended that Guatemala should 
―…amend the law to limit the jurisdiction of the military courts to the trial of military 
personnel who are accused of crimes of an exclusively military nature.‖226 In light of 
this thesis‘ finding that Uganda‘s military tribunals cannot be said to be legally 
competent, one cannot help but to wonder why they are given such wide jurisdiction 
over offences of a nonmilitary nature. Military courts in Uganda lack the necessary 
legal capacity to deal with the legal intricacies and evidential technicalities that most 
civilian offences present. Moreover, one fails to see how, unless if committed in a 
military context, offences of a nonmilitary nature negatively impact on the discipline 
in the armed forces – which is the major reason, advanced for having military justice 
as a separate system of administration of justice. 
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Concerning the issue of generally restricting the jurisdiction of military tribunals to 
only trial of military personnel, the HRC has consistently emphasised that it is 
incumbent on a State party that does try civilians before military courts to justify the 
practice.
227
 A review of Uganda‘s military justice legal framework however reveals 
that military courts are given wide jurisdiction over many categories of civilians 
without any serious and compelling reason. Under Section 179 of the UPDF Act 
2005, any person subject to military law who commits a service offence can be tried 
by a military court. Under Section 119 of the same law, persons subject to military 
law include civilians: who serve in the position of an officer or militant in any force 
raised and maintained outside Uganda and commanded by an officer of the defence 
forces;
228
 who voluntarily accompany any unit or other element of the defence forces 
which is on service in any place;
229
 who serve in the defence forces under 
engagements by which they agree to be subject to military law;
230
 who aid or abet a 
person subject to military law in commission of a service offence;
231
 and every one 
found in unlawful possession of arms, ammunitions or equipment ordinarily being the 
monopoly of the defence forces or other classified stores as prescribed.
232
 Every 
person who commits a service offence while subject to military law is also liable to be 
charged and tried by military tribunals notwithstanding that they have ceased to be 
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subject to military law since the commission of the offence.
233
 This means that retired 
members of the armed forces and civilians, who cease to be subject to military law, 
remain liable to be tried by military courts for the service offences they committed 
while still subject to military law. 
 
From the foregoing analysis, it is without a doubt that Uganda‘s military justice legal 
framework confers wide jurisdiction on military tribunals over civilians. This is not 
only generally inconsistent with the right to a competent tribunal as provided for in 
the ICCPR, but also contravenes the right of everyone to be tried by ordinary courts as 
provided for in Principle 5 of the Basic Principles on the Independence of the 
Judiciary and the right of civilians not to be tried by military courts as provided for in 
Section G of the African Commission Principles.
234
 The important questions that 
remain to be determined are: Are there any serious compelling reasons in Uganda for 
conferring upon military courts jurisdiction to try civilians? In particular, are the 
regular civilian courts unable and inadequate to try the categories of civilians in the 
above mentioned circumstances? Are other alternative forms of special or high-
security civilian courts inadequate to the task of trying those categories of civilians? Is 
resort to military tribunals unavoidable? In case it is unavoidable, are the military 
tribunals in position to ensure the full protection of the rights of the accused persons 
guaranteed by Article 14 of the ICCPR?   
 
In Madani v. Algeria, the HRC held that mere invocation of domestic legal provisions 
for the trial, by a military court, of certain categories of serious offences does not 
constitute an argument under the ICCPR in support of recourse to trial of civilians by 
military tribunals.
235
 Comparative jurisprudence from the ECrtHR also stresses that it 
is not sufficient for the national legislation to allocate certain categories of offences to 
military courts in abstracto.‖236 So, the act of Uganda‘s military justice legal 
framework giving military tribunals jurisdiction to try civilians for such offences like 
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unlawful possession of arms, ammunition and equipment ordinarily being the 
monopoly of the defence forces and all offences where civilians aid or abet a person 
subject to military law in commission of a service offence
237
 is wrong and 
contravenes the right to a competent tribunal as guaranteed in international human 
rights law.
238
 
 
Besides, there is no reason whatsoever to suppose that Uganda‘s regular civilian 
courts are unable or inadequate to undertake trial of most of the categories of civilian 
persons subject to military law. Uganda‘s regular civilian courts are both 
operationally and legally capable and able to try most of the categories of civilians 
subject to military law including those accused of serious offences like unlawful 
possession of arms, ammunition and equipment ordinarily being the monopoly of the 
defence forces.
239
 For a very long time, Uganda‘s civilian courts have satisfactorily 
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dealt with many serious and sophisticated offences including those involving arms, 
like armed robberies. Indeed in what may be recognition of the capability and 
competence of civilian courts to deal with such offences, the Parliament of Uganda 
recently deemed it fit to confer exclusive jurisdiction of trying persons charged with 
the offence of terrorism, to the High Court – a civilian court.240  
 
In Attorney General v. Uganda Law Society,
241
 where the General Court Martial tried 
to assert that it had jurisdiction over the offence of terrorism, the Supreme Court of 
Uganda held that it did not have such jurisdiction because the Anti-Terrorism Act 
expressly confers jurisdiction  over the offence of terrorism in the High Court alone to 
the exclusion of  other courts. The Court therefore held that the General Court Martial 
was not a competent court for purposes of trying persons accused of committing the 
offence of terrorism. Quoting the words of three justices of the Constitutional Court 
that ―…there can be no fair trial within the meaning of Article 28 (1) of the 
Constitution where the court is not competent,‖242 Justice Mulenga who delivered the 
unanimous decision of the Supreme Court emphasised that the more accurate 
statement was that there can be no trial at all where the court is not competent. He 
stressed that ―a trial by an incompetent court is by that fact alone a nullity ab 
initio.‖243 
 
The issue of whether other alternative forms of special or high-security civilian courts 
are unable and inadequate to try the particular categories of civilians does not arise in 
Uganda‘s case because the country does not have such alternative special or high-
security civilian courts. But this issue suggests that according to the HRC, in case the 
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regular civilian courts are unable and inadequate to try particular categories of 
civilians, it is better to create special or alternative high-security civilian courts to try 
such civilians than subject them to the jurisdiction of military tribunals. In the United 
Kingdom for instance, government enacted legislation which provides for certain 
categories of civilians such as contractors or dependents of the members of the armed 
forces living abroad, to be tried by a special court called the Service Civilian Court, 
whose members do not include military personnel.
244
 
 
With respect to the issue whether the trial of civilians by military tribunals is 
unavoidable, it is clear from the submission in the foregoing paragraphs that it is not 
unavoidable. Finally, as a last prong to the test whether the trial of civilians by 
military tribunals conforms to international human rights law, it has to be 
demonstrated that the military tribunals are in position to ensure the full protection of 
the rights of the accused persons guaranteed by Article 14 of the ICCPR. Can this be 
said to be true in the case of Uganda‘s military tribunals? The answer is evidently in 
the negative. Already, it has been established that Uganda‘s military justice legal 
framework does not guarantee and ensure the right to a competent tribunal as required 
by Article 14 (1) of the ICCPR. Sections 4.4.2-4.4.5 will analytically establish that 
neither does Uganda‘s military justice legal framework (and therefore the military 
tribunals) guarantee and ensure the protection of the other rights of accused persons 
protected under Article 14 of the ICCPR.  
 
One of the important questions that arise from giving military courts jurisdiction over 
civilians is: If the major objective of military justice is to ensure discipline, morale 
and good order in the armed forces, why are military tribunals given power to try 
civilians? In United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, where an ex-serviceman in the 
United States Air Force was arrested and taken to Korea to stand trial before court 
martial on charges of murder and conspiracy to commit murder while he was still an 
airman, the Supreme Court of United States of America pointed out that it was 
―...impossible to think that discipline of the Army is going to be disrupted, its morale 
impaired, or its orderly processes disturbed, by giving ex-servicemen the benefits of a 
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civilian court when they are actually civilians.‖245 It stressed that it was not impressed 
by the fact that some other countries indulge in the practice of subjecting civilians 
who were once soldiers to trials by courts-martial instead of trials by civilian 
courts.
246
 It emphasised that free countries of the world restrict military tribunals to 
the narrowest jurisdiction deemed absolutely essential to maintaining discipline 
among troops in active service.
247
 
 
In the same case, the Supreme Court of United States of America also held that the 
constitutional power of Congress in Article I of the Constitution ―To make rules for 
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces‖ did not allow it to give 
military tribunals jurisdiction over civilians. In the words of Mr. Justice Black who 
delivered the judgement of Court: 
This Court has held that the Article I clause just quoted authorizes 
Congress to subject persons actually in the armed service to trial by court-
martial for military and naval offenses...It has never been intimated by this 
Court, however, that Article I military jurisdiction could be extended to 
civilian ex-soldiers who had severed all relationship with the military and 
its institutions. To allow this extension of military authority would require 
an extremely broad construction of the language used in the constitutional 
provision relied on. For, given its natural meaning, the power granted 
Congress ‗To make Rules‘ to regulate ‗the land and naval Forces‘ would 
seem to restrict court-martial jurisdiction to persons who are actually 
members or part of the armed forces. There is a compelling reason for 
construing the clause this way: any expansion of court-martial jurisdiction 
like that in the 1950 Act necessarily encroaches on the jurisdiction of 
federal courts set up under Article III of the Constitution, where persons 
on trial are surrounded with more constitutional safeguards than in 
military tribunals.
248
  
From the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of United States of America quoted 
above, the provisions of the UPDF Act giving military courts jurisdiction over 
civilians can further be challenged on the same reasoning. Article 210 of the 
Constitution of Uganda under which the UPDF Act 2005 was enacted, states in 
similar terms to Article I of the U.S. Constitution which was in issue in the above case 
that ―Parliament shall make laws regulating the Uganda Peoples‟ Defence Forces 
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and, in particular providing for – (a) the organs and structures of the Uganda Peoples‘ 
Defence Forces; (b) recruitment, appointment, promotion, discipline and removal of 
members of the Uganda Peoples‘ Defence Forces and ensuring that members of the 
Uganda Peoples‘ Defence Forces are recruited from every district of Uganda; (c) 
terms and conditions of service of members of the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces; 
and (d) the deployment of troops outside Uganda.‖249 It is submitted that there is 
nothing in Article 210 reproduced above, which empowers Parliament to give military 
tribunals jurisdiction over civilians. The UPDF Act provisions giving military 
tribunals jurisdiction over civilians are therefore not only in violation of the right to a 
competent tribunal but are also unconstitutional.  
The HRC has emphasised that the trial of civilians in military or special courts raises 
serious problems as far as the equitable, impartial and independent administration of 
justice is concerned.
250
 This is essentially because, as Rowe puts it, ―The trial of a 
civilian by a military court lends itself to the perception that the court is not 
independent of the executive arm of the government.‖251 It is important to recall in 
this regard, as was discussed in Chapter Two, that although not decisive, perceptions 
and appearances are very important factors in determining whether or not a tribunal is 
independent and impartial.  But beyond mere perceptions and appearances, the trial of 
civilians by military rather than civilian courts also raises issues of differential 
treatment contrary to the right to a fair trial requirement that all persons shall be equal 
before the courts and tribunals.
252
 In this regard, Moeckli has argued that the principle 
that all persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals requires that ―...all those 
accused of a crime are offered the same treatment by the criminal justice system. Any 
deviation from the uniformity of the judicial system is automatically suspect and can 
only be justified if the state demonstrates the existence of reasonable and objective 
grounds for trying particular categories of persons before extraordinary tribunals or 
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for applying special rules.‖253 It therefore follows, that even if one assumed that 
Uganda‘s military tribunals enjoy most of the guarantees of the right to a fair trial as 
provided for in international human rights law (which it doesn‘t), when compared to 
hearings before the regular civilian courts, one cannot deny the fact that the civilians 
tried by the country‘s military courts cannot be said to enjoy the same treatment. For 
instance, depending on whether a civilian is being tried in civil or military court, same 
offences may attract different penalties. In sum, by giving military courts jurisdiction 
over civilians, Uganda‘s military justice legal framework not only violates the right to 
a competent tribunal as guaranteed in international human rights law but also 
contravenes the Constitution. Regarding this particular aspect, Uganda‘s current 
military justice is, in fact, worse than Uganda‘s military justice during the colonial 
times. Uganda‘s military justice legal frameworks during the colonial times never 
conferred jurisdiction on military tribunals to try civilians.  
 
Finally, another aspect to fault Uganda‘s military justice system as far as compliance 
with the right to a competent tribunal is concerned relates to the issue of jurisdiction 
over military personnel accused of committing gross human rights violations. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, the HRC has stressed that military courts are not the most 
appropriate tribunals for the protection of the rights of citizens in the context where 
the military itself has violated such rights. It has on a number of occasions 
recommended to different countries to review the jurisdiction of their military 
tribunals and transfer their competence in cases concerning the violation of human 
rights by military personnel, to ordinary courts.
254
 Inconsistent with the right to a 
competent tribunal, Uganda‘s military justice legal framework confers wide 
jurisdiction to military tribunals over military personnel for all offences known in 
Uganda‘s criminal law including violation of human rights. Section 179 of the UPDF 
Act 2005 provides that any person subject to military law, who does or omits to do an 
act in Uganda or outside Uganda, which constitutes (or if it had taken place in 
Uganda) would constitute an offence under the Penal Code Act or any other 
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